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Accountability is a multi-dimensional concept. Most simply put, it involves
decision makers being held responsible for the decisions they take. This simple
definition raises many questions: who should be involved in the decision making
process, how should decisions be taken, and who should hold decision makers to
account? Other questions include: what degree of transparency should there be
regarding decisions taken, against what criteria should decision makers be judged,
and what mechanisms and processes are needed to facilitate holding decision
makers to account? The intent of this volume is to further inform the debate on
some of these issues in relation to the accountability of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to its various stakeholders.
The Executive Board
One of the central failings of the IMF's current governance structure is the lack of
effective participation by many of the developing countries, Sub-Saharan
African countries in particular, in the decision making processes of the Executive
Board. As Rustomjee reveals in Chapter 1, the skewed allocation of votes and
board seats in favour of the richest countries undermines consensus decision
making. Little opportunity is provided for the developing countries to put their
concerns on to the board's agenda or to get their views taken into account during
board discussions. The implication is that the priorities of the IMF do not
necessarily reflect those of the majority of the institution's clients, that is,
those members who borrow from the IMF, and that decisions taken may not be
optimal because they do not consider borrowers' needs or capacities. This lack
of understanding leads to a loss of ownership and instances of poor policy and
program design, and ultimately can lead to policy and program failure.
Furthermore, developing country Executive Directors (EDs) assume a
disproportionate share of the workload since they typically represent more
members who are engaged in IMF programs. Relatively speaking, developing
country EDs are less well resourced, have less institutional memory and face
greater intra-constituency political and coordination challenges, all of which
further limits their ability to engage optimally in the board.
Rustomjee's proposed solution is firstly to initiate a dialogue on the issue
of developing country representation, either by: 1) establishing a committee of the
Executive Board reporting to the governors; 2) establishing a committee of the
Board of Governors; or 3) carrying out an external review.
Secondly, he proposes several options for increasing the voting share of
all or a subset of developing countries, while maintaining an assured but not
excessive majority of the voting power for creditor countries. Options include:
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reallocating votes between developed and developing countries, increasing the
basic vote, and using purchasing power parity (PPP) as a means of calculating
gross domestic product (GDP) in the quota formula.
Thirdly, Rustomjee calls for the creation of one or two additional seats for
Sub-Saharan African countries and possibly an additional Asian seat, either by
increasing the size of the board, or reducing the number of seats held by European
countries.
Finally, he proposes to increase the length of terms for elected EDs to be
between three and five years to address the challenge of institutional memory
constraints, and to increase the number of staff in their offices to account for the
relative intensity of their workload.
The Role of National Parliaments
Eggers, Florini, and Woods find in Chapter 2 that parliaments are paying more
attention to the activities of the IMF through oversight mechanisms and by
influencing policy decisions. In some developing countries, parliaments have
rejected IMF reform proposals, leading the IMF to put much more effort into
consulting and persuading program country parliaments. Some developing
country parliaments are also looking to finds ways to systematically become
proactive, rather than merely reacting to IMF-Executive Branch agreements post
hoc.
Parliamentary engagement with the IMF will remain limited unless both
the IMF and national governments at least permit, if not facilitate or require,
parliaments to get involved. Although parliaments ought to be among the key
stakeholders included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy process, the IMF's
Articles of Agreement limit its negotiating remit to the finance ministry and central
bank governors. There is an obvious role for the IMF to play in informing,
explaining and communicating information about economic policy to parliaments.
However, currently there is much scepticism among parliamentarians about the
impartiality of the Fund's efforts in this regard.
The IMF's effort to improve transparency is a vital step towards
democratic accountability and needs to be further encouraged. If parliaments are
effectively to hold the IMF to account, it is vital that they know whether it is the
board or the management and staff they should be holding to account for a
particular decision or policy. This demands greater transparency and duty to
disclose at the board level. One option is to require a formal vote on all issues and
to keep and publish the voting record.
Enhancing Learning and Policy Accountability
In Chapter 3, Wood argues that since individual IMF staff or board members
cannot be held accountable for policy outcomes, it is not legitimate for the IMF to
impose policy choices on government institutions through conditionality.
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Governments should be responsible for policy choices, have ownership of them,
and therefore be accountable to their electorates for their outcomes. However, the
IMF continues to have an important advisory role to play since developing
countries do need a good and reliable source of macroeconomic advice.
The quality of the IMF's advice is not always as high as it should be since
it has neglected to develop effective monitoring and evaluation systems to facilitate
evidence-based policy making. As a result there is an absence of a learning culture
in the IMF which leads to instances of poor policy advice.
Wood advocates the introduction of a participatory systematic learning
process based on prior assessment of anticipated policy outcomes and risks,
monitoring of intermediate outcomes during implementation, and evaluation of
actual - in relation to anticipated - outcomes on completion. Such a system needs
to be transparent and complemented with performance-related staff incentives.
Transparency could be improved by making public the IMF's database on the
monitoring of arrangements (MONA) and producing an annual report on program
performance.
Staff incentives should be reoriented to discourage rapid department
switching, and to reward staff for developing country-based knowledge and for
improvements in policy outcome forecasting. The Policy Development and Review
department's screening of program content should be reoriented so as not to
discourage policy innovation. When hiring staff, greater priority should be given to
candidates with experience in policy application.
Operational Policies and Procedures, and an Ombudsman
Bradlow, in Chapter 4, argues that the number and range of actors with which
the IMF is engaged has grown beyond the point where its operating
practices can be kept informal and known only by a relatively small number of
experts. Consequently, it needs to develop a set of operational policies and
procedures to guide its interactions with a broader range of stakeholders and to
guide its decision making. Indeed, the IMF is unusual in that it has not already
done so.
The benefits include: providing effective guidance for staff when
conducting their work; predictability in the conduct of IMF operations;
transparency in IMF decision making and action; promotion of accountability; and
facilitated learning. The costs include: increased bureaucratisation; loss of
flexibility; and possible disincentives to innovation. However, on balance, the
benefits are greater. Such procedures will allow outside stakeholders to engage
more effectively with the IMF, public understanding of the IMF's operations will
be improved, they will promote accountability, and internal governance will be
improved.
In order for operational policies and procedures to be effective, they
need to be supported by a mechanism capable of monitoring and promoting
compliance with them. Bradlow concludes that the mechanism best suited
to the IMF is an independent ombudsman with the authority to investigate
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complaints from directly affected people and groups about staff and management
non-compliance with the policies and procedures.
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Introduction
Angela Wood
The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) growing influence and role in
developing countries has generated demands for greater accountability. Moreover,
as a larger number of people have become affected by its policy advice, demands
have grown for the IMF to consult with and be more accountable to a wider range
of stakeholders, both inside and outside governments.
Accountability means that decisions taken should be predictable,
equitable, based on sound judgement, follow clear and enforceable procedures, and
have clear mechanisms for reporting. Those responsible for taking decisions should
be answerable for them to clearly defined authorities. The problem for the IMF is
that although its role and policy reach, the potential impact of its policies, and its
client base has changed considerably since it was founded, the mechanisms by
which decisions are taken and who takes them have not. In addition there is
considerable murkiness as to who should be responsible for these decisions and to
whom. As a result, the IMF's own accountability does not reach the standards of
transparency and good governance that it demands of its members.
The IMF's transformation has been rapid since the 1970s when the
collapse of the Gold Standard fixed exchange rate system gave way to flexible
exchange rates and ended the IMF's original purpose of maintaining exchange rate
alignment. By the mid 1980s the IMF had turned its attention to addressing the
Latin American debt problems through structural adjustment. In the early 1990s it
was thrust into the role of helping to develop market-based economies in the
countries of the Former Soviet Union, and by the end of the decade it was dealing
with financial sector reform and systemic financial crises. Today, in the poorest
countries, it is engaged in establishing the macroeconomic conditions for poverty
reduction. The changing role of the institution has led it deeper into more areas of
domestic policy making. It has increasingly focused on restructuring borrowing
countries' economic systems and latterly public institutions as well.
As the IMF's role has changed, so too has its client base. The membership
has increased from the original 45 to 184 countries today. This reflects the change
in the political landscape as developing countries have achieved independence
from former colonial rulers and the Soviet Union has been dismantled. These new
clients are more economically diverse and have a wider range of needs and
priorities than the original membership.
While previously the IMF operated as a credit union, with all members
likely to borrow from it from time to time, today the IMF has structural creditors
and structural debtors. The creditors, the developed countries, are highly unlikely
to actually borrow from the IMF, and prefer to borrow directly from private
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markets free from the policy interference of the IMF. The debtors, the developing
countries, in some cases borrow almost continuously from the IMF and must
submit to its policy demands. Today, the IMF's program work is wholly conducted
in the developing and emerging market countries.
Despite these significant changes, the systems by which the IMF is
governed and decisions taken have not evolved and continue to be based on
original divisions of power. Many of the poorest countries, which are most
regularly in discussion with the IMF about debt relief and structural adjustment
programs, are barely represented in the IMF's decision making structures - the
Executive Board and the International Monetary and Finance Committee. A larger
proportion of board seats are held by developed countries than developing
countries. The distribution of votes, which is allocated according to a country's
strength in the world economy, is also heavily skewed in favour of the richest
countries.
This means that the developed countries can dominate board decision
making and it is almost impossible for developing countries to put their priorities
on to the IMF's agenda, which the principal shareholders continue to set. As a
consequence, a yawning gap has developed between the institution's stakeholders
and shareholders, and those who are affected by decisions and those who should be
accountable for them. The problem is that the developed country decision makers
are largely unaffected by the decisions they take. This not only undermines the
legitimacy of the decisions taken, it potentially affects their quality. The
implication is that because the developing countries' views are not taken into
consideration, the board's decisions are sometimes less than optimal.
Similarly, a lack of engagement between the IMF staff and a broad range
of national stakeholders has the potential to negatively affect the quality of the
IMF's advice to governments. Despite the depth of the IMF's influence in
domestic policy making, the IMF's engagement with national stakeholders still
remains largely confined to the finance minister, central bank governor and
sometimes the head of government. This lack of participation and open discussion
undermines transparency. Furthermore, finance ministers are increasingly entering
into agreements with the IMF about policy choices beyond the finance ministry's
remit and outside the country's political process. This means that they cannot
effectively be held accountable at the national level. Since the IMF holds the purse
strings and access to IMF resources is often vital, the tendency has been for the
finance ministry to listen and be accountable to the IMF rather than to its fellow
ministers and citizens.
Within the IMF, identifying who should be held to account, for what and
by whom, is not always immediately clear. There are several layers of decision
making and many voices in the decision making process. When deciding on
program content and policy advice, the staff's technical judgements may be mixed
with the board's political concerns. The IMF's institutional priorities and
responsibilities are decided by a small group of governors, overseen by the
Executive Board, and carried out by the staff.
The IMF's hierarchy is clear: IMF staff and management are accountable
to the Managing Director, who is appointed by and accountable to the Executive
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Board, which in turn is appointed by and accountable to the Board of Governors,
which is appointed by and is ultimately accountable to the member states. But there
are problems at every level, which impedes the effectiveness of oversight.
Firstly, the staff and management have far superior information than the
Executive Board, which is supposed to oversee the day-to-day management of the
IMF. Therefore, the staff has relative autonomy, except perhaps in relation to the
largest shareholders. There is a tendency for the board to simply 'rubber stamp'
programs presented to them by the management. Moreover, since the distribution
of board votes is heavily skewed in favour of a handful of creditor countries, staff
and management accountability tends to be biased towards the preferences of these
countries. The fact that the Managing Director is chosen by the European members
and the Deputy Managing Director by the US government is also likely to
reinforce this tendency.
Secondly, at the board level most countries are grouped into
constituencies. In some constituencies the appointment of the Executive Director
(ED), who makes decisions on the constituency's behalf at the board, is rotated
amongst the membership and in others the country with the largest number of votes
appoints the ED. Unless a government actually has the chair and gets to appoint its
own ED, in most cases it has relatively little influence over the positions taken by
the ED and by and large it has little means to hold the ED and therefore the staff
and management to account.
Thirdly, while the buck should finally come to rest with the Board of
Governors, which is comprised mostly of finance ministers and in some cases
central bank governors, it has little ability to effectively oversee the institution's
activities. The governors' engagement in the IMF is only partial. They meet only
once a year, and except for those who are elected to the International Monetary and
Finance Committee (membership of the committee is based on the same
constituency system as the Executive Board), which meets only twice a year, their
role is largely cosmetic.
Fourthly, there is the question of who holds the finance minister or central
bank governor to account and how accountability at this level can be metered out.
Ideally, this should be the responsibility of parliaments. At present,
parliamentarians, especially in developing countries, typically have little
knowledge of the IMF and little access to information about the governor and ED's
engagement in it. There is an absence of formal, recorded voting procedures and
vital information about ED's positions regarding board decisions is not made
public. Moreover, in the case of many of the poorest countries, their ED has so
little influence in the decision making process that it becomes almost meaningless
to try to hold him/her to account. Yet parliamentarians in developing countries
have no means of holding other board members or governors to account. Nor can
IMF staff or management be held accountable at the national level since as
members of an international institution they have legal immunity and cannot be
held accountable even by a national court of law. Given the usually indirect links
to the IMF's decision making structures, there may be few incentives for members
of parliament to involve themselves in overseeing the IMF's activities.
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This accountability void may be filled in part by non-governmental
organisations, which often seek accountability directly from the IMF leaving aside
the parliamentary process, but there are no formal mechanisms for doing so.
Although individual staff and EDs have made significant effort to engage more
with civil society, this engagement is typically ad hoc and expectations are unclear.
The result is that, often, civil society organisations remain unsatisfied with the
outcome of interactions. Moreover, for civil society in the developing countries a
lack of resources, a lack of information, or an inability to organise can limit their
capacity to exercise informal oversight, although capacity is improving. Ultimately
this means that there is no requirement for IMF staff or management to be directly
accountable to citizens in program countries, nor is there much likelihood that the
governor or ED will be held accountable either.
While the crux of the accountability problem lies in the inadequate
representation of members on the Executive Board, particularly those governments
who borrow from the IMF, and the distance of the board from those who are
affected by IMF policies, there is also a lack of mechanisms through which
oversight and accountability takes place.
Internally, review and accountability is confined to the Office of Internal
Audit and Inspection (OIA) and the Policy Development and Review department
(PDR). The OIA's remit is confined to reviewing the IMF's organisational and
operational effectiveness and auditing the Fund's accounts. Reports are made to the
board, but are not published. PDR is responsible for ensuring consistency between
programs and countries' equitable treatment, although no formal procedures exist.
All policy and operational documents, program related documents, mission briefs
and reports, and surveillance reports pass through PDR for clearance before they
are submitted for approval by the Managing Director, and finally by the board.
PDR also conducts sporadic evaluations of policies and program outcomes in
relation to objectives, but these are not linked to any mechanism of accountability
and are not necessarily made public. There is potentially a moral hazard problem in
that PDR staff both establishes policies and programs and reviews them without
any external input into the process. There is no systematic monitoring or reporting
of program outcomes, unlike at the World Bank where all completed projects are
reviewed by its Operations Evaluation Department and an annual report is
published. Neither is staff performance monitored nor are staff incentives linked to
performance in relation to core IMF objectives.
Although there is much missing in terms of a coherent system of
accountability, the IMF has made efforts in recent years, some considerable, to
address some of its critics' concerns. Since 1999, the IMF has produced a few new
operational policies and guidelines for staff. Most notable perhaps are those that
were the culmination of the conditionality streamlining process embarked upon in
2001. The process called for greater transparency and clarity as to what constitutes
conditionality but also called for a scaling back of the number of conditions and the
areas to which conditionality would be applied. However, operational policies and
guidelines remain few, covering only a small area of the staff's work. Apart from
reports to the board prepared by the staff there is as yet no formal mechanism to
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regularly monitor compliance or allow external stakeholders to raise complaints
where non-compliance is suspected.
In 2001 the IMF established the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO),
which undertakes ad hoc evaluations and reports directly to the Executive Board.
Its reports, which are made public, have proved useful for prompting reflection and
operational change in the IMF, although it does not operate explicitly as an
accountability mechanism (preferring to focus on learning) and it is not a vehicle
through which external stakeholders can participate or pursue complaints.
Since 1999 there has been a marked increase in transparency, which
makes accountability to external stakeholders more effective, as well as making it
clearer what the IMF can be held accountable for. The IMF has revised its policies
on making program and surveillance documents, staff reports, and its archives
public. There is now a much stronger presumption of publication although it is still
not yet mandatory. Nor are internal reviews automatically made public. More
importantly, although the introduction of Chairman's Summaries and Public
Information Notices summarising board discussions on country programs,
surveillance reports, and broad policy issues is welcome, the lack of transparency
surrounding board decision making and the positions taken by individual board
members continues to impede accountability to member states and citizens.
Finally, in 1999 the IMF established a committee to review its quota
formula, which determines how much each country must pay into the IMF and
therefore each country's allocation of votes. In 2000 the IMF established a joint
committee with the World Bank to examine the processes by which the IMF
Managing Director and World Bank President are selected. Revealingly, both of
these processes were conducted under a very limited remit and to no substantive
effect.
Although these steps towards improved transparency, evaluation and
ownership are welcome, they are only the first towards a coherent system of
accountability. By themselves they do not create accountability, but they offer a
useful foundation from which to build better structures and processes. This
discussion makes clear that there are many aspects of IMF accountability that need
to be addressed and the complex relations require clarification and simplification.
New systems need to be introduced and old governance structures need to be
modified. Some of the apparently most pressing issues, such as voting and board
reform, may be the most difficult to address since they will require the willing
surrender of power. This report does not try to address all of the issues raised here.
Rather, a pragmatic approach is taken to look at several key issues that could be
practically implemented within current constraints.
One of the most urgent issues is how to achieve better representation of
developing countries on the Executive Board. The inability of developing country
EDs to adequately represent the views of their constituency members at the board
is explored in Chapter 1. Cyrus Rustomjee shows how a lack of voting power
prohibits developing country governments from putting forward their opinions to
the board. The result is weaker, and sometimes inappropriate, board decisions
which can hamper progress in developing countries. At best developing country
governments can be reactive to the agendas of the developed countries but they
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have almost no opportunity to propose their own agenda. The inability of
developing country EDs to be proactive is further undermined by the burden of
work they shoulder in terms of representing their clients, an issue starkly
demonstrated by the case of the two Sub-Saharan African EDs. Rustomjee
considers several options for increasing developing countries' capacity to engage
more fully and effectively in board discussions.
There is very clearly an extremely weak link between most member
governments, the Executive Board and the IMF management and staff. Andrew
Eggers, Ann Florini and Ngaire Woods explore in Chapter 2 what options and
limitations there are for parliamentarians to become more involved in oversight of
the Executive Board as the legitimate interlocutor between civil society and
government.
In Chapter 3, Angela Wood argues that the demand for greater
accountability arises from the perceived failure of the IMF to learn from its policy
shortcomings and to take account of the risks to full policy implementation. Wood
explores the limitations for holding the IMF staff directly to account for the
outcomes of its policy advice. She suggests that it would be more productive to
focus less on apportioning blame and to pay more attention to adopting
mechanisms to improve policy advice and enhance staff learning. Wood argues
that accountability can be effectively demonstrated by putting lessons learned into
practice. Wood outlines the core components and process of a systematic learning
mechanism and argues that for such a process to be useful, it needs to be
complemented with appropriate incentive structures and transparency mechanisms.
Staff and management are not held directly accountable for the outcomes
of their policy advice. Daniel Bradlow makes the case in Chapter 4 for formal
operational policies and procedures. With these, affected peoples can hold the IMF
staff to account for how they conduct their work and go about making decisions. A
mechanism to investigate claims of non-compliance is necessary. Bradlow
compares the current relative lack of operational policies and procedures, and
mechanisms for enforcing them at the IMF with the situation in the multilateral
development banks. He evaluates the feasibility of establishing a comprehensive
set of operational policies and procedures, and considers the case for establishing a
mechanism for holding the staff and management accountable for compliance with
them. Finally, he identifies the key features of a compliance mechanism.
Chapter 1
Improving Southern Voice on the IMF
Board: Quo Vadis Shareholders?
Cyrus Rustomjee1
Introduction
There is a growing and persuasive body of literature to suggest that the voice of
developing countries in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be
significantly improved. Several of these studies focus on the improvements which
can be made to the internal functioning of the institution, in ways that favour the
interests of developing countries.2 Others focus more directly on the options for
improving developing countries' representation, or voice, in the IMF Executive
Board itself.3 Yet however clear the argument, the obstacles to achieving these
objectives are very significant indeed. Meaningful changes can only be made with
the consent of the industrial countries, which hold a majority of the voting power
in the IMF Executive Board and of course in the IMF Board of Governors. And
these members currently see little benefit in changing the status quo. This, in turn,
presents an additional challenge: to identify processes which can unlock the current
impasse between developing and industrial countries - largely represented by
debtors and creditors respectively, on the issue of improved developing country
influence in the decision making processes of the IMF Executive Board.
This chapter focuses on the challenge of improving the voice of
developing countries on the IMF board, given their inadequate representation. The
presumption is that creditors in the IMF Executive Board should, particularly in
regard to financing decisions, maintain an assured majority of the voting power. It
examines some of the recent literature on developing country representation in the
1 The author would wish to thank the Ford Foundation for the grant which made it possible
for the paper to be produced; and the University of Natal, South Africa, where the author is
an Honorary Research Fellow, for facilities provided.
2 See for example Evans and Finnemore (2001), who provide a detailed treatment of
potential organisational reforms which could significantly strengthen the voice of
developing countries in the IMF. These proposals briefly touch on options to increase the
voice of developing countries in the IMF Executive Board itself, but also focus on other
options, including rebalancing resources and obligations in area departments; decentralising
staffing; increasing mid-career hiring to attract staff with direct experience in developing
countries; and sub-contracting research to developing country researchers.
3 See for example Buira (2002); Bradlow (2001); and Mohammed (2002).
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board and seeks to identify some options for improving such representation. This
literature points broadly to the presence and the deepening of two parallel
challenges which currently confront the collective membership of the institution.
The first challenge is a decline in the efficiency of conduct of board work,
focusing on the long-term disadvantages of its imbalanced decision making
arrangements. The argument is that inefficient representation arrangements are
leading to less than optimal decision making based on a failure to adequately
understand the needs of the majority of the institution's clients. The inadequate
understanding leads to instances of poor policy and program design; and ultimately
in some instances to policy and program failure. The costs of this challenge are
significant and direct, both to the institution as a whole and to the members
concerned.
The second challenge is that the representation arrangements for
developing countries in the IMF Executive Board have now become so unbalanced
that there is a substantive claim that the overall representation process is no longer
democratic and does not promote the principles of consensus, cooperation,
collaboration and multilateralism upon which the IMF was founded.
Change is solely the responsibility of the shareholders of the IMF. If there
are to be changes that improve the developing country representation, these cannot
come from IMF management and staff, but will need to occur through decisions
taken by the shareholders of the institution, in practice through decisions of the
Board of Governors. Prima facie, this appears to make the task of addressing these
challenges all the more complex.
The recent conclusion of the Twelfth Quota Review process resulted in a
decision not to increase quotas and hence passed up an opportunity to make
corrections in the quota arrangements - and therefore relative voting power in the
board. This decision highlights the considerable inertia in the quota and voting
process and the reluctance of the largest shareholders to make changes to quota and
voting arrangements.4 But as Buira and other commentators note, there are now
powerful economic and political reasons for changes in representation arrangements
which favour developing countries.5 These arguments are growing and it would be
opportune to find mechanisms for open and detailed discussion of the various options
that could be considered in any rearrangement of board representation. Doing so will
contribute to strengthening governance, addressing the concerns of a large segment
of the IMF's membership, and could reveal some options which limit the adverse
economic and political impacts perceived by some creditors.
The second part of this chapter outlines the scope of the challenge
confronting developing countries, in view of the current system of weighted
voting, coupled with the current distribution of board seats among the membership.
The third part sets out a case for improving the representation of developing
countries in the board. Developing country interests are to a large extent
4 Refer to IMF (2003): Press Release No. 03/02: IMF board Recommends to Governors
Conclusion of Quota Review, IMF, Washington DC.
5 See Buira (2002).
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homogeneous and their claims for strengthened representation are largely based on
a common set of arguments. This section outlines three key arguments for an early
improvement in the status of developing countries in the board. It also presents
some of the specific arguments raised by sub-groups among developing countries.
The third part examines some of the arguments why developing countries are
currently in so unfavourable a position, and concludes with some potential
considerations that could point to a way forward.
The fourth part of the chapter illustrates the general claim for stronger
developing country representation by focusing on the representation arrangements
for one large section of the IMF's membership, Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA)
- one quarter of the IMF's member countries - the most significantly affected by the
imbalanced representation arrangements in the Executive Board. The fifth part
suggests a range of options and proposals for change in representation arrangements
that can begin to address the twin challenges of strengthening efficiency and
strengthening of democratic process. Part six concludes.
Voting Share and Board Presence - the Status Quo
The magnitude of the challenge confronting developing countries in seeking to
improve their status in the IMF Executive Board is formidable. There are two basic
benchmarks for assessing the legitimacy of developing countries' claims for a
stronger voice relative to their power in the board. Firstly, voting share; and
secondly the share of board seats. In combination, they present an accurate
reflection of the influence of developing countries in the Executive Board.
Determining Relative Voting Share - Two Approaches
One approach assigns the voting shares of each individual member to a specific
category (for example emerging market, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC),
transitional and other countries) and aggregates the voting shares in each category.
The second approach examines voting share on a constituency basis, based on the
current distribution of Executive Board seats. Each approach has advantages and
disadvantages. The category-based approach provides an accurate reflection of the
precise voting share of categories such as emerging markets, or of developing
countries as a whole. However, it does not take account of the fact that Executive
Directors are not permitted to split their votes and to cast separate votes for each of
the members they represent. Instead, they are required to cast a single block vote
for all of their members. The second approach, which focuses on the constituencies
as a whole, recognises the reality of board voting practice, but masks the fact that
some constituencies, which are headed by creditor members, may also represent
debtor countries.
A comprehensive example of the former approach is provided in Evans
and Finnemore (2001). This approach reveals that developing countries,
comprising the emerging market economies, HIPC and Non-HIPC Poverty
10 Accountability of the International Monetary Fund
Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) countries, India, China and a number of other
developing countries, hold approximately 30.3 per cent of the voting share in the
Executive Board. A further 8.2 per cent is held by the transitional and other
countries, including, in Evans and Finnemore's methodology, the Russian
Federation. By contrast, the G-7, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden hold a
majority of 51.5 per cent. When combined with all other OECD countries, the
creditor members of the institution hold a majority of 61.45 per cent of the total
vote.
A second approach to assessing relative voting strength is to examine
voting based on the current constituencies in the board. The collective voting
strength of the Executive Directors from developing countries, together with the
number of developing country Executive Directors is illustrated in Table 1.1. The
table highlights the fact that, based on the current configuration of the Executive
Board, there are eleven Executive Directors whose constituencies are headed by
developing country members, almost all of whom are debtors. Ten of the available
24 board seats are occupied by developing countries and collectively these
members hold 26.2 per cent of the voting share. Note that the number of
developing country board seats rises to eleven seats when the constituency
currently headed by Spain is chaired by Mexico or Venezuela.6
On the above analysis of voting power, if joined by the Russian
Federation, a single country constituency which has been an important debtor
member in recent years, the developing country group holds a voting share of just
under 29 per cent. This aggregate falls considerably short of a simple majority of
the voting power, which is the minimum required for any decision of the Executive
Board. For developing countries to be able to carry a decision in their favour, they
must build alliances with creditor members.
Table 1.1 IMF Executive Board: voting share and distribution of board seats
Country/Constituency



















6 Each constituency has its internal rules, among its members, for board representation. In
the case of the seat currently chaired by Spain, a rotation arrangement is in place which
enables Mexico, Spain and Venezuela to rotate the constituency chair.
















































Source: IMF Voting Shares - IMF Website: www.imf.org.
The Influence of Mixed Constituencies
In addition to the ten constituencies almost entirely comprised of developing
country debtors, there are also currently eight mixed constituencies, containing
both creditor and debtor members. These comprise the constituencies currently
headed by Italy, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Iceland, Spain, Australia and
Switzerland. Of these, all of the above-cited countries, except Iceland and Spain,
permanently head their constituencies, with Iceland rotating its constituency chair
with a small group of Nordic members and Spain rotating its constituency chair
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with Venezuela and Mexico. For these mixed constituencies, one proxy to assess
the likely degree to which a particular constituency would support a developing
country position in the process of decision making is the relative share of voting
power among debtors and creditors within each mixed constituency.7 Using this
approach, the following table illustrates the creditor share of the total voting power
in each of these constituencies.
Table 1.2 Creditor/debtor voting share in mixed constituencies



















Source: Data From IMF Voting Shares, IMF Website: www.imf.org, May 2003.
The table illustrates that in seven of the eight mixed creditor/debtor constituencies,
the majority of voting power resides with creditors. In the cases of the
constituencies chaired by Italy, Canada, and Iceland, creditors are in the
overwhelming majority by voting power. This means that even if all five remaining
mixed constituencies were to favour a position supported by developing countries,
and even if the Russian Federation opted to join this decision, these members
would not be able to muster a simple majority of voting power.
Among the remaining five mixed constituencies, there is varying scope
for building alliances with developing countries. Clearly, of all the mixed
constituencies, the constituency currently chaired by Spain is considered most
likely to cast its vote in favour of developing countries. With its cooperation, the
potential voting power of developing countries as a whole increases to 33.2 per
cent. If Australia, which represents a series of Asia-Pacific countries, were to also
cast its vote in favour of developing countries, the potential voting power of
developing countries as a whole would increase to 36.6 per cent.8 This again
7 This is a useful general proxy, although it should be noted that on many occasions,
particularly in regard to country matters, each of the eight mixed constituencies have at
times taken positions favoring developing countries.
8 In practice, the extent of such cooperation with developing countries, by the mixed
constituencies containing both debtor and creditor members, hinges on the nature of the
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remains well short of a simple majority of the voting power. For all these reasons,
it seems clear that on an issue on which creditors and debtors are significantly
divided, it is likely, based on the above analysis, that seven of the eight mixed
constituencies would vote in favour of creditor interests.
Conclusion: Relative Voting Share
The tables above indicate that developing countries have a minority of seats in the
IMF board and hold approximately 29 per cent of the voting share. Chairs
represented by creditors currently enjoy approximately 71 per cent of the voting
share. There are eight mixed constituencies, with varying degrees of
creditor/debtor mix. If some of these mixed constituencies opt to vote in favour of
developing country interests, the share of the vote in favour of developing country
positions rises accordingly. There are indeed numerous examples of individual
mixed constituency members 'breaking rank' and voting in favour of a debtor
position in the board. However, the large bulk of these occur in regard to the
details of country-specific programmes and not in respect of policy issues; and
almost never by means of a collective shift in vote by all mixed constituencies.
With creditor interests dominant in three of the eight mixed constituencies, there is
no realistic prospect of developing countries assembling an alliance of board
members in favour of an explicitly debtor position.
The aggregates in Table 1.1 also reveal a further challenge for developing
countries: whereas the aggregate voting share of creditor members is 61.45 per
cent (per the methodology used by Evans and Finnemore, 2001), the voting share
which creditor members can muster, because of the practice of voting as an entire
constituency, can rise to 66.7 per cent.9 This is in excess of the aggregate voting
share of creditor members.
Additional Challenges for Developing Countries
Aside from the consequences of the current delineation of constituencies in the
IMF Executive Board for relative voting power, there are other additional
consequences of the current delineation which favour creditor members. The first
of these is that developing country Executive Directors tend to assume a
disproportionately large share of the workload associated with the representation
function in the board; not only do they represent on average several more members
than most creditor members, but they represent members with financing
programmes with the IMF, which many of the creditor members do not. The
contrast is most clearly illustrated in comparing the respective responsibilities of
the single-country creditor constituencies, particularly five of the G-7: the USA,
policy or financing program under discussion. This occurs particularly in the case of country
programs.
9 This excludes the votes cast by the Spanish Executive Director. If the latter constituency
were to cast its vote in favour of a creditor position, the share of voting power which
creditors could muster increases to 71 per cent.
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Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. All of these countries are single
country constituencies with some large developing country constituencies, which
represent over twenty members, a large proportion of which have IMF-funded
programmes.
The challenge of a disproportionate workload is compounded by two
further factors. Firstly, the large industrial members are better resourced and
generally better informed. This decisively influences the representation function.
Developing country members, because of their broader country representation
responsibilities, are obliged to spread resources more thinly. They do not enjoy the
extensive institutional support provided by their constituency member countries;
and as they represent several members, they are obliged to address coordination
and intra-constituency political challenges which the single country creditor
constituencies do not.
The second factor is that the mechanism which has sought to address
these different challenges among the membership - the process of staffing
Executive Directors' offices - has tended not to keep pace with the expansion of
the IMF's role in developing countries. Staffing arrangements do offer some
compensation, by linking the number of staff in constituency offices with the
number of countries represented. However this approach should be bolstered for
three reasons:
• Firstly, staff arrangements take no account of the intensity of programme
relationships, for example whether a member has a financing programme
or not; whether the member's programme is in difficulty; whether
particular relations attach, for example the fact that a member may be a
large emerging market economy either in or about to enter into a crisis, or
the fact that a member may, in addition to having a PRGF arrangement,
also be an HIPC-eligible member.
• Secondly, staffing arrangements have also tended not to take account of
the significant diseconomies of scale which arise with constituency
representation in the case of large multi-country constituencies,
particularly those with large numbers of IMF-supported programmes.
• Thirdly, the expansion of the IMF's work in developing countries in
recent decades has significantly outstripped the staffing resources
provided to the constituency offices.
A further challenge for developing country Executive Directors focuses
on the term of office. This has tended to favour, albeit inadvertently, the creditor
members and particularly the appointed Executive Directors. The multi-country
nature of constituency representation has meant that in some instances, developing
country Executive Directors have tended to remain for shorter periods in the
Executive Board, being obliged to yield the chair to other members of the
constituency. In part this has been attributable to internal rules within
constituencies; and in part this has been attributable to the fact that Executive
Directors' elections take place every two years. A lengthening of the terms of
service of Executive Directors, for example by holding elections every three or
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four years, would tend to favour the elective constituencies, by strengthening
institutional memory in these constituencies and enabling developing country
Executive Directors to have a strengthened influence on decision making, by
enabling these individuals to benefit from greater familiarity with board policies
and procedures because of their longer terms of service.
Arguments for Improving Developing Country Voice
Common Concerns of All Developing Countries
There are three equally forceful sets of arguments. Firstly, the need for
strengthened voting share and board presence due to the increased level of
involvement of the IMF in developing countries in recent decades.10 Indeed, the
claims of developing countries for strengthened representation have grown in
recent years, in tandem with the growing influence in the global economy of the
large emerging market economies and the transition economies and with the IMF's
significantly increased role in low-income countries. Secondly, the need to restore
what has become a significant departure from the principle of effective consensus-
based decision making and a drift toward simple majority decision making. And
thirdly, decision making in respect of the interests of developing countries has
tended to become unnecessarily poor and unbalanced.
(i) Increased level of involvement of the IMF in developing countries
The IMF's work in developing countries has expanded significantly in each of the
last three decades, to the extent that developing countries now account for by far
the largest client base of the institution. Developing countries are the focus of the
significant majority of the IMF's policies, the entirety of the institution's financing,
almost all of its technical assistance and a large part of IMF surveillance activity.
The quantum of resources now provided by the IMF to its members has
significantly increased in recent years."
10 Note that it has been nearly three decades since IMF financial resources were used by a
large industrial country.
11 Successive IMF Annual Reports since 1995 reveal that the increase has taken place in
respect of the IMF's regular resources, as well as the PRGF. The IMF Annual Report for
2002, for example, notes that in 2001, augmentations of existing arrangements and new
arrangements contributed to a sharp rise in new IMF commitments in the IMF's Financial
Year 2002, p. 57. The same report also notes that the IMF committed new PRGF loan
resources of US$2.7 billion and that a further commitment of US$2 billion could be reached
in 2002, particularly reflecting some large new arrangements, p. 46. The size of individual
financing packages has also significantly increased in recent years, both for the regular use
of Fund resources as well as for the PRGF, pp. 46-47.
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(ii) Need to improve cooperation, collaboration and consensus decision making
A further set of arguments for improved relative voting share and a stronger board
presence focuses on the claim of developing countries that there has been a steady
decline in the application of key principles which have been used in the past for the
conduct of work in the IMF board. Since its inception, the board has generally
sought to conduct its work in a cooperative, collaborative manner both among the
diverse membership and of course among the Executive Directors themselves.12
In this context, it is often said that the board seeks to arrive at decisions
based on a broad consensus of the membership. This is certainly the intent of all
Executive Directors, who recognise the benefits not only of a congenial and
collegial approach to the day-to-day conduct of board work, but who also
recognise the value of decision making based on the broadest support among the
membership. However, in the context of the claim of developing countries that
their voice and representation in the IMF Executive Board warrants strengthening,
it is important to understand how the effort to build consensus is achieved in
practice.
There is no precise definition of consensus. Optimally, consensus
comprises a unanimous decision by all Executive Directors. Many board decisions
are indeed taken on this basis. However, in instances where there are important
differences of view among the membership, for example between debtor and
creditor interests, some departure from a unanimous decision can and often does
occur. How then is this latter form of consensus arrived at? As Van Hourven notes,
Rule C-10 of the IMF's Rules and Regulations prescribes that the Chair shall
'ordinarily determine the sense of the meeting, in lieu of a formal vote', with the
'sense of the meeting' representing the position supported by Executive Directors
who would have sufficient votes to carry the question if a vote were taken. On this
basis, the Chair will seek to obtain the broadest spectrum of support, in terms of
numbers of Executive Directors and voting share, provided that if put to a vote,
there would be more than 50 per cent of the total voting share in favour of the
decision. On this basis, consensus could broadly be said to have been achieved
when a reasonable majority of the board members, with a reasonable majority of
the voting share, agree to a particular decision. It is clear therefore that a consensus
would not be considered to have been reached if there were a clear majority of
Executive Directors in favour of a particular decision, but the combined voting
power of these members was less than half of the total voting power of the board.
On this basis, a consensus which on balance favours the interests of
developing countries is very difficult indeed to achieve in the IMF Executive
Board.13 Alliances need to be made with a number of additional Directors from
outside the developing country group. To attain even a simple majority of the
12 See Van Houtven (2002) for an extensive treatment of the efforts which are made to
achieve this outcome.
13 Note that consensus does not mean favouring no group at all, but rather finding a
formulation on a particular issue or a particular decision which takes on board the broadest
possible spectrum of interests among the members. The outcome of such a process could be
consensus-based, yet favour a particular segment or set of interests among the membership.
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voting power, the ten Executive Directors representing developing countries would
then need to assemble, aside from additional Directors in support of their position,
and aside from the combined votes of all eleven Executive Directors representing
developing countries, at least a further 20 per cent of the voting power, drawn from
members not representing developing countries. In practice this means attracting
the support of at least seven non G-7 colleagues, at least six of whom chair
constituencies in which creditors hold a majority of the voting power. Based on the
current distribution of voting power and of board seats, building a consensus which
on balance is in the interests of developing countries is therefore a formidable and
near impossible challenge.
Furthermore, what happens if no consensus, based on a broad majority of
Directors and a broad majority of the voting strength, emerges? If positions differ,
as they inevitably do given the wide range of issues under discussion at any one
time, often on detail and occasionally on principle, a basis for arriving at a decision
must be used. In practice, for the bulk of day-to-day policy and programme
decisions, that basis is decision making based on a simple majority of the voting
strength of members. In these instances, simple majority decision making
supersedes consensus-based decision making as the deciding factor. With a
combined 29 per cent of the voting strength, developing countries face a
significantly greater challenge in mobilising a simple majority than the industrial
country members, particularly the advanced industrial countries. As can be seen
from Table 1.1, where no consensus can be reached and it becomes necessary to
secure a simple majority of the voting power, this can quickly be achieved by a
collective agreement among the G-7 chairs and a few other directors.14
Unless changes are agreed to the overall voting arrangements among
members, consensus based decision making in the IMF Executive Board will
remain a lop-sided form of consensus, with declining credibility.15 Consensus in
practice means developing countries almost always have to join a consensus
initiated and built by the developed country creditors and almost never by
developing country debtors. This is despite the fact that most decisions are made in
respect of developing country policies and programmes.
14 As can be seen from Table 1.1, a collective agreement between the G-7 members, who
hold 47 per cent of the total voting power and any one of five other creditor constituencies,
can quickly mobilise a 50 per cent simple majority. Hence, when consensus cannot be
reached, it is possible, given the current distribution of voting share, for eight Executive
Directors to obtain a decision, when up to 16 Executive Directors are opposed to that
decision. In practice, this would be an extreme outcome, which would rarely occur. But it is
illustrative of the extent to which weighted voting has now eroded meaningful opportunities
for consensus-building. Developing countries argue that the extent of these imbalances are
clearly not conducive to collaborative, consensus-based decision making.
15 Many important decisions require special voting majorities. Van Houtven (2002) notes
that there are 40 categories of decisions which require a special majority of voting power in
the Executive Board. Of these, 16 require an 85 per cent voting majority and most of the
remaining categories, which pertain to decisions regarding financing and operational issues,
require a 70 per cent voting majority.
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(Hi) Institutional inefficiency arising from lack of ownership
In practice, because decisions are always seen to be arrived at based at best on a
consensus centred on the interests of creditor members, there has been a growing
loss of ownership by the developing countries of board policies. This loss of
ownership has been costly to the IMF as a whole and to individual members. It has
left scope for poor decisions and inefficient decision making, often based primarily
on creditor vs. debtor interests - decisions which are not necessarily in the overall
interests of the membership. There is adequate evidence to demonstrate how
significantly the imbalance in representation arrangements has affected the
efficiency of decision making in the long term. These are most vividly illustrated
during periods of crisis. For example, during the Asian crisis in 1997-98, a host of
commentators, including several Asian member countries themselves, argued that
Fund programme design was inappropriate and failed to take account of specific
circumstances of member countries. The quality of decision making and in turn
programme design and content would have been far improved and the prospects of
success strengthened had the recipient members had a stronger influence in the
decision making process. Similar arguments and similar criticisms are noted below
in respect of the PRSP initiative.
Similar arguments have also been advanced in regard to the IMF's policy
on conditionality. In the past, IMF conditionality has been the subject of extensive
criticism. It has been an issue affecting all developing countries with IMF
programmes. Despite clear and mounting evidence over many years that programme
conditionality had become excessive, irrelevant and counter-productive to the
interests of the programmes themselves, decisions approved by the Executive Board
continued, over several years, to favour excessive conditionality in IMF-supported
programmes. This was despite repeated and well-argued objections by the debtor
countries in the board, both to the IMF's policy on conditionality and to the
manner in which it was being implemented. Developing countries argue that the
lack of voting power to carry their view resulted in substantive failure of the IMF's
conditionality policy, caused unnecessary damage to the institution's reputation,
and contributed to programme failure in many cases. Fortunately, a fundamental
change in conditionality policy was finally agreed, after an extensive consultative
process, though only after many years of growing policy failure.'6
The loss of ownership in policy making is most acutely borne by the
IMF's lowest-income developing country member countries. These members, who
are eligible for the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
16 Objections to the severity of IMF conditionality have been widespread and persistent.
More recently, given clear evidence of the failure of conditionality policy, a new approach
to conditionality has been agreed by the IMF Executive Board. The new approach attaches
value to parsimony of conditionality and the need for the IMF to focus on conditionalities
relevant to its core areas of expertise. The new approach has begun to restore credibility to
IMF conditionality policy, though only after over a decade of mounting failure in
conditionality policy and immeasurable harm to the institution's reputation. The cost of poor
conditionality policy to member countries cannot easily be measured but is considered to
have been significant.
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programmes, are able to muster barely 6 per cent of the voting power in the IMF
board.17 They have little scope to influence policy and must rely significantly on
the persuasive power of their representatives in the board and on the consensus-
based style of decision making. As we note below in the case of the Sub-Saharan
African members of the board, this makes it all the more important for these
members to enjoy an adequate presence, in terms of numbers of seats, in the
Executive Board. Their minimal voting strength means that they have no prospect
of building a simple majority of the voting power, to generate a decision explicitly
in their favour.
There is a similar set of arguments in regard to the PRSP and HIPC
processes. For example, lowest-income developing country members raised
significant objections, on grounds of both procedure and practice, when the PRSP
initiative was launched in December 1999. These included the lack of institutional
capacity in their countries to incorporate the new PRSP process and the consequent
need for longer timeframes for implementation, the need for PRSPs to be
conducted over a period longer than three years, the need for stronger support in
linking PRSP objectives to the budget process in member countries, and the need
for countries emerging from conflict to be provided with other means to develop
poverty-reducing strategies which would nevertheless enable them to qualify for
HIPC debt relief at an earlier stage. Although some objections were incorporated at
the inception of the PRSP, the bulk of these were overridden because of the
overwhelmingly superior voting power of the creditor group. The consequence was
that in almost all instances, the PRSP process encountered precisely the challenges
and difficulties which developing countries and particularly the PRGF members
had predicted. Some of these were corrected during an important review of the
PRSP process in 2002, based again on evidence in the field of mounting and valid
objections to aspects of the process. But developing countries note that these
objections had been raised three years earlier. The three-year delay unnecessarily
damaged the institution's reputation as an agency seriously interested in poverty
alleviation and resulted in significant and unnecessary capacity constraints on low-
income country members. This group of the membership continues to object to
some aspects of the design of PRGF programmes. Given the current distribution of
voting power and particularly of board representation, these members consider that
there is little prospect of redress by relying on their direct experience of the flaws
in PRGF programme design, because of their limited voice at the table.
The growing sense of lack of collective ownership of decisions has had
another secondary, but serious, consequence for institutional efficiency, by eroding
the likelihood of success of individual country programmes. It has meant that in
some - fortunately limited - cases recalcitrant policy makers have had a handy
excuse for not committing themselves to sound policies, ever aware that they can
lay all fault at the Fund's door because programme and policy decisions are
perceived to be decided by the creditor members of the IMF.
17 See Evans and Finnemore (2001), who illustrate the fact that HIPC members hold 2.29
per cent of voting share and the remaining non-HIPC PRGF members hold only a further
3.67 per cent.
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Additional Concerns of Specific Groups of Developing Countries
As noted above, in their representation arrangements in the IMF Executive Board,
developing countries share a host of common challenges and common grounds for
claiming improved voice in the board. While there remains a strong degree of
homogeneity of interests among developing countries, there is also a range of
specific reasons which particular sub-groups among developing countries advance
in favour of strengthened voice. For analytical purposes, it is useful to identify at
least three significant strands within the developing country group in the IMF
board. These include the large emerging market economies, which generally enjoy
access to international capital markets, the transition economies and the low-
income members, broadly comprising members eligible for the IMF's concessional
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
Each of these sub-groups among developing countries emphasises specific
reasons for improving their voice:
• The large emerging market economies emphasise their claim on the
grounds that they are large and growing users of the IMF's resources and
that in some cases their economies have grown very significantly in recent
years. Their relative quota and hence their relative voting share does not
reflect this. These members focus their claims on the methodology used to
calculate members' quotas and hence their relative voting strength. They
argue that important changes are required in the methods used to
determine calculated quotas, to reflect their growing global economic
influence. These include changing the basis, in the quota formulae, for
converting GDP measured in domestic currency, from a market-based
exchange rate method, to the use of a purchasing power parity (PPP)
index.18 In addition, they challenge the weights used in several of the
variables included in the quota formulae. Some members also assert that
their actual quotas are well below their calculated quotas. Even without a
change in the calculation methodology, based on the existing rules for
calculating quotas, their actual quotas should be adjusted upward to more
closely approximate their calculated quotas, thereby improving their
relative voting share.
18 These members note that PPP is used for calculations in the IMF's World Economic
Outlook assessments and in other international reports. Moreover, market exchange rates do
not necessarily equalise the price of tradable goods across countries, even after allowances
are made for quality and transport costs; and they note that the depreciation of market
exchange rates may erode or underestimate the GDP growth of some countries in relation to
others. The issue of choice of mechanism to convert domestic currency GDP was
extensively considered in 2000, in a report of a panel of experts to the Executive Board.
Refer to IMF (2000): Quota Formula Review Group, Report to the IMF Executive Board,
2000, IMF, Washington DC.
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• A similar case is made by the transition economies, who also argue that
the IMF has increased its attention and focus on this category of countries
in recent years. Some transition economies also emphasise the fact that
they represent a growing claim on the use of Fund resources, as is the case
with the emerging market economies.
• The low-income developing country members assert that their share in
total voting power and their presence in the board should be improved for
several reasons: they represent by far the largest proportion of countries
who are members of the IMF; they argue that the principles of
collaborative, multilateral and cooperative behaviour on which the
institution is supposed to operate are not being adequately upheld given
their current minimal voting share and board presence; that poverty
reduction has become an increasingly important and indeed a central
objective of the institution; and that the approach to determining quotas is
inappropriate. This group of developing countries shares some of the
arguments of the emerging market economies and the transition
economies regarding the relative emphasis which should be placed among
the variables used in the quota formulae. But they tend to go further, to
suggest that the selection of the variables themselves should be changed to
reflect factors which more closely recognise the institutions' focus on
poverty reduction. This group accordingly emphasises the need to include
a poverty index in the quota formulae. Representing as they do the group
on which the IMF focuses a significant portion of both its operational
resources and staff time for the purpose of contributing to global poverty
alleviation, this group asserts that it deserves a strengthened voting share
and an improved level of representation in the board.
Accounting for the Low Aggregate Voting Power of Developing Countries
If the combination of the above three concerns common to all developing countries
- the increased role of the IMF in developing countries; a departure from
collaborative, participatory and consensus-based decision making; and declining
long-term efficiency of the decision making process - as well as the specific range
of concerns of the various sub-groups among developing countries, are sound
arguments for increasing the collective voting share and board presence of
developing countries, why is it that this has not occurred?
• Firstly, successive quota reviews have tended to include a significant equi-
proportionate element, or have resulted in a decision not to increase quotas
at all. This has resulted in considerable stickiness in adjustments to relative
quotas and therefore to relative voting power.
• Secondly, there has been no recognition of the arguments of developing
countries, who assert that variables such as a PPP-based method for
calculating GDP, as well as indices which include factors such as
population and depth of poverty, should be included in the formulae. This
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latter set of arguments is particularly applicable to the low-income
developing countries, which can identify no elements of the current quota
calculation methodology which offer them any hope of an improvement in
their relative quota share and hence voting power.
• Thirdly, the relative importance of the basic vote has declined over time, from
11.3 per cent of the total vote, to 2.1 per cent of the total vote at present.19
This has resulted in developing countries, which represent the largest number
of countries in the IMF, losing voting share to the creditor members.
• Fourthly, regarding increasing the number of developing country board
seats, there has been no increase in the number of board seats for over a
decade. This is despite the fact that there has been a very significant
expansion in the membership of the IMF. The decision not to expand the
size of the Executive Board is often justified on the grounds that an
increase in the size of the board will generate inefficiency. Indeed, quite
the opposite effect may result from a modest increase in board size. At the
establishment of the IMF, the original 45 member states were represented
by a 12-member Executive Board. By 2003, the membership since the
founding of the institution has increased by 139 members. At present, the
current 184 members are now represented by a board of only 24
Executive Directors. Hence only 12 new board seats have been created, to
accommodate 139 new members.20
Is there a Way Forward?
Creditor members clearly hold a clear majority of the voting power in the IMF
board. Two questions arise from this basic fact. Firstly, should creditors continue
to hold a majority of the voting power? And if so, how large should the size of this
voting majority be? In providing financing to its members, the Fund operates on
principles akin to a credit union. Until such financing arrangements are changed,
for an institution which relies significantly on the funding provided by its creditor
members, the presence of a majority of voting power among creditors, particularly
in respect of decisions which require financing, can be argued to be logical and
appropriate. Without an assured majority, creditors would inevitably leave the
19 The implications of the systematic decline in the relative contribution of the basic vote in
total voting power are extensively treated in Buira (2002). Buira highlights, inter alia, the
fact that a restoration of the relative share of the basic vote in total voting share would
significantly increase the voting share of developing countries, while retaining a creditor
majority and preserving the US veto. Note also the comparative analysis provided by Buira,
highlighting the fact that other international institutions have adjusted the level of their basic
votes to preserve the general principle of equality of states, while others have enshrined this
principle in their founding rules.
20 For a more detailed treatment of the impact on Executive Board workload of the
comparatively small increase in Board size, see Bradlow (2001). See also Van Houtven
(2002), who notes that since the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement in 1978,
which specified a Board of 20 Executive Directors, the size of the Board has increased by
four Directors, while 57 more countries have joined the IMF.
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institution and the financing which underpins a major aspect of the institution's
work would disappear. On this argument, at least in regard to financing decisions,
creditors should hold a majority of the voting power.
Turning to the second question - how large should this majority be, or
alternately, to what extent can the creditor-debtor gap in relative voting share be
narrowed? The response to this question hinges on a number of factors: firstly on the
extent of political will among creditors to adjust downwards the aggregate creditor
voting share; secondly on the question of whether all creditors or only a sub-set of
creditors would experience a downward adjustment; thirdly, if the former, whether
any adjustment would be shared equally among all creditors - either equally in
absolute terms or equally based on existing relative share; fourthly, if only a sub-set
of creditors were to lose voting share, which would these be and why; fifthly, the
influence of all of the above factors on the ability of the US to preserve its current
veto on decisions requiring an 85 per cent majority decision of the board; and sixthly,
the extent of impact of these decisions on the aggregate European voting share.
While these are difficult questions to answer, applying the collective minds
of the IMF membership could generate important progress on some, if not all of
these matters. Options and proposals which seek to address these challenges in a
manner which takes account of the concerns of both creditors and debtors, while
nevertheless achieving an improved voting share for developing countries, are
considered in part five of this chapter.
The Special Case of Sub-Saharan African Representation in the IMF
Executive Board
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) members' voice and representation capacity are
stymied by the effect of two issues: (i) the minimal voting share of SSA members
in the IMF Executive Board; and (ii) the number of board seats afforded to
members from SSA.21 SSA members argue that these factors have resulted in their
marginalization from the decision making processes of the institution. They argue
that both of these factors can be corrected with minimal adjustment to the interests
of the overall membership, but with significant benefits. Benefits would accrue to
the institution as a whole, in terms of improved efficiency through better quality of
decision making in regard to policies for poverty reduction, a recovery of
credibility regarding the consensus-based approach to decision making and a
significant restoration of the concept of uniformity of treatment among members.
There are currently 45 SSA member countries in the IMF. This represents
almost exactly a quarter of the institution's 184 members. Of these SSA members,
almost all (44) are represented by two Executive Directors.22 These two Directors
hold a combined voting share of merely 4.4 per cent. Hence nearly 25 per cent of
21 Refer to Memorandum of African Governors to IMF Managing Director, Special Meeting
of Africa Group 1 Constituency, Maputo, Mozambique, June 1999.
22 Note that one SSA member (Ghana) is also represented by the constituency chaired by Iran.
Meeting
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the combined IMF membership have 4.4 per cent of the voting share; and have two
of the 24 available board seats. Using any conceivable measure of fairness or
efficacy, SSA members argue that this represents an almost irrelevant share of both
vote and seats.
The allocations do not resonate with the IMF's objective of addressing the
interests of low-income developing countries. SSA's share of voting power has
remained consistently low throughout successive quota reviews and in recent
reviews has even declined. In the early years of the Fund, this approach might have
been explained by the relatively small share of the institution's human resources,
time and financial resources allocated to its SSA members and by the fact that
there were far fewer SSA members of the institution in earlier decades. But at
precisely the time that SSA's quota and hence its relative voting share has
declined, the needs of its members and the role of the Fund in SSA have both
vastly increased. Unlike the IMF's role in earlier decades, in recent years there has
been a growing range of critical policy issues on which the IMF board now
regularly decides, which directly affect the interests of SSA members. All of these
policies have directly influenced the IMF's work in SSA member countries.23
These include policy decisions on:
• The HIPC Initiative: Decisions regarding the HIPC Initiative have
occupied a considerable portion of the board's time, particularly since
1996. Aside from the regular HIPC progress reviews, there have been
important policy decisions in regard to tracking Poverty Reducing Public
Expenditure in HIPC member countries (2002), and Debt Sustainability in
HIPC member countries (2002). Of the twelve members eligible for HIPC
at 30 April 2002, but which had not yet reached the decision point, ten
were from SSA.24
• On Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) policies and processes:
there have been several board discussions focusing on the PRSP,
including the extensive deliberations at its launch and a major review of
the program in March 2002. The majority of PRSP cases are from SSA. A
significant portion of the institution's resources now focuses on assisting
members develop sound PRSPs. The IMF has hosted several major
international conferences on the PRSP and sought to actively link the
PRSP process with the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals.
23 A key impetus to the IMF's involvement in low-income countries occurred in December
1999, when the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank launched the PRSP
initiative; and in the same month, the IMF Executive Board transformed the former
Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) into the PRGF. The two decisions also
inter-linked the IMF's role in the HIPC initiative with both the PRSP and the PRGF
initiatives. The combination of these two decisions placed poverty reduction at the centre of
the IMF's work in low-income countries; and marked the beginning of a significant increase
in the institutional resources, as well as Executive Board time, devoted to policies and
programs in low-income countries. For a detailed outline of the range of IMF initiatives to
help reduce poverty, refer to Chapter 5, IMF Annual Report, 2002.
24 Refer to Table 5.1, IMF Annual Report, 2002, p. 53.
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• On the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF): almost all SSA
members are now pursuing PRGF programmes. Aside from the extensive
involvement of the board during the process of transforming the ESAF
into the PRGF there has been a significant review of the PRGF in March
2002.
SSA experience looms large in board discussions of conditionality, domestic
ownership of Fund programs, on support to countries emerging from conflict, and
on the Fund's policies in regard to arrears.
The Growing IMF Role in Low-income Countries: Implications for Workload of
SSA Constituencies
Aside from the increase in policy work for low-income countries, SSA members also
draw attention to the direct increase in workload in the SSA constituencies, resulting
from the IMF's increased role in poverty reduction. SSA members in the Executive
Board argue that an improvement in both their voting share and the number of
board seats made available to their members is warranted on the grounds that a
very substantial share of the IMF's work on poverty reduction now focuses on
SSA. These members point to the fact that SSA is now the focus of:
• the overwhelming bulk of the IMF's work on the Heavily Indebted Poor
Country (HIPC) debt relief initiative;25
• a very large share of the IMF's PRGF programmes;
• the large majority of its work on Post-Conflict Assistance;26
• and almost all of the IMF's protracted arrears cases.27
In addition, these members note that SSA represents the largest user, in comparison
with any other region, of PRGF resources.28 SSA members also observe that in
recent years they have become increasingly reliant on the IMF as one of their few
remaining significant sources of international financial assistance. For member
countries so reliant on the resources of the institution, it is therefore inappropriate
that they should have so negligible an influence on the policies which directly
affect their interests.
25 Of 27 HIPC countries to which the IMF had committed resources as at 30 April 2002, no
less than 23 were from SSA. Refer to Table 6.3, IMF Annual Report, 2002, p. 62.
26 On 30 April 2002, four of the six members receiving the IMF's concessional post-conflict
emergency financing were from SSA. Refer to Table 6.2., IMF Annual Report, 2002, p. 63.
27 Of seven IMF member countries in protracted arrears to the IMF at 30 April 2002, five
were from SSA. These members had combined protracted arrears of SDR2.298 billion,
representing 97.6 per cent of total protracted arrears to the IMF. Refer to Table 6.7, IMF
Annual Report, 2002, p. 69.
28 The extent of IMF focus on Africa is highlighted by the fact that by the end of April 2002,
over two dozen SSA members were preparing PRSPs with IMF assistance; and 23 members
had qualified for HIPC debt relief.
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Consequences of Declining Relative Voting Share of SSA Members
With an improved voice for SSA members, board efficiency and effectiveness in
regard particularly to the IMF's work in low-income countries could have been far
more effective. The absence of adequate voice has meant a direct and unnecessary
cost to the Fund's reputation and its ability to succeed in its own objectives of
reducing poverty, by not adequately understanding and incorporating the views of
a significant share of the membership, on a set of issues which in fact affects a
majority of the IMF's member countries and on which these countries have the
most incisive and direct experience and knowledge. Clearly more voices speaking
on behalf of SSA would offer a greater opportunity for representatives of the
region to articulate the needs of SSA members and much greater scope to forge a
consensus on many of the matters of crucial interest to these members.
SSA members contend that the PRSP framework, for example, was
established during a key board meeting in December 1999, ignoring many of the
concerns of the low-income countries and many of the key objections raised by
SSA members.29 Both the World Bank and the IMF Executive Boards corrected
some of the defects identified by low-income countries in the PRSP process, but
only three years later and amid clear signs that the approach contained significant
defects.30 The weighted voting structure had muted the voice of those members that
knew most about the issue, resulting in deficiencies in the PRSP and unnecessary
damage to the reputation of the institution and hence to all its members.
The second important consequence of the combination of minimum
voting power and minimum board presence has been to generate an impossibility-
of-performance scenario. The two SSA Executive Directors have at least double the
number of PGRF countries in comparison with any other non-SSA constituency. In
addition, most member countries within the two SSA constituencies are also HIPC-
eligible, adding considerably to the workload. Furthermore, all of the remaining IMF
arrears cases are now within the SSA fold.
29 Concerns pertained to the process through which the PRSP would be initiated, rather than
the principle of a country developing a poverty reduction strategy. Relevant and legitimate
issues were raised regarding the pacing and phasing of PRSPs, the need for different
approaches to PRSP preparation, the lack of domestic capacity to prepare PRSPs in many
countries, the lack of fiscal resources to give effect to the recommendations which PRSPs
were likely to generate; diversion of policy-maker's efforts from other crucial activities,
including their macroeconomic reform efforts and their efforts to secure bilateral and
multilateral debt relief. Only a few of these objections were translated into amendments to
the framework at inception.
30 Refer to Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/31 - IMF Executive Board Reviews the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach, which reviewed progress with the
PRSP. Many issues on which progress was made during this review were issues which had
been raised three years earlier by SSA and other low-income country members when the
PRSP was conceptualised.
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The third and very significant adverse consequence of the low voting
share/low board presence combination has been to erode - and with the growth of
SSA membership in the Fund, to effectively remove - any realistic possibility that
these members can build a consensus. For the SSA members consensus decision
making has come to mean joining a consensus already built by other members.
Consensus building is immeasurably easier if seven or eight members of the board
hail from the same region and decide to join forces on a particular issue or on a
particular policy. To achieve a reasonable measure of consensus in the board,
these members would need to persuade not much more than four or five
Executive Directors of their view and, if they comprise the largest creditors and
if consensus were to be put beyond challenge, they would need few if any
additional votes to achieve a simple majority. If the two large SSA members,
notwithstanding that they represent a quarter of the members of the institution,
decided to join forces equipped with 4.4 per cent of the vote, they would need to
find at least ten other supporters in the board and at least 45 per cent of the vote,
to build a consensus.31
A fourth consequence of the absence of effective representation for SSA
members has been to contribute to progressively reducing member programme
ownership, thereby undermining domestic commitment to reform.
Several commentators have begun to recognise the extraordinary situation
of the SSA members in the IMF Executive Board. The most detailed presentation
of this issue thus far is that of Evans and Finnemore (2001), who after a detailed
assessment assert that 'the obvious remedy would be to divide the two African
constituencies in half and add two more African EDs'. As the authors note, this
would not necessarily require changing voting shares, and under certain
circumstances might also not require increasing the size of the board.32 The issue
of inadequate representation of SSA board members has also been noted inter alia
by Bradlow (2001) and Mohammed (2002). Within the IMF itself, there has been
some recognition that the representation of SSA members has become an important
challenge.33 In addition, a number of further papers have suggested considering a
change in the rules, to enable any constituency with a specified number of
members to elect an Executive Director; or setting a ceiling on the number of
member countries represented by any one chair.34
31 It is hardly surprising that for these board members, the incentive to actively build
consensus is muted and viewed as something of a Herculean and effectively Don Quixotic
challenge.
32 Refer to Evans and Finnemore (2001), pp. 13-14.
33 See Van Houtven (2002), who notes that 'The low voting strength of the two sub-Saharan
constituencies, which together amount to 4.4 per cent, is among the issues of concern in the
size and structure of the Board in view of the exceptionally large number of member
countries in the sub-Saharan groups, 45, many of whom have policy programs with the IMF
and need technical assistance as well', p. 22.
34 See for example Alberich and Martinez (2002). The authors make a strong appeal for
open and transparent rules for the election and appointment of Executive Directors.
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Options for Improving Representation of Developing Countries in the IMF
Executive Board
This section considers some potential options for reform of both the voting
structure and the distribution of Executive Board seats in the IMF, which would
address the substantive concerns of developing countries in the board, and
significantly address the challenges of loss of ownership of the decision making
process and attendant loss of efficiency in decision making.
Several types of options are suggested: first, all-inclusive dialogue among
shareholders, and second, options which seek to address the imbalance in voting
power. These include proposals based on a pre-determined creditor-debtor voting
structure and those focusing on specific sub-groups among developing countries.
Third, there are options addressing the size of the board. Finally, additional proposals
and options for improving developing country voice in the Executive Board.
There are no simple options. The suggested options are in most instances
not mutually exclusive. All options would require broad political consensus among
the membership. Because of the zero-sum nature of aggregate voting power, most
options, though not all, necessarily imply that there would be some losers and
some winners. Similarly, in addressing the imbalance in representation based on
the current distribution of board seats, most scenarios imply that there are likely to
be some winners and some losers.
A. Dialogue
Option 1: Establish a committee of the Executive Board
Directors could examine the key issues and report to the Board of Governors. The
report could be either an extensive treatment of the issue, containing
recommendations, or it could constitute a brief statement of the key aspects of the
challenge. The advantage of this approach would be that it would include the views
of Executive Board members themselves, thereby providing a direct overview of
the day-to-day challenges experienced by Directors. A disadvantage could be that
the issue could prove to be too contentious to address at the level of the Executive
Board, placing unnecessary strain on the regular conduct of board operations.
Option 2: Establish a committee of the Board of Governors
To initiate a broad shareholder dialogue, the Board of Governors could establish a
committee representative of the membership, to examine the issue and to report
back to the Board of Governors. The advantage of this approach would be that the
discussion would be mandated at the highest level and would avoid a potentially
disruptive process from emerging in the Executive Board.
Option 3: External review
An external agency could initiate a process of dialogue among a broad cross-
section of the membership, to identify the key aspects of the challenge of
developing country representation, to seek consensus and to identify areas in which
progress may be able to be made; and to make recommendations to advance the
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issue. The advantage of this approach would be that a dialogue could begin
relatively promptly. A disadvantage would be that the process would not have been
initiated by a wide cross-section of the IMF's membership.
B. Adjustment of Voting Shares
Option 4: An agreement on raising voting share
There could be an understanding that the voting share of developing countries, or
more precisely of IMF debtor countries, would be established at some percentage
below 50 per cent, but considerably more than the current level. Decisions on how
this increase was to be allocated within the developing country group could be left
to developing countries. Decisions as to how the corresponding decrease would be
effected from among the developed countries would be taken at the time of the in-
principle decision of the amount of reallocation. It could be agreed to phase the
implementation of such a decision over a medium-term cycle of 2-3 quota review
periods, thereby minimising potential for sudden and large corrections.
What is feasible in terms of reallocation? At present, creditor members
hold a very significant majority of the voting power. As noted earlier, their voting
share by country is 61.5 per cent; and by virtue of the current distribution of
Executive Board seats, creditors are able to increase their voting power to 70 per
cent. It would be reasonable to propose a downward revision in overall creditor
share which resulted in creditors in the IMF holding a voting majority, of
approximately 52 per cent. This would result in an approximately 10 per cent
reallocation of voting power to debtor members. The retention of a permanent
creditor majority in the IMF could be structured to preserve the US veto and could
also be structured to retain a significant European voting share, including the
current European veto. In addition, depending on the mechanisms used to effect
such a revision, the relative ranking of voting strength among the creditor group
could be preserved, either entirely or to a large extent.
If political agreement were unable to be achieved to improve the interests
of all developing country members, a further set of options would be to agree to
enable one or more sub-sets within the debtor group to benefit from an overall
political agreement to improve their voting status. These options include:
Option 5: Increase the basic vote
A similar option would be to increase the basic vote by an agreed margin.35 This
option would have the advantage of being applicable to all members of the
institution, would not result in any reduction in voting share of any members, and
would correct the significant decline in the voting share of the smallest members of
the IMF. Many authors have proposed restoring the basic vote to its relative share
in the total vote at the time of establishment of the IMF, hence increasing the share
of the basic vote in total voting share from 2.1 per cent to 11.3 per cent. The
precise degree of adjustment would require a political consensus among the
membership. As Buira (2002) shows, increasing the basic vote to its relative share
' Many commentators have recommended this option. See for example Buira (2002).
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of the total vote at the time of inception of the IMF would preserve the US veto,
maintain an overall European member veto and maintain a creditor majority in the
total vote. It would also increase the share of developing country vote to
approximately 47 per cent, thereby considerably narrowing the creditor-debtor gap,
while still maintaining a creditor majority.
Option 6: Return the basic vote to original level of significance
The weakness of Option 5 is that the relative influence of the larger developing
countries - typically the emerging market economies - would decline despite the
fact that they represent the largest users, in quantum of resources, of IMF
resources. A variant on the Option 5 would be to agree to increase the basic vote
by a specified percentage - perhaps some level less than the 11.3 per cent needed
to restore the level set at the IMF's establishment; and to combine this with a
selective allocation to some developing countries. The combined effect of the
increase in basic vote and the selective increase to specified developing countries
could be pre-determined, resulting, for example, in a net increase in developing
country voting power equivalent to that which would occur had the basic vote been
restored to its level in 1944, or to any level agreed by the membership as a whole.36
This approach could also be used to address the concerns of some Asian members,
that the influence of Asian members in the global economy has grown and merits
an increase in relative quota and shareholding.37
Option 7: Migrate to a PPP approach
To address the strong preference among emerging market economies, transition
economies and many low-income countries that a PPP-based method of computing
GDP is a more appropriate approach than the current exchange rate-based
approach, there could be a gradual migration from the current approach to the PPP
method. The migration to a PPP approach could be agreed to take place in steps,
over for example two or three 5-yearly quota reviews. This would entail a gradual
shift over a 10-15 year period, thereby allaying the fears of some members that
their voting share would be significantly adversely affected. An envisaged final
timeframe, for example 2018 or 2023 (15 or 20 years hence) could be agreed, by
which time a final approach would be expected to be fully implemented. This
option could also include the concept of a floor on the downward adjustment of
36 The determination as to which developing countries would benefit from the selective
portion of such an increase would depend on the objectives. Groups of members who could
justifiably benefit include the emerging market economies, some transition economies and
the stronger performers among the PRGF countries. A selective increase could also be used
to achieve certain political objectives which might be perceived to be in the interests of the
overall membership, including facilitating some members, for example SSA, from
exercising a leadership role within this group, in the IMF board. At present, the presence of
two SSA board seats, each with over twenty members, results in the inability of even the
largest members within each group from exercising leadership on behalf of the group. This
situation would be further accentuated in any scenario increasing the basic vote.
37 The suggestion that an increase in basic vote would need to be re-balanced by some
selective increases to emerging market members is taken up in Buira (2002).
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voting share of members most significantly prejudiced by the change, in each round
of correction and on aggregate. In this manner, the adjustment would not precipitate a
sudden pronounced correction in relative voting shares. However it would, over time,
correct a significant flaw in the methodology used for computing GDP. The approach
could also serve as an incentive for those countries which have not yet developed a
PPP-based measure of GDP, to do so within a reasonable timeframe. For countries
which currently do not have PPP-based data, the average degree of correction among
all other member countries could be applied, or some other basis mutually agreed
by the collective membership, in computing their quota share.
Option 8: Focus on income PRGF-eligible members
There could be an agreement to increase the collective voting share of the low-
income PRGF-eligible members by a specified percentage; and deducting such
share from all other members. The deduction could be achieved in several ways: by
deducting a fixed number of votes from each non-PRGF member; by effecting
deductions based on existing relative shareholding with the larger shareholders
relinquishing a comparatively larger proportion of their voting share; or some other
commonly agreed method. Depending on what method was used to reallocate
voting power, an advantage of this approach could be that in relative terms, all
non-PRGF members could retain their relative ranking in voting terms, while the
PRGF members would increase their aggregate voting share. Furthermore, because
the relative share of PRGF members in total voting share is minimal, their relative
shareholding could be significantly improved - for example doubled or tripled -
without a significant adjustment in the voting shares of the non-PRGF members.
This option would enable the IMF to give substance to the claim that it is willing to
hear the views of its clients; and would significantly promote ownership of its
policies and programmes, by the institution's members. Note that in preference to
'deducting' votes from some members, the same outcome could be achieved by
allocating a selective quota increase to the PRGF members.
Option 9: Focus on SSA members
To address the low aggregate voting share of SSA members, this option would
consist of a political agreement among the combined membership to: (a) ensure
that the combined voting share of SSA members does not decline beyond its
current level; and (b) to allocate the SSA members a predefined share of the total
voting power. This share would be greater than the current level of 4.4 per cent,
with any increase being drawn from an agreed pool of non-SSA members. Since
the overall aggregate increase would be likely to be relatively small, perhaps an
adjustment of between three to four per cent, spread among a large segment of the
membership and possibly among all non-SSA members, the adverse implications
for each non-SSA member would be negligible. In addition, the current relative
ranking of voting share among the non-SSA members could be maintained, by an
agreement to this effect by all members. The net effect of this option would be to
preserve the relative voting ranking among all non-SSA members, while increasing
SSA's share in the total vote. This would allow for several benefits. Firstly, it
would address the acute imbalance which has developed in SSA's overall voting
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share. Secondly, it could be structured to permit the creation of a third and possibly
fourth SSA Executive Board seat, each with a meaningful voting share (see Option
10 below). Thirdly, it could be structured to benefit SSA members selectively
rather than collectively, for example favouring those members who have been high
performers within the group, those who can offer strong leadership to the group
and those for whom a special case is warranted.
C. Size of the Board
Option 10: Add board seats
Establish one or two additional board seats for SSA members. The advantage of
this approach would be to eliminate the impossibility of performance which has in
the past characterised SSA board representation; to allocate the work load among
three or four rather than two constituencies; and to enable SSA members to achieve
effective representation in the IMF board. Note that a sub-division of the existing
two seats into three seats, with approximately 15 members per seat, would result in
the three SSA members continuing to have the largest workloads among all 26
board members of a reconstituted and enlarged board.38
A method of achieving the same outcome, without explicitly favouring
any specific region, would be to set a ceiling which is represented by an Executive
Director. If the ceiling on the number of countries were set at ten members per
constituency, this would result in three more seats for SSA members, and would
also require some non-SSA constituencies that represent more than ten members
relinquishing some members. In practice, a ceiling of 13-15 members would
constitute an optimal outcome, ensuring that SSA members secured at least one
additional board seat, and enabling all other constituencies to remain intact, or to
effect a voluntary reshuffling if they considered it desirable.
An ancillary challenge presented by this approach would be determining
how the resulting three African constituencies would be comprised. Some
reshuffling within the current two constituencies would clearly be required. In
practice, this challenge would be addressed internally among Sub-Saharan African
countries. There are optimistic grounds that a suitable arrangement could be
established, as a number of key entities could be utilised to help forge a broad Sub-
Saharan African agreement on the composition of the three African chairs. These
could include the African Union, the NEPAD, as well as contributions to this
determination by key regional institutions in East, West and Southern Africa.
It is often suggested that the circumstances of SSA members can be
adequately addressed by assigning these members an additional Alternate
Executive Director position and/or by increasing the number of staff in the
Executive Directors' offices. Implementing these suggestions would certainly
38 Even with one additional board seat, SSA members represented by three constituencies
would continue to have the largest number of PRGF program countries, members with
PRSPs, HIPC members, members emerging from conflict and members in arrears to the
Fund. In practice, however, the current impossibility of performance engendered by a two-
seat SSA representation in the board would be ameliorated.
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ameliorate one aspect of the challenge confronting SSA members: the impossibility
of adequate performance given the large number of member countries represented
in each of the two current constituencies, the large number of programme, off-
track, post-conflict and arrears cases within them, as well as the challenge of
representing a very large share of HIPC members. In this regard, a recent decision
by the Executive Boards of both the IMF and the World Bank, to allocate three
additional Advisor (IMF) and Senior Advisor (World Bank) positions to the
constituency offices represents a significant step forward in helping ameliorate the
workload in the two offices. The increase in staffing to the SSA constituency
offices, although an important improvement, is unable to address the work in large
intensive constituencies of more than twenty countries, each with more than 17
programmes that are either active or in intensive-care mode. It is unable to address
the challenge of diminished member country ownership in the decision making
process itself, nor the challenge of enabling SSA members to have meaningful
opportunities to forge and join a Board consensus.
To increase the board's size (an 85 per cent majority is required), it is often
argued that an increase in size will contribute to decreased operational efficiency. It
should be noted, however, that any such decrease, were it to occur, would be
marginal, given the addition of up to two more seats to the current 24. Any losses in
efficiency would be likely to be far more than compensated for by the benefits.
As regards the prospect of a decrease in the size of the board, to enable
one or two more SSA seats to be created, this would clearly require an
extraordinary political consensus among the collective membership. In practice, as
many commentators have noted, this would most likely be achieved by reducing
the number of European chairs in the IMF board, from the current 7-8, to (if only
SSA claims to further board seats were to be considered) 5-6 seats.39 In this regard,
the possibility of a union between the French and German seats has been
considered; and a further possibility could be to achieve agreement among the
remaining 5-6 European chairs, to a reduction in one further European seat. In
practice, unless there is agreement to enlarge the size of the Executive Board,
which appears unlikely given objections by the large industrial countries and
particularly the USA, the resolution of the current acute minimisation of Africa's
voice in the IMF Executive Board will only be able to be resolved once the
European chairs determine how to reduce their representation, including the
number of European board seats, in the IMF Executive Board.
39 There are strong grounds for proposing a reduction in the number of Directors
representing European members: the region already has by far the largest number of seats in
the Board in comparison with other regions, while its GNP is only 70 per cent larger than that
of the US which has a single chair; in addition, increased regional integration in Europe has
rendered the region more akin to a single monetary, economic and trading bloc, suggesting the
possibility of reducing the number of board seats to a single seat. This of course would be a
radical change in representation arrangements and on balance would not be in the interests of
the collective membership of the IMF. However, some reduction from the current 7-8 seats
would be reasonable. For a discussion of some options for reducing the number of European
seats as well as the aggregate European vote, see, for example, Buira (2002).
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Option 11: An additional Asian seat
An additional board seat would reflect the increased economic strength of Asian
member countries. It would be perceived to address an imbalance, by recognising
the growing influence of Asian members in the world economy. In practice, the
creation of such a seat would be likely to favour Korea, whose economic growth
has been particularly pronounced in recent years. Per the provisions of the Second
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement, this option would also require an 85 per
cent voting majority of the Board of Governors. An important disadvantage of this
approach is that it would tilt the overall balance among the (non-SSA) developing
countries away from the current perceived approximate balance between Latin
America, Asia and the Middle East, toward a stronger representation by Asian
members.40 For this reason, it is often argued that the preferred approach to
recognising the increased influence of Asian economies is to increase the relative
quota of selected Asian members, on the basis suggested in Option 6 above.
D. Further Options and Proposals
Option 12: A further detailed set of options has been suggested by Kelkar et al.
(2003)
These options, which would also require broad political consensus, involve
separating the various functions served by quotas. Kelkar et al. note that the basic
problem of the quota formulas has been a classic assignment problem, namely a
mismatch between the number of instruments and objectives. Currently, there is
only one instrument, namely the quota that is aimed at achieving multiple policy
objectives such as determination of members' contribution to the Fund, their access
to Fund resources and their influence in the governance of the Fund through voting
rights. Kelkar et al. suggest that the number of instruments should be not less than
the number of policy objectives. As there are three policy objectives, at least three
instruments are needed. To achieve this, quotas should be confined principally to
determining members' contributions to Fund resources; quotas should be delinked
from policy and a greater role should be assigned to the Westphalian principle (one
country one vote) in the determination of voting rights. The proposals of Kelkar et
al. would represent a very significant departure from current practice.
Option 13: Increase ED terms and staff
This option would address the challenge of lack of institutional memory and
staffing constraints of the developing country members. The length of service of all
elected Executive Directors could be increased to between three and five years.
This would enable developing country Executive Directors to acquire greater
influence, through the ability to become more familiar with Fund policies and
40 At present, Latin American and Caribbean members have three seats (headed by Brazil,
Argentina/Chile and Mexico/Venezuela, the latter except in two of every six years, when
Spain assumes the chair); Asian members, excluding Japan, have three seats (China, India,
and Thailand/Indonesia) and one alternate position (Korea); and Middle Eastern members
have three seats (Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia).
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practices, as well as board procedures. Regarding staffing constraints, one option
would be to allocate additional staff on the basis of the number of member
countries in a constituency with IMF-supported programmes. A specific proposal
would be to allocate an additional Advisor position for every three member
countries supported by IMF programmes. As the number of member countries with
IMF-supported programmes in a given constituency would vary over time, some
historical averaging could be used to determine the additional staff numbers to be
assigned per constituency. Coupled with the existing policy of allocating staff on
the basis of number of countries represented, the advantage of this approach would
be that it recognised the varying degrees of intensity of workload.
Conclusion
Creditors in the IMF Executive Board should, particularly in regard to financing
decisions, maintain an assured majority of the voting power. But as this chapter has
argued, the current margin beyond that required to assure a simple majority has
become illogical and excessive. Collectively, the excess surplus of votes held by
the creditor group beyond a simply majority of votes strikes at the foundation of
the principles of collaboration and consensus decision making upon which the
Fund operates, weakens the institution, reduces operational efficiency, gnaws away
at the institution's legitimacy, erodes ownership of programmes and policies by the
collective membership, has bred understandable resentment by the debtor group
and offers no tangible benefit to the collective membership. In recent years the
excess majority of voting power has also precipitated a range of efforts by the more
powerful debtor members to find other institutions and mechanisms to express
their opinions. All of these arguments suggest that a narrowing of the extent to
which creditors hold a voting majority in the IMF board would be desirable and in
the collective interests of the membership as a whole.
While the size of the Executive Board has evolved over time to take
account of the growth of the membership, some important inconsistencies have
developed in this process - in particular the disproportionate number of
constituencies representing European members; and the fact that accommodation for
growth in membership has been made for all but the two large Sub-Saharan African
constituencies. Correcting the second inconsistency need not have a bearing on the
first challenge, but requires a decision to increase the size of the board.
Some innovative new proposals have been suggested which re-examine
the multiple functions of IMF quotas. Detailed examination of these could yield
options for progress in correcting the imbalance which has developed in regard to
developing countries' voice in the IMF Executive Board. It would be useful to
actively find methods to discuss these proposals.
The terms of duty of Executive Directors should be lengthened, to
improve the capacity of developing country Executive Directors to contribute to
policy and programme discussions and to build institutional memory in their
constituencies; and staffing rules would benefit from reforms which took account
of relative intensity of workload. While intensity is difficult to define, one useful
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proxy is the number of countries in a constituency with IMF-supported
programmes. Supplementing the existing rules which assign staff based on number
of countries represented with this approach, would help alleviate the
disproportionate burden on developing country constituencies.
All potential options require political consensus among the membership
and the preservation of the factors to which creditors attach significant importance,
including the principle of creditor majority, the US and European veto power and
relative ranking among creditors. Mechanisms should be found to initiate
consideration of these options.
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Chapter 2
Democratizing the IMF
Andrew Eggers, Ann Florini and Ngaire Woods1
Introduction
Calls for the IMF to democratize abound. The demands for greater participation in
IMF decision making are coming from many sources, including non-governmental
organizations, trade unions, religious groups, and grass-roots groups. They have a
compelling case. First, like any organization working closely to meet and further
the needs of its clients, the IMF needs constant feedback from its member countries
and peoples affected by its programs in order to keep up the quality and relevance
of its own policies and decisions. Second, IMF lending and conditionality typically
takes place during a crisis when the IMF and finance ministry officials of a country
must make decisions without time to engage in broad democratic consultations. If
the Fund's role is not to be coercive, then the participation of the broader society
must precede the crisis and be part of the normal politics of engagement between a
country and the IMF. Finally, globalization and its detractors have intensified
scrutiny of all international organizations and the IMF, like all others, must
demonstrate and reinforce its claim legitimately to set standards and influence
economic policies in its member countries.
Despite the clear need to democratize the Fund, little rigorous thought has
been given to how to make that happen. Obviously democracy in this context does
not mean holding popular elections for Fund officials. Instead, the question is how
to allow citizens affected by Fund operations and policies to exercise
accountability over the relevant decision makers and to have voice in the decisions.
There is no single answer, no one mechanism that will magically resolve
the dilemmas of global democracy. But there are several steps that would
constitute real progress. One would be to find meaningful ways to increase the
involvement of parliamentarians, who in most countries are intended to be the
' Andrew Eggers is Senior Research Analyst at the Brookings Institution. Ann Florini is
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of the recent book The Coming
Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World. Ngaire Woods is Director of the Global
Economic Governance program at University College, Oxford and author of a forthcoming
book on the politics of the IMF and the World Bank. The authors wish to thank Chas
Budnick for valuable research assistance, and many senior staff members and country
representatives at the IMF for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of
this chapter.
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channel through which citizens have voice in national decisions. In a few, mostly
rich, countries, legislators already weigh in on IMF issues, but most
parliamentarians do not. In this chapter, we describe and evaluate the status of
parliamentary involvement to date, and recommend how both parliamentarians and
the IMF itself can bring about more and better parliamentary oversight.
A Changing Institution
Democratic process was not a priority when the IMF was first established. At the
time, the rules governing international organizations were those of diplomacy, not
democracy. Protecting the confidentiality of negotiations took precedence over
direct accountability to citizens. The IMF had a mission of monitoring the pegged
exchange rate system. This seemed to require oversight only by the most
technically qualified components of national governments, the Treasury/finance
departments and central banks. Thus, it seemed logical to have general oversight
provided by a Board of Governors consisting of such officials (usually the finance
minister or the head of the central bank) from member governments. Day-to-day
direction of the Fund's activities was, and is, provided by Executive Directors who
report to (and usually are selected by) the finance ministry or central bank of the
relevant member(s).2 The Articles of Agreement provide that 'each member shall
deal with the Fund only through its Treasury, central bank, stabilization fund, or
other similar fiscal agency, and the Fund shall deal only with or through the same
agencies'.3
Since the collapse of the pegged exchange rate system in the early 1970s
and the debt crisis in the 1980s, the Fund's activities have changed beyond
recognition. It has evolved into a key provider of development assistance. For
many countries it is now also the ultimate arbiter of whether international capital
will be made available at all. The Fund's use of conditionality has hugely
expanded. These changes have led to a storm of objections about the Fund's
perceived usurpation of the prerogatives of sovereign governments.
2 The IMF website describes the role of the Board of Governors as follows: The Board of
Governors, the highest decision making body of the IMF, consists of one governor and one
alternate governor for each member country. The governor is appointed by the member
country and is usually the minister of finance or the governor of the central bank. All powers
of the IMF are vested in the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors may delegate to
the Executive Board all except certain reserved powers. The Board of Governors normally
meets once a year.
It describes Executive Directors as follows: The Executive Board (the Board) is
responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the IMF. It is composed of 24
Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or by groups of countries, and
the Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman. The Board usually meets several times
each week. It carries out its work largely on the basis of papers prepared by IMF
management and staff.
3 Article V ( l ) .
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In 2001, in response to growing criticism of the intrusiveness and political
infeasibility of many of its loan conditions, the IMF began revising its overarching
philosophy on loan conditionality. New conditionality guidelines were heralded as
a way to signal the institution's intention to reduce the scope and depth of the
IMF's involvement in fundamentally political matters. Subsequently, operational
guidelines have amplified how this new philosophy should be put into practice.4
The new approach entrenches four principles that ideally ought to guide Fund
officials' approach to conditionality: (1) ownership, meaning that the IMF must
interact in ways which permit countries to take the lead, and that Fund officials
must continue talking and not walk away from negotiations; (2) parsimony of
goals; (3) focus on conditions which clearly lead to specified goals; and (4) clarity
as to what is and what is not a condition of the loan. It bears noting that the actual
implementation of these new guidelines will require serious and active monitoring
and enforcement not just by senior management within the Fund but also by its
Executive Board - indeed, the not-so-different previous conditionality guidelines
were honoured more in breach.
These revisions, while welcome, will not by themselves resolve the
democratic deficit in the IMF. The Fund remains deeply involved in political
matters. In effect, as the IMF's role has changed it has become part legislature,
deciding or strongly influencing what policies countries will adopt and how they
will spend funds, part executive branch, heavily influencing how those policies
will be implemented, and part agency of restraint on governments, holding them to
explicit targets and policy objectives and monitoring their performance in
achieving these goals. Yet the Fund's governance structure has not changed to
reflect its new roles.
The Democracy Gap
At best, there is a tenuous link from the IMF to citizens it affects. In a handful of
rich-country democracies, citizens elect politicians, some of whom form a
government that appoints ministers who appoint an Executive Director, who
usually need not report to anyone other than the minister. Some rich countries
share Executive Directors, but the largest shareholders each have their own and can
replace him or her at any time - holding him or her directly to account for his or
her actions on the board. Contrast this to the lack of accountability of Executive
Directors to the developing countries, all of whom are grouped in constituencies
represented by one member of the board who cannot be replaced at the whim of
any one government. Consider a person living in an undemocratic country with no
opportunity to elect (or throw out) his or her government. The unelected
government joins with other governments, sometimes similarly unelected, to select,
in a closed-door process, a single Executive Director who must represent all the
countries in that constituency.
1 www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2003/eng/050803.htm.
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Other chapters in this volume address the issue of whether the IMF's
governance structure should undergo fundamental reform that would require
renegotiation of the Articles of Agreement to change the relative voting power of
rich and poor IMF members. This chapter examines a more immediately applicable
set of reforms: how might citizens in all countries better hold the IMF to account
and exercise voice in its decisions, much as they would expect to do with their own
governments, within the existing structure and rules of the organization?
This chapter focuses particularly on the role of parliamentarians as
potentially the key and most legitimate interlocutors between societies and
governments. It describes a situation very much in flux, with parliamentarians,
non-governmental activists, and IMF staff and Executive Directors already
grappling with difficult questions about how best to ensure adequate accountability
and voice. It assesses the existing role of parliamentarians in holding the board
accountable and in shaping Fund policies and programs. It concludes with
recommendations for enhancing that role.
Underscoring the analysis is the assumption, now openly recognised by
the IMF, that the institution's effectiveness depends upon a greater engagement
with parliaments and citizens within countries. Compliance with Fund-supported
policies, even where they are narrowed to a focused minimum of conditionality,
cannot be achieved simply by enhancing the Fund's public relations. Key groups
within countries must be drawn into the process of formulating, monitoring and
implementing policies. In the current jargon, 'local ownership' of policies is
critical if the IMF's work is to be successful. But this must go beyond
consultations as currently conducted by the Fund.
Why Focus on Parliaments?
To date parliamentarians have played relatively little part in oversight of the IMF.
An array of non-governmental advocacy and campaigning organizations has
attempted to fill the gap. Spurred on by the growing influence of the IMF on
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the impact of structural
adjustment programs, many groups came together to attempt to influence the IMF
directly. They have campaigned on a wide range of issues, from labour rights to
environment to corruption. The largest efforts have centred on poverty, debt relief,
and the processes of decision making at the Fund. The range of tactics reflects the
range of groups and issues: everything from street protests at the Fund's annual
meetings to correspondence and meetings with senior staff and Executive Directors
to engagement with member governments and parliaments.5
5 For a detailed account of the role of civil society groups at the IMF, see Robert O'Brien,
Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams, 'The International Monetary Fund
and Social Movements', in Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic
Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000,
pp. 159-205.
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There is no question that the efforts of NGOs have borne fruit. Thanks in
substantial part to their demands, the Fund is a far more transparent and less
secretive organization than it was a decade ago, and it pays at least some attention
to some of the substantive issues raised by the campaigners. However, with a few
notable exceptions, non-governmental organizations lack the sustained funding and
expertise needed for concerted campaigns on Fund issues.
Moreover, relying on civil society groups to serve as the channel for
public voice into the IMF is problematic. Which voices to include or exclude is
often decided haphazardly, or relies upon the Fund itself to act as a gatekeeper,
picking and choosing with whom it will consult.6 Inevitably the best-funded,
largest, and best-located NGOs end up with disproportionate attention. This
magnifies the voice of Northern citizens within the Fund since they have more
chance to influence both their powerful government representatives in the
institution as well as their home-grown NGOs and their parliaments.
More philosophically, non-governmental organizations may lack the
legitimacy that accrues to members of parliaments when those members are
elected. In democracies, parliamentarians channel and balance the sometimes
competing interests of various elements of civil society. In exercising this role,
they are held to account not only by elections but by each other through
parliamentary rules and processes, by their political parties, and by counter-
balancing institutions of government including the courts, ombudsmen and such
like. Non-governmental organizations are not always held to account. They need to
attract members and funding and hence they need media attention and public
support; but few are subject to any form of representative or democratic
accountability.
At the local level, the use of non-governmental organizations as the sole
way to link citizens to the IMF risks eroding efforts to strengthen democracy and
accountable government by sidestepping local representative institutions such as
parliaments, particularly in developing countries. This risk is heightened by the
Fund's new propensity to consult at local levels with non-governmental groups in
efforts to broaden support for agreements it forges directly with executive branch
agencies.
This is not to argue against the right of such groups to engage the Fund
and its member governments however they (peacefully) can. Such public
engagement is a crucial element of good governance, whether at the national or
global level. But it cannot be the sole mechanism for channelling citizen voices.
Fortunately, the engagement of civil society can actually strengthen the
incentives and possibilities for parliaments to hold the Fund to account. Their
monitoring and publicizing of the IMF's activities has served to draw attention to
the IMF and not least to generate parliamentary interest in and scrutiny of the IMF,
especially in Northern legislatures.
6 The Fund has now published a guide to assist staff in conducting outreach which outlines
how they might build positive relationships and how such outreach might assist them. The
guide can be accessed at www.imf.org/external/np/cso/eng/2003/101003.htm.
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Overseeing the IMF in Northern Parliaments
Parliaments in the larger creditor countries of the Fund have always had at least
nominal power to oversee the Fund's business. As holders of the power of the
purse, their assent is necessary before the IMF can increase its financial resources.
Further, using their powers to review, question, and legislate ministry of finance
policy, they can technically exert oversight and control over the actions of the
government's Executive Director on the IMF board.7 In practice, parliaments for
most of the life of the Fund have not taken up active oversight roles. But in recent
years, as the Fund's purview has broadened and its activities have become
increasingly controversial, parliaments in a number of creditor countries in the
North have become more active with regard to the Fund. They have summoned,
questioned, and grilled officials from their ministry of finance and the IMF itself.
They have rejected or threatened to reject IMF quota increases, and made approval
contingent on specific IMF reforms. They have passed legislative mandates
requiring Executive Directors to pursue certain policies at the Executive Board.
While many national legislatures are capable of exerting influence on IMF
governance and many legislatures have increasingly done so, the US Congress has
taken a far more active oversight role than any parliament. Accordingly, our review
of the record of legislative oversight of the IMF is largely devoted to evaluating
and analyzing the Congressional experience. The role of Congress is important not
just because Congress has been responsible for the bulk of legislative oversight but
because its forays into Fund governance suggest some of the possibilities and
pitfalls of further expanding parliamentary oversight of the IMF. But while the
example of Congress provides some useful lessons for legislators around the world
who seek to increase their oversight role, one of the key conclusions to be drawn
from observing Congress's experience with the IMF is that no other parliament is
likely to produce the kind of oversight, positive and otherwise, held by Congress.
Advocates of parliamentary oversight have expressed the hope that, if other
legislatures would simply follow the example of Congress, Fund governance
would become much more democratic. Others have cautioned that Congress's
oversight has been politicized and misguided, and the Fund would be damaged by
more such activism. A close look at the history of Congressional oversight and
emerging efforts in other legislatures suggests that both these hopes and fears are
overdrawn.
The Singular Case of the US Congress
Why has the US Congress been the torchbearer of legislative oversight? Since the
US has the largest share of votes on the IMF board (and veto power on crucial
matters such as quota increases), Congress clearly has a larger incentive to become
7 The power of parliaments to legislate international financial policy varies, of course, from
political system to political system. Further, this power is significantly smaller in countries
that share an Executive Director among other countries in a constituency and in cases where
the ED reports to an independent central bank rather than the finance ministry.
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involved in IMF matters than do other legislative bodies. Located on the other side
of Washington from the IMF's headquarters and blessed with generous staff and
funding resources, Congress also has fewer logistical obstacles to realizing that
influence than do other legislatures. But the overwhelming reason for Congress's
extraordinary role is that the US political system provides Congress with
extraordinary powers over the US executive branch. The US has a system in which
the president can be, and often is, from a different political party from the one that
controls Congress. Congress's most significant Fund oversight efforts have taken
place at moments (such as 1983 and 1998) when Congress and the White House
were at odds in ways that are impossible in the parliamentary systems of the other
major creditors.
Congress's oversight of the IMF is characterised by long periods of
neglect punctuated by brief flurries of activity. Treasury provides Congress with
regular reports about IMF business and committees in the House and Senate
attempt to stay apprised of Fund developments, but international financial issues
ordinarily occupy such a low place on the political agenda that IMF business
generally receives very little attention. On a number of occasions in the past
several decades, though, political forces and economic events have converged to
put the Fund at the centre of legislative controversy. By examining two of those
episodes, in 1983 and 1998, we hope to illuminate the circumstances that make
Congress the most active legislative overseer of the IMF. It should be clear that
Congressional oversight has often been driven more by narrow domestic politics
than by the challenges of global economic governance. It should also be apparent
that Congress is an extraordinary case, and that no other legislature can be
expected to play as dynamic an oversight role on IMF matters. Still, Congress's
experience highlights some of possibilities and limitations of using domestic
legislatures to democratize decision making at the Fund.
Two Episodes of Focused Congressional Attention
In 1983, the IMF proposed a US$33 billion increase in IMF quotas and an US$18.5
billion increase in the General Agreements to Borrow, which amounted to a
roughly 50 per cent increase in the IMF's total resources. This dramatic expansion
came on the tail end of the Latin American debt crisis that began in Mexico in
1982. The Fund set a deadline of 30 November 1983, for member country approvals,
and the Reagan administration put its support behind fulfilling the US commitment.
According to US law, expanding the quota requires Congressional authorization, so
the Republican administration called on a split Congress (Democratically-
controlled House of Representatives and Republican Senate) to act.
A fight ensued in the US Congress, which touched on issues of
legitimate concern (such as moral hazard in international bailouts), but in the end
hinged on narrow domestic political agendas. Democratic leaders in Congress
made their support of the proposal contingent on the administration's approval of
a measure that would increase subsidies to provide low-income housing.
Meanwhile, Republican lawmakers pushed for language requiring the US to oppose
IMF measures in communist countries. Two privately-organized right-wing anti-
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IMF campaigns used radio advertisements and mailings to claim that the IMF was
turning Uncle Sam into 'Uncle Sucker', financier of delinquent borrowers and
communist dictators in unsavoury regimes in Iraq, Laos, Tanzania, and
Mozambique.8
A combined IMF-housing bill finally passed Congress on 18 November
1983. Along with subsidies for low-income housing, it included compromises on
the substance of US policy at the IMF. Instead of requiring the US Executive
Director to automatically oppose loans to communist countries and to South
Africa, as critics had initially insisted, the final bill required the Treasury Secretary
to explain any favourable US vote on such loans and, if requested, appear before
Congress to justify the vote.9 The legislation also included mandates requiring the
US Executive Director to pursue a set of policies designed to reduce moral hazard
in IMF lending, increase transparency, and promote free trade.10
An even more dramatic collision between the IMF and Congress took
place in 1998, when the IMF, recently stung by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997,
proposed a 45 per cent quota increase. The Democratic Clinton Administration
asked a Republican-led Congress to approve the jump in the US contribution. In
the ensuing debate, opponents used politically popular isolationist themes but also
expressed broader concerns including: the moral hazard problems inherent in
bailing out bankrupt regimes; qualms about the IMF's excessive political influence
in post-crisis Asia; outrage that the IMF had provided loans to ruthless regimes like
Suharto's government in Indonesia without opposition from the US representative;
and (from Democrats) misgivings about the insufficient emphasis on social safety
net programs and labour standards in the IMF's reform programs.
In the end, dissatisfaction with the IMF coalesced around the issue of
transparency. In the legislation passed in October 1998 that finally approved the
quota increase, Congress imposed a new set of mandates requiring the US ED
(Executive Director) to take on a broad reform agenda at the IMF addressing
transparency, exchange rate stability, sound banking principles, good lending, and
a dozen other priorities. Treasury was also required to make more frequent and
thorough reports to Congress, including updates on the progress of Congress's
proposed reforms. Most importantly, Congress created a commission chaired by
Professor Allan Meltzer (who had been on record arguing that the IMF should be
abolished") to investigate the functioning of the IMF and other international
financial institutions and propose reforms. The Meltzer Commission reported back
in 2000 with a sharply critical series of proposals designed to limit the scope of
8 Leonard Silk, 'The Campaign Against IMF', The New York Times, 19 October 1983, D2.
9 Hobart Rowen, 'Massive IMF, Housing Compromise is Approved by Senate, 67 to 30;
Major Changes Seen in Lending', The Washington Post, 18 November 1983, D8.
10 U.S.C. 286z-gg, 30 November 1983. See GAO Report GA 03-401R, 'Treasury Maintains
a Formal Process to Advance U.S. Policies at the International Monetary Fund', February
2003.
11 Allan Meltzer, 'Why it is Time to Close Down the IMF', Financial Times, 16 June 1995,
p. 21.
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IMF activity and make the Fund more accountable to national governments
(especially the US government).
While these are only two episodes in the story of Congress's oversight of
the IMF, the dominant features of these episodes are typical of Congress's role in
Fund governance. One key point is that Congress was moved to act by a quota
increase proposal which it had the authority to approve or reject. (And since an
IMF quota increase cannot take place with the approval of members with 85 per
cent of quotas, Congress has effective veto power over the entire proposal.) The
bulk of Congressional activism towards the IMF has occurred at times when quota
increases have been under consideration. The political stakes of these approval
processes are somewhat heightened by 'sticker-shock'. The 1998 quota increase,
for example, came to US$17 billion, and although raising the quota by US$17
billion costs the US far less than US$17 billion, this point was usually lost in the
course of Congressional debates.12
Another important point is that these battles took place when Congress
and the White House were controlled by different political parties. Opposing the
quota increase provides Congress with a way of expending the President's political
capital and exacting concessions on unrelated partisan issues, as was the case with
housing for the Democratic House of Representatives in 1983. Less cynically,
constraining the US ED with legislative mandates offers a means for Congress to
impose its partisan policies on the executive branch.
Another central factor is that in both 1983 and 1998 the IMF had recently
gone through a highly-publicized and criticized financial crisis - the Latin
American debt crisis in 1982 and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. These
episodes elevated the importance of international finance as a public policy issue
and led to public pressure, particularly channelled through NGOs, in favour of
changing the Fund's course.
Types of Congressional Oversight
Congressional oversight of the IMF can be separated into two types: review and
control. Review is the most basic and, in the end, the most essential form of
legislative oversight of the IMF. The US Congress currently requires a number of
reports from the Treasury Department, including a quarterly report on the US
Executive Director's votes on new programs and semi-annual reports on foreign
exchange issues, which ordinarily involves IMF policy discussion. As an
outgrowth of the Meltzer Commission process, Treasury must file annual reports
on its efforts to promote US policies at the Fund and on governance reforms taking
place at the Fund, such as increasing the transparency or changing the extent of
12 Interview with Jon Rosenwasser, former professional staff member to the U.S. Senate
Budget Committee responsible for international affairs, March, 2004. Although Treasury
argues that there is actually no cost to an IMF quota increase (since it is an exchange of
monetary assets rather than an expenditure), there is a cost from interest rate risk and
valuation adjustments. Thus the true cost is somewhere between zero and the 'sticker price'.
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IMF conditionality requirements.13 Congress has also relied on its research agency,
the General Accounting Office (which has a US$432 million annual budget and a
3200 person staff)14 to conduct ten major studies of IMF policies since 1998 (and
one each in the 1970s and 1980s).15
On occasion, Congress has engaged in IMF review through fact-finding
projects of its own. For example, in April of 1998 a House Banking subcommittee
called on United States Executive Director Karin Lissakers to testify. Along with
another Treasury official, Lissakers underwent nearly two hours of hostile
questioning, in which legislators asserted that, in the recent IMF bailout in
Indonesia, the US ED's office had neglected Congress's instructions to oppose
IMF programs in countries with records of human rights abuses.16 Members of
Congress and their staff have also attended annual meetings of the IMF, although
since they attended as visitors they did not have access to policy making meetings
or even have much opportunity to question senior staff.
In contrast to oversight through review, oversight through control consists
of attempts to dictate IMF policy. One way in which Congress has exercised
control has been to make the release of approved funding conditional upon
particular IMF reforms. For example, Congress replied to a 1994 IMF request for
US$100 million for an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program
by providing US$75 million and promising the rest when a list of confidential IMF
documents, including policy framework papers, were made public.17 This condition
led to an important step forward in IMF transparency. Again in 1998, the US
Congress made its approval of the major quota increase conditional on several
reforms designed to improve accountability and reduce high-risk investment. For
its part, the IMF has generally satisfied the US conditions, but not without claiming
that these were reforms that the IMF was already working on anyway, and that no
single country would force reforms on the Fund.18
As we have already indicated, another way in which Congress has
exercised control in IMF matters is through legislative mandates dictating the
policies that the US ED must pursue on the board. As of 2003, there were 67 such
13 The Treasury Department is required to provide semi-annual foreign exchange reports to
Congress under section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Reporting about the progress of US policies at the Fund is pursuant to Sections 1503 and 1705
(a) of the International Financial Institutions Act and the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-113 section 504(e), cited in GAO-03-401R, 'Treasury Maintains
a Formal Process to Advance US Policies at the International Monetary Fund', p. 1.
14 The United States General Accounting Office, 'GAO at a Glance', www.gao.gov/about/
gglance.html.
15 These studies are available on the GAO's website, www.gao.gov, by searching for
'International Monetary Fund', in the 'Title' field of the site's search page.
16 David E. Sanger, 'IMF Loans to Rights Violators Are Attacked in Congress', The New
York Times, 22 April 1998.
17 Pratap Chatterjee, 'Accountancy: Uncertain Returns from a 50-year Investment - Why the
IMF and World Bank are Coming under Greater Scrutiny from their Backers', Financial
Times, 21 July 1994, p. 14.
18 'Congress Approves $18 Billion for IMF', 22 October 1998.
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legislative mandates currently in force prescribing US policies at the Fund, the
oldest dating from 1945.19 Congress's legislative mandates can be divided into two
broad categories, policy mandates and directed vote mandates.20 Policy mandates
identify policy priorities of the Congress and direct the US ED to use his 'voice'
and/or 'vote' to pursue those priorities. For example, a policy mandate in the 1998
quota increase legislation asks Treasury to instruct the US ED to use his voice and
vote to promote policies that will open markets for agricultural commodities and
reduce trade barriers.21 Directed vote mandates more specifically require the US
ED to oppose particular types of IMF programs; one such mandate that was passed
in 2002 requires the US ED to oppose any loans to the Cambodian government,
except to support basic human needs.22
What is the effect of these mandates on IMF policy? The answer depends
on both the content of the mandate and the standards by which we measure
effectiveness. One way to judge the policy mandates is by the extent to which the
mandate succeeds in persuading the IMF staff to consider an issue in designing a
program. By this standard, most policy mandates have been ineffective because
they address issues that the IMF staff considers distant from the Fund's core
macroeconomic focus. Currently active mandates regarding environmental and
labour conditions, female genital mutilation, and trafficking in women address
important issues, but not concerns the IMF staff typically view as sufficiently
relevant to economic stability and growth to be determinants of IMF program
policy. (If anything, the staff would argue, these are issues for the World Bank or
other multilateral development banks.) On issues such as these, the US ED
essentially goes through the motions of advocating Congress's policy by making
statements at board meetings and requesting the staff to pursue the matters further;
the staff, already occupied by more macroeconomically-relevant issues, generally
declines to add the issues to the institution's research agenda. This is especially
true for proposals that are not only irrelevant to macroeconomic stability but seem
to narrowly promote American interests, such as a 2000 mandate requiring the US
ED to promote the use of US clean coal technology in infrastructure programs.23
Some policy mandates have no effect because they echo already-accepted
IMF policy. For example, a directed vote mandate that emerged from the 1983
quota increase controversy essentially articulates standard financial reasoning
about moral hazard and debt rescheduling;24 a 1978 measure (also prompted by a
quota increase) requires the US ED to encourage the IMF staff to formulate
economic stabilization programs that foster investment and employment;25 and a
19 Report of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade (GAO),
'International Monetary Fund', GAO-03-401R, 7 February 2003.
20 GAO's 2003 report 'Treasury Maintains a Formal Process to Advance US Policies at the
International Monetary Fund', GAO-03-401R, employs this distinction.
21
22 \
 22 U.S.C. 262n-3, 21 October 1998.
' P.L. 107-115, section 563, 10 January 2002.
23 P.L. 106-429, section 537, 6 November 2000.
24 U.S.C. 286dd, 30 November 1983.
25 22 U.S.C. 286e-9, 10 October 1978.
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1998 mandate encourages the US ED to work to strengthen the financial systems
of IMF member countries and promote sound banking principles and practices.26 In
each case, the legislative mandate reflected what was already considered to be the
core IMF mission at the time.
It is on issues that reside between these two extremes of irrelevance and
redundancy that legislative mandates have the greatest potential to affect IMF
policy. Yet it is difficult to find examples of policy mandates to date that fit that
description. Perhaps with time and repetition, the US ED's statements in
observance of Congress's policy mandates will lead to changes in the IMF's
priorities in designing programs. To be sure, none of Congress's more self-serving
policy mandates (such as a 2000 mandate requiring the US ED to work toward the
maximum use of American goods in IMF programs) will change any minds in the
IMF staff. But it may be that persistent efforts to follow up on Congress's
mandates on sex trafficking or female genital mutilation, now considered irrelevant
to IMF policy, may lead to the IMF staff changing its view of what is relevant.
In the case of directed vote mandates, the issue becomes slightly more
complicated. Since the US has the largest single bloc of votes on the Executive
Board (17 per cent), its votes can make a difference in deciding IMF policy.
Approval of a country's IMF program requires support from a majority of the
board so the US cannot unilaterally block access to IMF funds. Still, an excessively
self-serving or otherwise inappropriate directed vote mandate from Congress
cannot be politely ignored as are many of its policy mandates. At this point, the
directed vote mandates generally require the US ED to adopt predictable positions
opposing funding of terrorist states, communist dictatorships (a holdover from
1983 quota increase legislation), and specific states (Cambodia, Sudan and
Burma). Occasionally, one is nakedly self-serving, as in the 1986 mandate
forbidding the US ED from supporting programs that would lead to production for
export that would hurt US industry.27
Of the total of 26 directed vote mandates, only a few stand out as having a
substantial effect on IMF policy. One example is the 1996 mandate requiring the
US ED to oppose IMF assistance to countries that do not conduct and report
regular audits of their military spending to civilian authorities.28 Starting in 1999,
the US ED was required to vote against or abstain on an IMF program if the
program country appeared on a blacklist compiled by a newly-formed US
Interagency Policy Group (convened by Treasury and made up of representatives
from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the US Agency for
International Development, the National Security Council, and the Office of
Management and Budget). As of 2000, 17 countries were on the list (Treasury did
not disclose which ones), and the US ED's office had abstained on three programs
in the first year the mandate was in effect. The IMF staff is generally supportive of
26 22 U.S.C. 262o-2, 21 October 1998. This mandate is examined in depth in GAO-01-214.
27 22 U.S.C. 262h, 15 October 1986 (also repeated in P.L. 107-115, section 514, 10 January
2002).
28 22 U.S.C. 262k-l, 30 September 1996. Congress passed four separate mandates
concerning military audits beginning in 1992.
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the idea of military audits, since military spending is clearly a relevant sign of a
country's commitment to economic development and a measure of the extent to
which IMF funds are being used for the purposes intended. Still, the IMF does not
require military audit data as a condition for its programs, so US efforts to identify
countries that failed to meet its standards has heightened the visibility and
importance of military spending discipline in many cases.29 One measure of the
success of the mandate is that non-compliant countries such as Burkina Faso,
Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau have made efforts to get off the list in order to
continue receiving aid.30
Not surprisingly, Congress has been interested in determining whether its
mandates are having the desired effect at the IMF. Part of the controversy in the
1998 quota increase battle in Congress was the extent to which the US ED's office
appeared to be flouting Congress's list of mandates. One of the conclusions
lawmakers arrived at during the questioning of US Executive Director Karin
Lissakers was that the US ED's office was not following up on legislative
mandates at the IMF.31 As a result, in 1999 the US Treasury Department instituted
a formal process systematically to promote these policies at the IMF. The process
relied upon a special departmental task force to seek out opportunities to advance
the mandated policies through dialogue with Fund staff, discussions with program
country officials, and formal statements at the Executive Board.32 As mentioned
above, the General Accounting Office is now required to report annually on the
extent to which the US ED is working to promote its mandates at the IMF.33
Members of the US ED's office have expressed concern that the
legislative mandates actually reduce their influence in board discussions.34 The
ED's obligation to rehearse points mandated by Congress lessens the impact of any
attempt to add more specific reflections on an issue or program. In the case of
directed votes, mandates can also restrain US influence. The fact that everyone
knows that the US will vote 'no' on a Cambodia program circumscribes the ED's
ability to shape that program. Still, EDs find ways to make their opinions known,
even when their statements and votes are governed by Congress, or a Treasury
Department for that matter. It is not difficult for the ED to follow the letter of the
mandate in board discussions while making clear the independent position of the
ED's office.
29GAO-01-214, p. 60.
30GAO-01-214, pp. 57, 63.
31 David E. Sanger, op. cit, p. A8; Nancy Dunne, 'IMF Chiefs Face a Grilling from a Lone
Warrior of Capitol Hill: Bernie Sanders is Taking on the Might of the White House and
Most of the Senate', The Financial Times Limited, 21 April 1998, p. 6.
32 'International Monetary Fund: Efforts to Advance US Policies at the Fund', GAO-01-214,
p. 6.
33 Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-113 section 504(e), cited
in GAO-03-401R, op. cit., p. 1.
34 This point is made in GAO-01-214, pp. 18-19, 71.
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Prospects for Legislative Oversight in Other Creditor Countries
Parliaments in other creditor countries generally have the same opportunities to
oversee IMF policy that are available to the US Congress. A legislative action is
required in each of the major creditor countries before a quota increase can be
passed.35 To varying degrees, parliaments in these countries also have the legal
authority to legislate national policy toward the IMF. But no other parliament has the
degree of oversight or political controversy on IMF issues approaching what we have
seen in Congress. In part, this has to do with the US's special place in the IMF; since
no country has anything near the US's voting share (Japan, with 6.15 per cent of the
votes, is second to the US's 17.14 per cent36), no parliament has as much of an
incentive to try to shape IMF policy. But the predominant reason why parliaments
have taken a smaller role must be that, in parliamentary systems, the legislature has a
less adversarial relationship with its cabinet than Congress does with the US
administration. Parliaments and their cabinets are controlled by the same party, so
IMF policy making is less likely to become a battle in an infra-governmental partisan
war in the way it periodically has in the US Congress. This is an obvious point of
comparative politics but it must be remembered as we contemplate the likely
effects of a further opening up of the Fund on parliamentary involvement.
Since IMF oversight in legislatures outside of the US occurs in a less
politicized environment, other creditor parliaments are extremely unlikely to adopt
the same brash and controlling tactics as has the US Congress. Still, in recent years
parliaments have increasingly acted as conduits for citizen concerns about the IMF
and signs of active oversight have proliferated.37 Both the UK parliament and the
French National Assembly began receiving reports on IMF matters from
government in 1999, and others, including Ireland (1999) and Italy (2003), passed
their own laws introducing reporting on IMF issues.38 Special committees in the
UK and French legislatures have closely tracked IMF issues and produced
thorough and useful reports. The UK House of Commons has also hosted IMF
35 In most cases, a parliament must make an amendment to the legislation through which a
nation joined the IMF, such as the 'Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act' in the case
of Canada. In the UK, the 1979 International Monetary Fund Act established that quota
increases would be undertaken via statutory instruments, which are orders promulgated by
the Treasury, laid before the House of Commons for 14 days, and then approved by a
resolution of the House.
36 'IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power', updated 29 February 2004.
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm. Last checked 31 March 2004.
37 Our discussion of European parliamentary oversight of the IMF benefited from an internal
background paper, 'Parliamentary Scrutiny of IFI Issues in Europe', prepared by Agir Ici, a
Paris-based NGO working on global development issues. This research is available from
Agir Ici on request.
38 On UK and France: Tavernier, pp. 205-206, email from Alex Wilks, 13 May 2003. On
Ireland: Interview with Carol Welch, Friends of the Earth, 29 April 2003. On Italy: email
from Antonio Tricarico of Italian NGO CRBM, 30 March 2003, to Carol Welch et al.
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Managing Director Horst Kohler for a heated question-and-answer session.39
Kohler later made appearances before the German Bundestag, the Dutch
parliament, and the Chilean Senate, although the IMF is careful to stress that its
officials never 'testify' before parliaments, maintaining that IMF staff cannot be
called to account in this manner.
Perhaps the most striking recent example of parliamentary activism on
IMF matters outside of the US occurred in Italy in March of 2003. The Italian
Senate used the occasion of its 1.12 million euro replenishment of the PRGF
(Poverty Reduction Growth Facility) to lay down a number of policy prescriptions
which, although non-binding, the government accepted as directives. It instructed
the treasury to promote better transparency and participation in the PRGF process,
to support the adoption of revised parameters for the evaluation of the
environmental and social impacts of PRGF processes, and to work for the
development of an improved arbitration mechanism within the IMF. Further, the
treasury was directed to report on the IMF spring meeting and describe what steps
were undertaken to further the above agenda. Most significantly, the PRGF
funding was made nominally conditional on the treasury fulfilling these
obligations. (Since the directives did not hold the force of law, neither did the
conditionality of the funding.40) The Senate's muscular treatment of the Italian
treasury on IMF issues suggests that parliamentary activism outside the US may
more frequently move from review to control.
Still, for the foreseeable future, no parliament other than Congress is
likely to burden the Executive Board with mandated pro forma statements or apply
serious pressure on its government and the IMF by threatening to reject a quota
increase. This point is extremely important because Congress's oversight of the
IMF is often mentioned as an example of the dangers of involving national
legislatures in Fund governance. In our view, the fundamental differences between
the US Congress and other legislatures mean that, even if the Fund follows
recommendations to further open its operations to scrutiny, it will not likely face
more of the controlling behaviour it has seen from Congress. On the other hand,
because other legislatures do not have as adversarial a relationship with their
cabinets as is the case in the US, there are limits to the positive contributions that
creditor country legislative oversight is likely to make.
The Emerging Involvement of Parliaments in Southern Countries
Parliaments in borrowing countries have typically had very little involvement with
the IMF. The terms of an IMF structural adjustment program are usually decided
upon in negotiations between the IMF staff and the finance ministry and central
bank of the country concerned. Parliamentary approval is critical to the
implementation of many of the more extensive Fund programs, since privatization
39 The transcript of the exchange is available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc868-iii/uc86802.htm.
40 Emails from Antonio Tricarico of Italian NGO CRBM, 30 March 2003 and 23 March 2004.
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programs, fiscal reforms, and financial system restructuring usually require new
legislation. That said, the IMF has typically expected borrowing country
parliaments to accede to the terms of the agreement, or at least has left the task of
winning parliamentary cooperation to its interlocutors in the ministry of finance. A
series of rebuffs from program country parliaments and growing parliamentary
interest in development policies have forced the Fund to put much more effort into
consulting and persuading program country parliaments.
Parliaments played leading roles in two of the most well-publicized recent
economic crises: Russia in 1997-1998 and Argentina in 2001-2002. Russia's
relationship with the IMF in the late 1990s presented one of many battlefields in
the brutal political struggles over market reform that took place between President
Yeltsin and a parliament heavily laden with recalcitrant communists. IMF loans to
Russia included a number of conditions, each of which provoked political fire
fights: tax reforms to increase revenues and rationalize an inconsistent and
corruption-prone system; spending cuts on the military and state-subsidized
industries; and the break up of nationwide gas and electrical monopolies.
Parliament at first ignored and then fought back against these requirements. As
Russia's economic crises deepened over the winter of 1997 and spring of 1998, the
IMF continued to provide loans despite the government's failure to follow through
on loan conditions. In July 1998, a day after a new US$17.1 billion loan agreement
was negotiated, parliament flatly rejected a number of the tax reforms that were
key conditions of the loan. President Yeltsin vetoed several of the parliament's
laws and began to institute required reforms by decree. The IMF, wanting to send a
message to lawmakers, reduced the value of the first instalment of its loan. The
power struggle between Yeltsin and parliament continued as Russia's currency was
devalued and the crisis hit bottom in August of 1998. Even after the IMF
reengaged with Russia the following spring, it continued to face sporadic
parliamentary resistance to IMF-sponsored reforms.41
Argentina, once considered a model program country, defaulted in
December 2001 on US$155 billion in foreign debt, the largest default in history.
The IMF quickly suspended aid. Argentina requested financial assistance from the
Fund in early 2002 and was met with a list of conditions including monetary
adjustments, spending cuts, and politically sensitive reforms to the system of
revenue-sharing with the provinces. Seeing no choice, the government met most of
the IMF's demands, but the parliament was more stubborn, refusing to move on a bill
converting savings to bonds while flouting IMF orders by passing bills reforming
bankruptcy rules and punishing 'economic subversion' which removed money from
the cash-strapped economy. Legislators faced stiff pressure from the IMF and the
government to step into line, but also confronted burgeoning popular resistance to
41 This account is based largely on a series of articles written by Michael R. Gordon in the
New York Times during the crisis 'Pressures for Change Mounting in Russia', 2 January
1997, p. 13; 'Russia Reaches IMF Accord to Free Loans', 13 December 1997, p. 1; 'Russia
Resists IMF's Strategy for Reducing Budget Deficit', p. 3, 16 May 1998; 'Russia and
Lenders Seal Accord on $17 Billion in New Support', p. 1; 14 July 1998; 'Parliament in
Russia Fails to Pass Bills Tied to Loans', 18 July 1998, p. 4.
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IMF-led reform, including demonstrations in which bank account holders and other
protestors surrounded the Senate and refused to let legislators enter.42 With the
IMF and parliament still at loggerheads over the 'economic subversion' statute,
Argentina sank further and threatened to default on loan payments to the World
Bank unless it obtained more assistance from the IMF. Ultimately, the IMF
provided a 'transitional loan' of US$6.78 billion, forestalling further crisis but
leaving unresolved major disagreements between parliament and the Fund.
In several less well-known cases, national parliaments have refused to
abide by the terms of agreements in which they had no voice. In Turkey in 1998,
parliament forced the government to break its promise to the IMF to hold down the
wage increases of public sector workers.43 In 1999 and 2000, the Moldovan
parliament repeatedly rejected IMF-mandated privatization of wine, brandy, and
tobacco enterprises in a political fight that brought down a government.
(Eventually, despite communist opposition, the privatization took place and the
IMF relationship was restored.44) The Indonesian government declared in January
of 2003 that it would break free from its commitments to the IMF; parliamentary
pressure, including a decree in October of 2002 requiring the government not to
extend the current IMF program, was a vital part of this decision.45
Some developing country parliamentarians are looking to find ways to
systematically become proactive, rather than merely reacting to IMF-Executive
Branch agreements post hoc. In the Brazilian parliament there have been recent
calls for a parliamentary front on the IMF and World Bank to heighten their
accountability to parliaments across Latin America. The measures proposed
include involving parliament in the selection and accountability of Brazilian
representatives on the board, enacting legislation to ensure that information on loan
agreements is made public, and creating mechanisms to facilitate greater
participation of officials and civil society in the design of programs. 6
The involvement of Southern country parliaments in considering,
implementing, and overseeing IMF programs is circumscribed by a number of
factors. Most important is the weak capacity of many of these bodies. Many
Southern country parliamentarians lack the office space and paid staff needed to
conduct the research required to arrive at informed assessments of these programs,
let alone an independent research agency along the lines of the US Congress's
General Accounting Office. Another important barrier is the reluctance of
governments to involve their parliaments in these matters. By keeping parliament
in the dark on the IMF program and the economic facts surrounding it, a
42 Marcela Valente, 'Argentina: Economy Minister Abandons a Sinking Ship', Inter Press
Service, 23 April 2002.
43 'Politics Cloud the Economic Horizon', Middle East Economic Digest, 1 August 1998, p. 7.
44 'Moldovan Government Resigns', Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 November 1999.
'Moldova 'May Face Default' After Parliament Rejects Privatization', BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 18 April 2000.
45 Smitha Francis, 'Indonesia's Battle of Will with the IMF', Network Ideas, 25 February
2003, www.networkideas.org/themes/trade/feb2003/tp25_Indonesia.htm.
46 www.rbrasil.org.br/frenteparlamentar.
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government may hope to deflect criticism of its own failings onto the IMF and
prevent parliamentarians from winning easy political victories. Finally, until
recently the IMF tended to treat recalcitrant parliaments as a part of the problem or
an obstacle to reform rather than as a vital source of ownership - and even
authorship - of a country's economic policies.
IMF Responses
In two ways, the IMF has taken steps to enable parliamentarians to play a more
constructive role. First is the broad progress over the past decade on IMF
transparency. An impressive variety of important documents is now routinely
released, ranging from staff reports to Letters of Intent, unless the relevant member
country objects to publication.47 Those releases go a long way toward enabling
parliamentarians to understand and assess the work of the IMF. But because they
rarely include documents related to issues still under negotiation, the releases do
not allow for effective input into that work.
The IMF is also making quite specific efforts to inform and engage
parliamentarians as part of its broader efforts encouraging governments and IMF
staff (where the government allows) to reach out to a broad range of stakeholders
(including parliamentarians) to build support for economic reforms. IMF missions,
including those conducting Article IV surveillance, often meet with a wide range
of stakeholders, not just the finance and central bank officials who have long been
the Fund's interlocutors.
The IMF's resident representatives in many countries have also begun to
make contact with members of parliaments. Their ability to do so depends both on
their personal proclivities and on the receptivity of their host country to the idea.
When it works well, such outreach can be highly productive for all concerned. In
Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 1990s, for example, the resident
representative met with parliamentarians as he or they saw fit. IMF missions also
had regular exchanges with relevant parliamentary committees, organized by the
central government authorities. Such contacts could help to give the IMF a sense of
47 See Publication Policies of the Fund, 12 February 2004, at
www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2004/021204.pdf. IMF staff seem willing to go farther
than the Executive Board will allow: see The Fund's Transparency Policy: Issues and
Next Steps, at www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2003/092903.htm. See also The Fund's
Transparency Policy: Review of the Experience and Next Steps, at
www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2003/092903.htm. For an assessment of the Fund's
disclosure policy, see the regular columns by journalist Toby Mclntosh at
www.freedominfo.org/ifti/imf.htm. In some cases, the IMF forbids its member governments
to share certain documents even with legislators, a policy that would seem to be at odds with
broader Fund interests in legitimizing decision making. See: William E. Holder, 'Publication
Policies of the Fund' (Preliminary Version), IMF Legal Department and IMF Institute
Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, 7 May 2002. It was
formerly available at www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/holder.pdf, but that
link now goes directly to the main IMF website.
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the political implications of the issues countries are facing, to identify what
economically advisable steps would be politically feasible and to determine
country priorities. That said, for the IMF to benefit from these contacts, the
institution must find ways to incorporate the information into their operations and
to feed it back to the management and staff in Washington DC.
In addition to such outreach, the Fund has begun holding seminars for
parliamentarians. From 1993 to 1996, the IMF held several seminars and briefings
in national capitals for policy makers from formerly communist countries of
Europe and Central Asia, but these drew few legislators. In the mid-1990s, the
Fund held a special seminar for Russian parliamentarians for three days at the
IMF's regular training ground in Vienna. Thereafter, the Fund held several week-
long sessions for parliamentarians from the region, aimed at both educating
parliamentarians about the IMF's role (globally and in particular countries) and at
providing an opportunity for legislators to express their views to the IMF. More
recently, other seminars have been held in Africa, in Kenya in 2002, and in Ghana
and Cameroon in 2003.
The Fund has also piggy-backed on the efforts of its sister institution, the
World Bank, in outreach to parliamentarians. In May 2000, the European Vice-
Presidency of the World Bank organized a conference in The Hague to provide a
forum for information sharing and open discussion between the Bank and
legislators. Out of that meeting grew what has now become the Parliamentary
Network on the World Bank (PNoWB), an independent non-profit association
registered under French law that brings together some 140 members of parliaments
from some 60 countries. Its purpose, according to its website, is 'to increase
parliamentary involvement and effectiveness in the field of international
development and to encourage dialogue between MPs [members of parliament]
and the World Bank'.48 At the group's fourth annual conference, held in Athens in
March 2003, IMF Managing Director Horst Kohler met with the group for a 90-
minute session that involved some fairly pointed questioning about the IMF, its
role, and its openness to parliamentary oversight and participation. That discussion
led to an exchange of letters between the PNoWB's Africa group and Kohler, all of
which are publicly available on the PNoWB website (www.pnowb.org) and the
IMF website (www.imf.org). The Fund is also participating in PNoWB-sponsored
visits by parliamentarians to PRSP countries.49
Most Executive Directors talk at least occasionally with legislators from
the countries that appoint or elect them. The number and nature of such contacts
vary widely, depending on the countries concerned, although most EDs report
growing interest from parliamentarians in initiating such contacts. In an effort to
systematize this somewhat haphazard set of interactions, in 2003 the Executive
Board set up a Working Group of IMF Executive Directors on Enhancing
Communication with National Legislators. Their report describes and encourages
48 www.pnowb.org/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid= 1
49 International Monetary Fund,
Strategy', 13 February 2003, p. 22.
49 International Monetary Fund, 'A Review of the Fund's External Communications
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more of the kinds of IMF outreach outlined above.50 But it is very tentative on the
question of just what greater parliamentary involvement should accomplish. The
report argues that more dialogue would be helpful both as a way to inform
parliamentarians and to enable the IMF to understand better the concerns of those
legislators. But it stresses repeatedly the importance of making clear that any
dialogue is not an opportunity for legislators to engage in program negotiations.
Parliaments as Stakeholders
As Fund staff and executive directors are quick to stress, the main role for
parliamentarians is at home, overseeing their central governments, including their
finance ministries, representing the interests of various constituencies, and setting
their country's policies in law. Domestic politics and lack of capacity often
combine to make such oversight and involvement a challenge.
One area in which the World Bank and the IMF have tried to encourage
broad political support for good economic policy is in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSP) process that now accompanies debt relief. PRSPs describe
the macroeconomic, structural, and social policies that a country intends to pursue
in order to fight poverty and encourage growth. The documents are supposed to be
prepared by low-income member countries by means of a participatory process that
involves a wide range of interested parties within the country as well as funders,
including the Bank and the Fund.51
Clearly, parliamentarians ought to be among the key stakeholders
included in the PRSP process. But in practice, they are not. The official Bank/Fund
review of the early PRSP process noted that the 'role of parliaments ... has
generally been limited, although individual parliamentarians have been involved in
some countries'.52 The report notes that in just a few cases (Burkina Faso and
Mauritania) have parliaments approved PRSPs, while in others (Nicaragua and
Honduras) individual legislators were involved in PRSP consultations. The
problem has been widely noted and funders are working to help parliaments
understand the PRSP process better and participate in it more effectively. But it is
clear that the PRSP process is very far from providing an answer to the problem of
adequate legislative oversight of and involvement in the development process
generally, much less specific oversight of Fund programs.
More generally, efforts to involve national parliaments in the oversight
and monitoring of government budgets and expenditures have been very slow to
50 Report of the Working Group of IMF Executive Directors on Enhancing Communication
with National Legislators, 15 January 2004, www.imf.org/external/np/ed/2004/ecnl/index.htm.
51 International Monetary Fund, 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Factsheet', April
2003, www.imf.org/external/np/esr/facts/prsp.htm.
52 International Development Association and International Monetary Fund, 'Review of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Early Experience with Interim PRSPs
and Full PRSPs', 26 March 2002, www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/review/earlyexp.pdf,
p. 22.
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show results and this bears directly on the role of parliaments in holding the IMF to
account. Even in countries such as Uganda, Bolivia and Ghana where efforts have
been made to strengthen the transparency and monitoring of public expenditure,
the role of parliaments in the process has remained fairly weak.53 This poses
several challenges for the IMF.
Challenges for the Fund
Parliaments and civil society groups have for a long time eschewed or been denied
a strong role in monitoring, let alone formulating, the core elements of an IMF
agreement - government budgets and expenditures. If parliaments are to play a
greater role, both the IMF and national governments will need at least to permit, if
not to facilitate or require, parliaments to get involved. In turn, other actors will
have to monitor what parliaments do in this regard.
For the IMF there is no quick or easy solution. In program countries (i.e.
those that are currently receiving IMF loans) the IMF now makes substantial efforts
to talk to a wider range of domestic actors, but it is still the case that the loan terms
are negotiated primarily with the finance ministry. On this point, the IMF staff has no
discretion - the Articles of Agreement that created the Fund specify that finance
ministries and central banks are to be its interlocutors in national governments. In
most cases parliaments do not get to vote on, and sometimes do not even see, the
loan terms before the deal is struck. However, in most cases parliamentary approval
is required to pass legislation implementing reforms and it is at least here that
parliaments can and should play a constructive role. Other government institutions
can help in this. For example, in many Commonwealth countries an auditor-general
is required to report to parliament on government expenditures and financial and
administrative actions. In Uganda, for example, the Public Accounts Committee
scrutinises and comments on the auditor-general's report with some alacrity. In
Ghana MPs are taking a deeper interest in monitoring the governments' expenditure
and poverty-reduction policies, and in Burkina Faso the National Assembly's
committees have a history of conducting enquiries on specific issues.54 Parliaments
could more actively use this kind of report, extended to cover all IMF activities in a
country, as a means to hold their government to account in relations with the IMF.
A further role the IMF can play relates to the problems of 'capacity' and
'interest' often invoked to explain the lack of parliamentary input and
accountability. In the Vienna seminars described above, Fund staff relate that some
of the early sessions had to be devoted to explaining such basic economic facts as
the tendency for large increases in the money supply (i.e. running the government
printing press) to lead to inflation. There is an obvious role for the IMF to play in
informing, explaining, and communicating information about economic policy.
Indeed the IMF has taken to this with some enthusiasm. That said, there is a high
53 John Roberts, Managing Public Expenditure for Development Results and Poverty
Reduction, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 203 (London, 2003).
54 Ibid, p. 59.
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degree of scepticism among parliamentarians, in both North and South, about the
impartiality of the Fund's efforts in this regard. On the ground the Fund is often
perceived as presenting just one view of economic policy or 'explaining Fund
policy' rather than opening up debates about economic policy which educate and
stimulate parliamentary debates and scrutiny.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The experience of creditor country parliamentary oversight of the IMF highlights
several advantages and disadvantages of democratizing the Fund in this way. On
the positive side, a greater engagement by parliaments could be reassuring to
citizens concerned that global institutions like the IMF are out of control, providing
them with a mechanism for being heard. On the global stage, as parliaments from a
larger number of countries become involved, they will counterbalance the
otherwise disproportionate influence of the US. Finally, as the example of the
military audits indicates, parliaments can expand the IMF (board and staff)
understanding of what constitutes relevant and important issues.
All that said, expanding the role of parliaments will not be a painless
process. It increases the risk (although, we argue, not by much) of burdening
Executive Board meetings with legislatively mandated pro forma statements and
voting restrictions and eroding the deliberative, consensus-building quality of the
institution. More generally, increasing the role of parliaments highlights
inequalities among legislatures of different countries. Some have weak
constitutional powers, few resources, or little power within domestic government.
These parliaments are unlikely to be able to exert any real influence in the Fund
and this could exacerbate the problem of disproportionate creditor influence in the
IMF, at least in the short term. Greater participation by parliaments will bring with
it all the glories of democracy, including the fact that democratic processes are
invariably messy, inefficient, and time-consuming - in short, the worst form of
government except for any other.
The approach we propose towards democratizing the IMF builds upon the
IMF's own revolution in transparency and disclosure. Where ten years ago almost
all Fund documents were difficult to obtain, today many are posted on the
institution's website. Furthermore, the institution has worked proactively with all
of its member governments to encourage them to be more transparent and to permit
the Fund to publish details of their agreement with the Fund and IMF reports about
the country. This is a vital step towards democratic accountability. That said, it
permits only a retrospective kind of accountability. By contrast, this chapter has
focused on an ongoing role for parliaments in overseeing the formulation and
implementation of the work of the IMF — not just in post-facto reviews.
The question then arises as to whom precisely parliaments should hold to
account in the IMF and how might this be better done. Is it the Fund staff or
management, or is it their country's individual Executive Director or the Executive
Board as a whole? Clearly all these levels of accountability are important. We
would argue that progress could be made in respect of each.
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The Fund staff and management should be held to account during and
after negotiations with a country, for their inputs, technical work, and impact on
domestic policy. This requires an increase in transparency and access to
information for appropriate parliamentary representatives throughout negotiations.
On this issue, IMF staff has rightly outlined problems resulting from opening up
delicate negotiation processes. Too easily, openness can become the prey of vested
interests or oppositional politics.55 That said, we are arguing for a more specific
kind of opening-up where a parliamentary body or committee delegated to apprise
itself of negotiations with the IMF would have access to documents (including
those the Fund currently classifies as 'confidential' and not for sharing even with
parliaments) throughout the process. There is ample precedent of parliamentary or
Congressional committees staying apprised and informed of highly sensitive
information in the areas of security and intelligence, as well as on economic issues.
To push forward in this way would require parliaments within Southern countries
to think carefully about how they might best structure and delegate their interaction
with the Fund to a particular committee or body.
This chapter has also highlighted the need for parliaments to play more of
a role in holding the Executive Board of the IMF to account. The board is the
political arm of the IMF, making political judgements and decisions on the basis of
technical and other advice offered by the management and staff. In theory it
represents all members of the institution. In practice there are serious flaws in the
chain of representation and accountability.56 But at core, if parliaments are
effectively to hold the Fund to account, it is vital that they know what decisions are
being made and with whose approval or abstention. They need at the very least to
know how their own government (or the Executive Director representing the group
of countries that includes their own) is representing their country's interests on the
board. This chapter has described the ways legislatures can demand and collect
information from their own governments. Progress on this would be greatly
enhanced if minutes of board meetings were published in a timely way (at best they
can be viewed several years later under the IMF's archives policy).57 More
ambitiously, several commentators have proposed that voting should take place on
all issues and a voting record should be kept and published.58 Indeed, this could be
taken as a natural extension of the IMF's current practice of publishing on their
website a summary of board discussions.
There are several arguments made against subjecting the board to this
kind of scrutiny. A first is that it would diminish rather than enhance Southern
power by eliminating the need to bring small countries within a consensus. The
presumption here is that small countries have an informal veto power through the
55 James M. Boughton and Alex Mourmouras, Is Policy Ownership an Operational Concept,
IMF Working Paper 02/72, 2002.
56 These are analyzed in full by Ngaire Woods (2001) 'Making the IMF and the World Bank
More Accountable', International Affairs, 77(1), January.
57 'Archives of the IMF', May 2003 Factsheet, IMF, Washington DC.
58 Jose De Gregorio, Barry Eichengreen, Takashito Ito and Charles Wyplocz, An
Independent and Accountable IMF (CEPR, Geneva 1999).
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operation of consensus. But this is not how decision making operates in the IMF
board. Typically on any issue the 'sense of the meeting' is gauged implicitly taking
into account the voting power of those around the table, and when a majority is
reached that is taken as the consensus of the board. Hence, small countries have no
veto power to lose through published voting records.
A second argument against published voting records is that it would erode
the collegiality and professionalism of the board. Board members might be overly
influenced by the need to account afterwards to those they represent outside the walls
of the board. This would lead them to vote for measures that did not embody good
technical judgements. This argument is easy to overstate because only eight members
have their own representatives on the board who could be mandated to vote in this
way. All other board members must aggregate and represent the collective interests
of all their constituency countries. But more deeply, the argument takes us to the
heart of why the Fund should be held to account, especially by parliaments, rather
than, for example, made more independent as some have argued.59
The argument for an independent IMF relies on a conception of the IMF
as a technical organization like a central bank. An independent central bank is
collegial and insulated from political pressures and broad accountability in order to
make good decisions. Its legitimacy is said to derive from the quality of its
decisions or outputs, rather than the nature of its process or democratic inputs.
However, the IMF today is a much broader, more political organization than a
central bank, and this will still be the case even if it were to enforce the philosophy
underpinning its new conditionality guidelines. The IMF engages in activities and
conditionalities far beyond narrow technically measurable outputs. For this reason
it needs more input legitimacy than an independent central bank, a fact already
recognised in the Fund's rudimentary structure of representation. In contrast to
preserving secretive collegiality, the Fund's legitimacy should be further enhanced
through greater transparency and accountability of board decision making.
These are not revolutionary goals. Our proposed enhancements to
parliamentary oversight of the IMF could foster broader public confidence in the
institution, and could better provide the institution with the kinds of information,
contacts and oversight to allow it to make good policy decisions in difficult
situations. That said, ensuring accountability always requires a political struggle.
The governments (or particular ministries) that currently enjoy preferential
influence at the Fund are unlikely to applaud proposals which dilute that influence.
Indeed, this has been amply displayed in the unwillingness of European and North
American members properly to debate and concede their special privileges in
respect of appointing the senior management jobs in the Fund. However, the Fund
is now facing increasing demands from parliamentarians as well as non-
governmental groups to be more accountable. These demands are difficult to resist
not least because the board, management and staff of the IMF have for a decade
been exhorting all other institutions and governments to demonstrate higher and
more rigorous standards of accountability and good governance.
59 Ibid.
Note 1
Experiences with the Parliamentary
Network on the World Bank:
A View from the Inside
Norbert Mao60
In 2000 a group of about 50 parliamentarians from about 30 countries gathered in
The Hague for the first ever meeting between the World Bank and
parliamentarians. It was a bold move. The Bretton Woods twins (World Bank and
IMF) usually prefer to deal with the executive branch of the government. This was
therefore a groundbreaking meeting to create a direct channel of dialogue between
parliamentarians and the World Bank.
But a one-off meeting would not be able to build the trust necessary for a
meaningful dialogue. An institutional framework would be required to do this.
That is how the idea of forming the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank
(PNoWB) came to be mooted and accepted.
The level of attendance from the World Bank showed that they took the
meeting very seriously. The World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn and the
Vice President for Europe both addressed the Hague meeting giving it a very high
profile. The then Dutch Minister for International Development, Ms Evaline
Herfkens, herself someone who has been at the forefront of calling for reforms of
the international financial institutions, gave the initiative her full blessing and
authorised the first grant to fund the activities. Current Norwegian Minister for
International Development, Hilde Johnson also attended and addressed the
meeting.
From around the world, parliamentarians prominent in the field of
international development and combating corruption were the majority in the
meeting. Anyone who sees the strides that the PNoWB has made now should trace
it back to that first ambitious cast.
In The Hague, we acknowledged that the World Bank was not only a bank
in the strict financial sense but also a knowledge bank. This knowledge is a
cumulative total of the intellectual talent that the Bank has under its beck and call
and also a sum of experiences, some of it disastrous, which the Bank has
accumulated over the decades. This knowledge is, however, complex and needs to
60 Norbert Mao is a parliamentarian from Uganda and a member of the Board of the
Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB).
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be interpreted in order for it to be palatable to the grassroots who need it badly. We
agreed that parliamentarians could act as step-down transformers for this high
voltage knowledge.
The PNoWB is also a salad bowl that brings together parliamentarians
from underdeveloped countries and developed countries. The interests of
parliamentarians from borrower countries and donor countries cannot be identical.
This diversity of worldviews and interests had to be reflected in the organisation.
But even within this diversity, there is an intersection of common interests. One of
these is to ensure that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) do a good job
by addressing the real needs of the people that the parliamentarians represent.
These common interests can only be identified and pursued if there is a forum
where the contentious issues are thrashed out. The PNoWB therefore provides a
forum for open information exchange and dialogue between parliamentarians from
the North and the South. In an increasingly globalised world, the founding of the
PNoWB was therefore very timely.
Most donor assistance from the developed countries is approved by their
parliaments. The International Development Committees of these countries rely a
great deal on information from the parliamentarians from the underdeveloped
countries in order to do a better job. The PNoWB provides a formal forum for this
type of exchange.
I recall that when the UK Parliamentary Committee on International
Development was visiting Washington DC for meetings with the World Bank and
the IMF, I gave them some information concerning the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, and a standoff that the local IMF office was
having with the Ugandan Ministry of Health about the use of the funds. In this way
people I met through PNoWB became part of an advocacy campaign for us. Later
we got a clarification from the IMF Managing Director Horst Kohler that helped
sort out the problem.
Since that first meeting in The Hague, the PNoWB has grown into an
organisation with a membership of about 160 parliamentarians from about 60
countries. The flagship event of the organisation is the Annual Conference, which
gives participants an opportunity to discuss and share experiences with World
Bank officials, government officials, academics and the civil society. Highly
placed government officials from Africa have addressed these meetings to voice
the concerns of the most underdeveloped continent. In 2001 in London, South
African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel addressed the meeting. In 2002 in Berne,
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade addressed the meeting, making an appeal
for parliamentary support for the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD).
The PNoWB seized on the wind of change in the World Bank presided
over by James Wolfensohn under the Comprehensive Development Framework
(CDF) and its emphasis on a participatory approach and accountability, to develop
new tools to facilitate wider consultation and accountability. The first tool is the
Question and Answer (Q&A) which allows parliamentarians to forward questions
directly to the World Bank and get answers (or at least replies). The terminal for
the Q&A is the Pan European Dialogue office at the European Vice Presidency in
Paris. The other tool is the Project Implementation Watch (PIW) through which
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parliamentarians can do a value-for-money audit of certain projects. During the
fourth PNoWB Annual Conference in Athens the organisation agreed that through
the PIW we can play a more active role in monitoring the implementation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The PNoWB has organised field visits to Uganda, India, Burundi and
Albania to assess World Bank projects there. In these visits, the delegations met
with officials from the World Bank country offices and the national governments.
The delegations also visited project sites to see whether indeed we are moving
closer to 'a world free of poverty'.
Through the PNoWB, a core team is emerging in many parliaments
around the world with people committed to the issue of fighting poverty. These
parliamentarians have the most up-to-date information, which is absolutely
necessary for them to be good watchdogs. But the needs of parliamentarians vary
from place to place. There are parliaments that are not even connected to the
internet. The PNoWB therefore has to help build the capacity of parliamentarians
to participate in the great debates that shape the lives of millions.
Parliamentarians have the duty to make laws, to represent their
constituents and to oversee the executive branch of the government. In their
engagement with the World Bank, the parliamentarians will also continue to
interact with a view to better carrying out their legislative, representative and
oversight roles.
In the last two years the PNoWB has stepped up its engagement with
other flagships of globalisation like the IMF and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). That is why the WTO Director General came to address the Berne
meeting. That is why in Athens 2003 we had an exciting Question and Answer
session with both James Wolfensohn and Horst Kohler.
At its founding, there were some concerns that the PNoWB could end up
being a mere fan club of the World Bank - a lap dog instead of a watchdog! But
given its structure and diverse membership, the PNoWB now enjoys a credibility
and visibility which puts it in a unique position to monitor the policies and actions
of global development actors and to hold them accountable to a wider
constituency.
Note 2
Bringing More Voices into the
Policy Debate
Goh Chien Yen
Despite the limiting political backdrop and resistance to proposals for fundamental
changes, there are still politically feasible and effective ways of bringing greater
plurality and accountability - alternative voices - to the IMF's policy formulation
process:
1. Deepen the principle of national ownership by involving the national
parliaments in the key economic decisions undertaken by the executive arm of the
government with the IMF. Parliament should be the focal point of national debate
and discussion, and where genuine country ownership can take root. The IMF
should encourage the national parliaments to adopt economic policies, and not
work exclusively with the executive.
2. All loan programs of the IMF should adopt the current principles of PRSPs:
• Explicit commitment to genuine national ownership of the policies,
reduced Fund usage of conditions, and greater country control;
• Greater emphasis on the social and poverty impacts of economic policies;
• Emphasis on a broad-based national participation in the formulation of
policies; and
• Emphasis on result-oriented approaches in assessing effectiveness of
policies, in terms of poverty reduction and engendering economic growth.
3. The independent and transparent role of the IEO of the IMF should be enhanced,
covering a wide range of issues. Its work program is determined through
consultations. The IEO (currently it has 13 staff members) can only focus on a few
topics at a time - many of the issues are ongoing and require regular if not constant
monitoring. To increase capacity and ensure timeliness, it could establish standing
task groups including representatives from civil society, academia, and personnel
from the relevant UN agencies.
4. Diversify expertise and exploit local knowledge and on the ground experience
by increased geographical decentralization. Regionally decentralized offices should
include staff from the major functional departments that design and evaluate
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programs, as well as area experts. In Latin America, ECLAC is an example of
successful decentralization, contributing to locally based and innovative theorizing.
5. Increase lateral entry recruitment of staff with practical policy experience in
developing countries. Then policy innovations might reflect the lived institutional
experiences of the developing countries. The departure from intellectual mono-
cropping would be even greater if recruitment of personnel with field experience
could be extended beyond the central banks and finance ministries of the South.
6. Provide another channel through which local knowledge can be introduced into
the IMF thinking by increasing support for developing country researchers and
investing in the expertise of developing country-based professionals. The current
practice of engaging the expertise of outside consultants and contracted research
draws heavily on elite US academic institutions, reinforcing the paradigms and
presumptions already in place within the organization itself.
7. Diversify the policy discourse by greater involvement of the UN system in areas
of common concerns. Staff from UN agencies (FAO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP,
UNCTAD, WHO, for example), could play a role as independent auditors, offering
assessment and alternatives early in the policy formulation process.
Chapter 3
Power without Responsibility?
Enhancing Learning and Policy
Accountability at the International
Monetary Fund1
Angela Wood
One of the important distinctions between ideology and science is that science
recognises the limitations on what one knows. There is always uncertainty. By
contrast, the IMF never likes to discuss the uncertainties associated with the
policies that it recommends, but rather, likes to project an image of being
infallible. This posture and mind-set makes it difficult for it to learn from past
mistakes - how can it learn from those mistakes if it can't admit them? (Joseph
Stiglitz, 2002).
[S]low absorption of lessons and broader policy guidance into actual operations on
a systematic basis contributed to weaknesses in program effectiveness (IEO, 2002).
The sharing of information is essential for sustainable development. It stimulates
public debate on and broadens understanding of development issues, and
enhances transparency and accountability in the development process (James
Wolfensohn, World Bank, 2001).
Calls for IMF accountability have amplified as its influence has extended deeper
into areas of national policy. At issue is the policy conditionality attached to its
lending. Many critics perceive that the IMF fails to properly consider the
significant negative consequences that its policy prescriptions have on vulnerable
groups. Others argue that the IMF's prescriptions are unable to achieve its new and
broadening objectives, which include growth and poverty reduction, or that the
IMF is usurping national processes and imposing its sovereignty against the wishes
of many groups in society.
Critics' demands for accountability reflect the perception that the IMF has
not properly reconsidered and reoriented its policies in the light of its new
1 Thank you to Jenny Richmond, Rosemary McGee, Kees Biekart, Ben Pollard, Leslie
Kenny and Caroline Robb for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Thanks also to Goh
Chien Yen for additional quotes.
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objectives, it does not heed the arguments and concerns of governments and civil
society when formulating policy prescriptions, and that it does not learn from or
even recognise past policy mistakes. Thus, despite a growing body of evidence, the
IMF appears to continue to pursue a set of policies apparently inappropriate to
many developing countries' needs, priorities, institutional sophistication and
capacity, and outside the bounds of its expertise.
Critics hold the IMF accountable for policy choices because of its
financial leverage, and because under the guise of its superior 'technical know-
how' it is able to impose policies on weaker governments (maybe only temporarily
but sometimes permanently) against their wishes and often those of their citizens
too. The perception is that the IMF continues to impose inappropriate or politically
unacceptable policies because the Executive Board and the management and staff
bear none of the burden of failed policy or the political consequences of imposing
policies against the electorate's will.
Governments are held to account at the ballot box, and dismissals (or
resignations) of ministers and other senior staff are regularly meted out as a means
of dealing with policy failings and public dissatisfaction. However, the IMF's
political leaders and senior managers do not face these political checks and
balances. Nor has civil society recourse to national legal systems since, being an
international institution, the IMF has legal immunity.
The underlying issue appears to be a lack of (or inappropriate)
mechanisms and incentives for staff to learn from the experience of policy
application on the ground in order to improve their policy advice, and to engage
with a broad range of stakeholders to consider policy options. Poor policy
decisions are symptomatic of the lack of widespread debate about policy
alternatives. There is a lack of inclusive, transparent mechanisms to systematically
assess the outcomes of policy prescriptions prior to implementation and to evaluate
them after implementation. To encourage better decision making and thus better
outcomes, it is necessary to establish an effective learning culture (with incentive
mechanisms).
This chapter demonstrates the need for an integrated learning and
accountability mechanism to facilitate decision making at the national level, to
provide a foundation for evidence-based policy making and to enhance
transparency and accountability. It proposes a virtuous circle of inclusive ex ante
analysis, monitoring and ex post evaluation.
First we reveal the difficulty of determining who should be accountable
for policy decisions. It is argued that the government should make and be
responsible for policy choices. This implies that the IMF's role should be one of
policy advisor not negotiator. Second we argue that improving the quality of the
IMF's advice is essential. As a public institution, whose principal function is to
provide advice, the IMF should be able to account for the quality of its advice. We
point to a lack of systematic policy analysis and evaluation at the IMF, and argue
that to facilitate improvement a focus on results is necessary. Then we present a
framework for systematic learning and evaluation based on ex ante analysis,
monitoring, and evaluation. We propose that these processes should be
participatory to facilitate learning both at the IMF and at the national level. We
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suggest that such a framework complements and can be built into the Poverty
Reduction Strategy process. Appropriate incentives need to be put in place to
encourage staff to effectively engage in such a process.
Policy Ownership: Who Is and Should Be Accountable?
Although the IMF is regarded as a lending institution, its main activity is to
provide policy advice to governments through research and publications, technical
assistance, surveillance of members' economies, and when negotiating programs
attached to IMF loans. Its advisory role is most significant in relation to this latter
function since by giving a 'seal of approval' and through the use of loan
conditions, it has the power to considerably influence (many would argue impose)
government policies.
However, there are numerous concerns about the suitability of the IMF's
policy prescriptions, these include:
• Lack of appreciation of the political environment in which decisions are
taken and/or to allow for it in policy advice;
• Lack of attention to the differences between countries when giving
advice;
• Advising policies that are not institutionally feasible, and failing to assess
and improve governments' implementation capacity;
• Lack of understanding of the redistributive effects of some policy
measures, or the need to take these into account;
• Institutional incentives to 'over-promise' on the speed at which core
reforms can be implemented and longer-term sustainability attained;
• Insufficient assessment of the real economy responses to programs and to
the sources of growth;
• Failure to develop strategies to respond to inevitable uncertainties about
the economic environment in developing countries leading to ad hoc
policy corrections;
• Inability to step back and reconsider the overall strategy pursued by
programs while learning lessons from experience; and
• Inability to reorient policy advice in the light of new objectives.
If the IMF's policy prescriptions were considered to be broadly successful and
pain-free then there would be little demand for accountability and both
governments and the IMF would be happy to claim responsibility for them. The
demand arises because some groups in society consider themselves to be adversely
affected, both in the short and long-term. The problem for these groups is that IMF
programs are determined outside national processes, which means it is not clear
whether the government or the IMF is setting policy and, therefore, who is
accountable. Moreover, it means that society's views are often not taken into
consideration in the policy setting process. This lack of transparency means that
both governments and the IMF can avoid taking responsibility for decisions taken.
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The IMF is able to distance itself from taking responsibility for the
consequences of its policy advice by claiming government 'ownership' of policies.
Ownership implies that a government accepts the need for and willingly
implements necessary reforms. It also implies that a government takes the decision
to implement the policies specified in IMF program documents. This implies that
the government is accountable for any misjudgement of policy; the IMF is simply
an advisor in the background.
However, governments often have little choice but to agree to an IMF
program and the IMF is by no means a passive advisor. Indeed, the IMF regards
itself as an enforcer of policy change. The 1998 External Evaluation of the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) heard from developing country
officials that the IMF had an 'inflexible attitude' and that the IMF often 'came to
negotiations with fixed positions so that agreement was usually only possible
through compromises in which the country negotiating teams moved to the Fund's
positions'.2 This raises some tricky questions about accountability. For example,
ActionAid (2002) found that IMF documents revealed that the government of
Malawi had been unwilling to implement aspects of its agricultural liberalisation
program, but had reluctantly done so to access balance of payments support.
ActionAid concluded that the government's 'willingness to accept inappropriate
policy reforms in the final instance and an inability to formulate policy alternatives
makes them equally responsible [as the IMF for subsequent outcomes]'.
Typically, governments with good analytical capacity are in a better
position to advocate their own policies and negotiate with the IMF, and therefore
may have greater ownership. Conversely, where capacity is limited, the IMF's
advice is more influential (Buira 2002). This capacity is often in short supply in the
poorest countries, thus even when new processes are intended to facilitate
government ownership the IMF remains extremely influential. For example, the
content of the programs financed through the IMF's Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) should be derived from a government's Poverty
Reduction Strategy (PRS). Thus, implicitly the government should have ownership
of the PRGF program. However, in practice, 'the latter [PRSs] often set out
macroeconomic policies solely in broad terms, and quantitative frameworks are
typically skeletal, perhaps reflecting capacity constraints in some countries. This
leaves a substantial amount of detail to be filled in by the PRGF supported
program'.4 In these cases, 'the PRGF-supported program, while consistent with the
I-PRSP/PRSP, is necessarily linked to these documents only at that general level'.5
Government ownership is also limited by a weak bargaining position
because often they cannot borrow from other sources. Since the IMF 'owns' the
resources, it sets the policy agenda. In a meeting discussing the subject of
conditionality and ownership co-organised by the IMF in 2001, Chaturon
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practice, adjustment programs were designed by the IMF, while the sovereign
government, facing an imminent crisis, had few options other than to accept them.
As such, the real "owner" of an adjustment program was the IMF, though this was
seldom explicit; while the government, not the IMF, would be held accountable for
a program's failure. In his view, therefore, the IMF should be prepared to share the
responsibility for the consequences of the programs it supported'.6
The IMF's leverage is increased by the fact that a government must agree
to a program with the IMF as a 'seal of approval' to release resources from other
donors: 'a number of Senegalese officials who have participated in negotiations
with the IMF over time thought that the level of "country ownership" of programs
has generally been low. In their view, the seal of approval role of IMF
arrangements in unlocking other sources of financing gave the IMF the upper hand
in negotiations with the authorities, and that sometimes the authorities went along
with these proposals - even though they had doubts about their ability to deliver on
implementation - in order to secure urgently needed resources.'7
Of course governments may sometimes overstate their lack of ownership
to avoid accountability for policies. In some cases governments have been able to
hide behind IMF conditionality and push the blame for difficult reforms on to the
Fund (Boughton, 2003). Thus governments have avoided accountability for
reforms that they would probably have implemented in the absence of
conditionality. In other cases some governments have been able to justify repeated
reversal of reforms and the confusion and instability this causes by claiming they
were imposed by the IMF, and so continue with and even garner greater support
for ineffective or even harmful 'national' policies (Collier, 2000). Both cases are
dysfunctional. For countries that are in a long-term borrowing relationship with the
IMF, the IEO concludes that 'there is an inherent tension between quasi-permanent
conditionality, implicit in prolonged use, and country "ownership", in the sense of
countries taking responsibility for the conduct of their economic policy, both by
being in the driver's seat and by facing the consequences of their decisions'.8
Usually, both governments and the IMF have a degree of ownership.
However, judging who should be accountable for particular policy impacts is made
problematic by the closed nature of negotiations. It is difficult to determine which
policy choices are taken independently of the IMF's advice, which are influenced
by it and which are imposed.
Judging who in the IMF is responsible and, therefore, accountable for
policy decisions, and who should hold them to account is also problematic. While
IMF staff negotiates programs directly with government staff, Executive Directors
(EDs) sitting on the IMF's Executive Board can also be influential in determining a
program's content. The staff impose their technical judgements and the board its
political priorities, but it is not made clear in program documents to who in the
IMF policy should be attributed. While the Managing Director gives initial
approval to a program the board gives final approval.
6DSE,2001.
7 IEO, 2002.
8 IEO, 2002, p. 81.
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The IEO (2002) argues that technical judgements should be clearly
distinguished from political judgements. The latter should be made in a transparent
manner at the level of the Managing Director and the board who should be
accountable for them. However, while the board oversees and can hold to account the
management and staff, there is no effective mechanism to hold the board to account.
The Board of Governors, which appoints the Executive Board, and the
International Monetary and Finance Committee, which provides some policy
direction to it, meet only once and twice a year respectively. Consequently they
have little effective capacity to oversee the Executive Board as a whole. At the
country level, each governor only has oversight of the ED who represents his/her
country - for those in multi-country constituencies this can be minimal - and no
oversight of an ED appointed/elected by another constituency. Thus those countries
with minimal voting power have little influence on the decision making process and
minimal capacity to exercise oversight. Moreover as Eggers, Florini and Woods
point out, the decisions of individual board members are not known since there is
no formal vote taking and their positions are not made public, which limits the
possibility for parliamentary scrutiny of board decisions and their ED's role.
There are two options for improving policy accountability. The first is to
make transparent who, amongst the government and within the IMF, has taken and
is responsible for a policy decision and what that decision is. In Chapter 4,
Bradlow explores the case for introducing operational policies and procedures as a
means of establishing accountability and an ombudsman to enforce them.
Establishing clear, transparent procedures for program negotiations could be
helpful to determine responsibility for decisions made.9
A requirement of an operational procedure for policy negotiations could
be that the IMF should state its negotiating position publicly at the start of program
discussions. This could be achieved by publishing the staffs mission briefs, which
form the basis of negotiations with governments. At present these are not even
revealed to the IMF's Executive Board. Chaturon Chaisang, Minister in the Prime
Minister's Office of Thailand, has proposed that program documents should clearly
indicate which policies have been adopted on the IMF's advice/insistence and
which are desired by the government. However, he notes that 'such a model would
no doubt raise political and diplomatic sensitivities'.10 It could also give
inappropriate or confusing signals to markets and political stakeholders. A third
element could be to make program documents publicly available within the
country in draft form, giving an opportunity for parliament to scrutinise them prior
to the government signing. This has been proposed by the IMF staff but has not
been taken forward by the Executive Board.
9 The External Evaluation of ESAF (1998) noted that ministers and government staff found
that the flexibility of mission leaders during negotiations depended very much on personal
factors and the extent to which they felt confident of the support of various departments at
the IMF's headquarters. Many ministers felt that too much depended on these factors and
that the negotiation processes would be greatly facilitated if some institutional safeguards
were found for reducing them.
IODSE, 2001.
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A second option is to allow governments to choose their preferred policy
routes for which they are fully accountable and to scale back the IMF's remit to an
advisory function. Chautran Chaisang argues that 'In such a model [of national
ownership], the IMF would provide resources without conditionality and simply
monitor progress under the (government's) program. The IMF staff could give
policy advice which the government would be free to ignore, but if the program
failed, the government alone would have to take responsibility'.11
Adopting an advisory function rather than a negotiating function would
not necessarily reduce the IMF's influence and may even increase it. The IMF
argues that policy conditionality ensures that governments carry out necessary
reforms in order to stabilise their economies. However, policy conditionality does
not ensure this. It is often not implemented or is quickly reversed and, therefore, is
largely ineffective at inducing long-term, sustainable reform (Collier, 2000;
Burnside and Dollar, 1998; Dollar and Svensson 1998; Devarajan et al, 2001;
IEO, 2002; Ivanova et al., 2003; Killick, 1998; World Bank, 1998).12 In contrast,
Gunning (2000) suggests that governments are receptive in the early stages of
program discussion to policy advice.
Allowing governments to make their own policy choices does not mean
that no conditionality could or should be applied. An alternative could be for the
government, the IMF, and other stakeholders to jointly agree on a limited set of
outcome targets (performance indicators) for program monitoring. Not only would
outcome conditionality help to give back policy responsibility to governments, it
would allow them to seek advice from other sources. Bringing some competition
into the provision of macroeconomic policy advice could help to improve it by
giving incentive to providers to ensure that their advice is more finely tuned to a
government's priorities, political circumstances and capacities, and to evaluate its
impact.13
"DSE, 2001.
12 Buira (2002) argues that it is the incentive to maintain access to future lending that gives
incentive to governments to repay the IMF's loans. Policy conditionality is unable to do this
since it is only effective while the program is active, yet repayments must continue to be
made several years later.
13 Since the IMF faces little or no policy competition, this has allowed the IMF to focus on
how to make its conditionality tool more effective at inducing reform rather than focusing
on improving the policy content. The conditionality streamlining process initiated in 2001
was largely such an initiative. It did not consider why it was that its policy prescriptions
have so regularly been ignored or reversed. To the extent that conditions were not
implemented because there were too many and some were regarded as unnecessary, then the
streamlining process may be useful. However, the fact that conditions are implemented but
later reversed suggests that it is not just the quantity but also the quality of the conditions
that is at issue, implying that the IMF's advice is not convincing to governments. Some
competition might encourage the IMF to look more closely at this issue.
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Assessing the Quality of the IMF's Advice
A second aspect of accountability is to assess on what basis decisions have been
taken, and whether they have been effective in achieving their intended outcomes.
It is argued that IMF staff cannot be held to account in any punitive sense for poor
policy outcomes since outcomes can be affected by many factors beyond their
control. Moreover, their policy advice is only as good as the data they receive from
governments. However, regardless of whether or not the IMF continues to
negotiate programs or scales back its influence to that of an advisor, as a public
institution, the IMF has a duty to demonstrate the quality and effectiveness of its
advice. Its staff should be able to account for why they have proposed particular
reforms, demonstrate on what evidence their advice is based and what they expect
the results to be, and their performance assessed accordingly. This implies the need
for a much more transparent process of policy formulation and a more concerted
focus on results.
Evaluations carried out by the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office
(IEO)14 point to several shortcomings in the IMF's policy development processes,
which call into question whether the advice it gives is optimal. However, a lack of
analytical detail in program documents makes it difficult to assess on what basis
the IMF's policy prescriptions have been formed.
Firstly, program documents do not reveal what the staff perceives the
problem to be, and therefore, what it is that their advice is intended to address.
Neither is it clear on what assumptions their advice is based, nor how the policy is
expected to operate through the economy to achieve its objectives. The rationale is
obviously understood internally but it is not made explicit in program documents,
thus it cannot be assessed (IEO 2003a).
Secondly, poor policy advice can result from over-optimistic projections
of key outcomes. Reviewing IMF policy advice to Korea, Indonesia and Brazil, the
IEO found that 'macroeconomic outcomes turned out to be very different from
program projections. In Indonesia and Korea, the initial projections were overly
optimistic, leading to a design of macroeconomic policies in the programs that
turned out to be too tight'.15 Reviewing IMF fiscal policy, the IEO found a
'reluctance to predict a downturn [in growth]' which has 'potentially significant
implications for program design, since it means that the need for countercyclical
fiscal policy and its appropriate role is rarely discussed explicitly'.16
Although it is unlikely that staff can predict outcomes exactly, it is not
unreasonable to expect that they should aim to make accurate predictions with the
degree of accuracy improving over-time. However, projections of key outcomes
when programs are in the formulation stage tend to be persistently over-optimistic
about both the speed of restoration of macroeconomic sustainability and the pace at
which structural reforms can be implemented, with strong tendencies to make over-
14 Established in 2001, the IEO provides independent evaluation of the IMF's policies and
operations directly to the Executive Board.
15 IEO, 2003b, p. 11.
16 IEO, 2003b, p. 16.
optimistic projections for growth, export growth, investment rates, fiscal revenues
and falls in inflation (IEO, 2002, 2003a; IDA and IMF, 2002).
The IEO (2002) agrees with the IMF's explanation that the staffs over-
optimism is caused by 'inadequate analysis of the likely sources of growth and of
the expected impact of planned policies'.17 It is well known that the staff negotiates
'expected' outcomes with governments; however, wishful thinking is clearly not a
firm foundation for realistic policy making. Institutional incentives towards
optimistic outcomes lead to unrealistic policy choices. The implication is that
programs are likely to go off-track, requiring policy adjustments mid-course.
Thirdly, despite the frequent need for program adjustments, over-
optimism understates the threat of potential risks caused by changes in the
economic environment. This results in a lack of prior consideration of how policies
might need to change during the implementation phase (IEO, 2002, 2003a). The
lack of attention to key risks, which are not spelled out in program documents, and
the failure to conduct stress-testing exercises, means that there is rarely any
consideration of a contingency strategy for dealing with uncertainties. This has
'sometimes led to ad hoc corrections that were inconsistent with long-term
objectives'.18
Fourthly, there is a lack of attention to assessing a government's
implementation capacity and the potential political impediments to implementation
(IEO, 2002).19 Governments' failure to implement reforms in full is often blamed
for poorer outcomes than expected: 'growth targets/projections for low-income
countries by the Fund, Bank and many development agencies have also tended to
show an upward bias often based on assumptions of full implementation of key
policy reforms'.20 However, some developing country governments have pointed
out that over-optimism is caused by the IMF's failure to understand their
administrative capacity constraints and the political obstacles to implementing
reforms. The IEO finds that the 'risks to the programs of weak political
commitments were often understated' and that 'only limited attention was often
paid to assessing and developing implementation capacity'.21 It concludes that
'repeated underestimation of the obstacles to policy implementation is, in itself, a
program design problem', and recommends 'strengthening the ability of IMF staff
to analyse political economy issues so that a better understanding of the forces that
are likely to block or enhance reforms can be taken into account in program
design'.22
17 IMF and IDA, 2002.
18 IEO, 2002, p. 80.
19 The OED (2001) finds a similar problem for the World Bank: 'CAEs [Country Assistance
Evaluations] find a pattern of over-optimism about borrower government's receptivity to
Bank advice, willingness to undertake difficult reforms, and capacity to implement
recommended measures', p. xv.
20 IDA and IMF, 2002.
21 IEO, 2002, p. 58.
22 IEO, 2002, p. 53.
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The IEO has also identified shortcomings in the IMF's procedures for
monitoring and evaluating programs, which casts doubt on the IMF's ability to
assess the outcomes of its policy advice and thus to learn from its successes and
failures in order to improve its advice.
The staff review is the vehicle through which the staff monitors
implementation of policy conditionality. This includes monitoring structural
benchmarks and indicative targets which are concerned with the implementation of
structural reforms, and monitoring short-term quantitative performance criteria
related to macroeconomic reforms. Often structural reforms are delayed and
performance criteria are not achieved and it is typical that these targets are revised
downwards. However, there is little substantive analysis in review documents as to
why certain reforms are only partially implemented or some not at all, or why
performance criteria need to be revised, even though understanding this is key to
improving advice or informing lending decisions (IEO, 2003a).
During program reviews staff often provides useful suggestions for how
programs might be better formulated. While such suggestions are often insightful,
they come once the program is underway when it is unlikely that a program will be
significantly revised. It is not clear why these suggestions are not being made at the
program formulation stage when they could have some impact on program design
(IEO, 2003a). At present there appears to be relatively little discussion of
alternatives at this stage, at least not beyond the staff. No detail is provided in
program documents as to which options were considered, or explanation provided
as to why a particular choice was made.
Sixthly, there is no formal evaluation at the end of a program and little
evidence of efforts to evaluate the previous program when preparing a new one.
Although the staff argues that evaluation of outcomes is implicit in the process of
negotiating a new program, this appears to amount to little more than reviewing
which conditions were implemented and which were not. With respect to fiscal
policy, the IEO (2003) finds that 'many program-request documents are
insufficiently linked to past outcomes and past reform attempts', and that '[f]ew
efforts are made to analyse the factors behind past policy failures'.23 In particular
there is little analysis of why programs go off-track or why reforms are
subsequently reversed. The IEO (2002) found substantial errors and gaps in the
MONA database for tracking performance under programs, especially with regard
to data on outcomes. It concludes that 'existing weaknesses in data on how
programs have performed are an impediment to efforts to enhance the IMF's
ability to learn from experience and to monitor the implementation and impact of
its own policies'.24
23 IEO, 2003a, pp. 73, 69.
24 The Office of Internal Audit and Inspection examines IMF operational procedures and
financial reporting and reports its findings to the board; these are not made public. The
Independent Evaluation Office undertakes ad hoc reports on IMF policies, program impacts
and operations. The IMF's staff also undertakes ad hoc internal audits on issues to do with
operational procedures and policies, which may or may not be published.
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This lack of attention to monitoring outcomes can partly be explained as a
hangover to earlier days when monitoring inputs was considered to be sufficient
since IMF policy was related to a small number of technical actions to maintain
exchange rate alignment, which was relatively easy to observe. However, today the
IMF's objectives have become increasingly complex, moving beyond balance of
payments stabilisation to include growth and recently poverty reduction and the
Millennium Development Goals (in the poorest countries). These broader
objectives are not so readily observed and require much deeper understanding of
how macroeconomic and structural policies impact on wider aspects of the
economy and society such as income distribution, vulnerability to price changes,
and access to services. This suggests the need to reorient and improve internal
monitoring and evaluation systems to focus on results in order to equip staff with
the means to assess policy impacts to improve their technical advice.
Ironically, the IMF has typically shied away from evaluating the outcomes
of its policy advice on the basis that outcomes are hard to determine: '[t]he problem
is that it is very difficult to evaluate the effects of programs on macroeconomic
variables for several reasons. First, the links between policies and outcomes is
uncertain. Second, it is necessary to filter out the effects of unanticipated exogenous
influences. Third, one has to define the relevant "counter-factual".'25
The first argument, that the links between policy inputs and outcomes is
uncertain, is precisely why attention needs to be paid to evaluating outcomes. A
pilot project between the government of Burkina Faso and a group of multilateral
and bilateral donors in the Special Partnership with Africa (SPA), using outcome
indicators (rather than input conditionality) for loan disbursement, revealed that the
expected results had not materialised despite the government's good track record
of policy implementation. This brought into question the donors' responsibility for
their policy advice. Focusing on results enhances government ownership and changes
the nature of the government-donor dialogue, making for more realistic and objective
interventions (World Bank, 2000). Likewise, the World Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department (OED) concludes that 'findings from project audits and
country evaluations suggest that the achievement of immediate policy objectives
does not necessarily translate into long-term impact on incomes and poverty'.26
Secondly, although unanticipated exogenous shocks are likely to send
programs off-course, the IMF staff should be able to identify what the likely
uncertainties are and how policies might be altered to deal with these if they
materialise. As the IEO reveals, the IMF does not demonstrate in its program
documents that it is taking anticipatable uncertainties into account in its policy
design. Evaluation should not aim to 'filter out' uncertainties; instead the aim of
evaluation should be to learn why these shocks were not anticipated so that they can
be better anticipated through ex ante analysis and factored into future policy design.
Thirdly, policy outcomes do not need to be assessed against the counter
factual of how an alternative policy scenario might have performed. The necessary
counterfactual is the staff's assessment of the problem, their justification for the
25 Khan, 2001.
26 OED, 2001, p. xiv.
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policy scenario they propose, their prediction of what should happen under the
policy scenario in relation to key objectives and how well they assessed risks to the
outcomes being achieved.
The lack of attention to results at the highest levels is the crux of the
accountability issue, and feeds through into a work culture that provides poor
incentives to staff to improve their policy advice. The IEO finds that 'most mission
chiefs do not feel that their career progression depends significantly on whether the
programs they negotiate and oversee achieve their objectives'.27 A large proportion
'believe that their performance appraisal would be better if they were "tougher" in
negotiations with countries', reflecting the impression that the IMF is more
concerned with getting maximum change than with maximising policy outcomes.28
Moreover, staff incentives implicitly discourage deepening understanding
of policy application at the country level.29 The reward structure gives higher
priority to learning how the IMF works internally, discouraging staff from staying
in any one department for too long. High staff turnover 'is a significant
impediment to the development of an effective learning culture, not least because
many of the lessons to be learned from experience are country specific'.30 It also
limits accountability, since individual staffs contributions to the outcomes of a
program become harder to assess, and staff have often moved to other departments
before a program can be completed and evaluated. The IEO concludes that 'a
revamping of internal personnel incentives to encourage greater stability is needed.
The focus of these incentives should be tilted toward encouraging the development
of a deeper familiarity with the problems of individual countries, and
correspondingly increasing responsibility, through longer country assignments'.31
Transparent Decision Making, Accountability and Learning
The absence of an integrated, transparent system of prior analysis, performance
monitoring and evaluation of outcomes at the IMF is cause for concern. It casts
doubt on the IMF's ability to manage programs, learn from and improve its policy
advice, and to demonstrate its effectiveness. There is an opportunity to put in place
a results-based system, which not only facilitates learning at the IMF, but also
helps to build on knowledge and policy making capacity at the national level.
Whilst IMF learning about policy impacts is important, it is equally important that
this knowledge is rooted within countries where day-to-day policy decisions are
being taken, where it matters most. To maximise learning by all stakeholders,
processes for policy design, decision making, monitoring, and evaluation all need
to be transparent and inclusive.
27
28 IEO, 2002, p. 65.




IEO, 2002, p. 68.
 IEO, 2002, p. 68.
IEO, 2002, p. 89.
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What follows is an outline of how a results-based system of policy advice
and evaluation might be organised and how this could facilitate improved decision
making and accountability.
Policy Determination
The first step is to make explicit in program documents the logic on which the IMF
has formulated its policy advice. This should include identifying what the problem
is, what the immediate and long-term objective of the policy reform is, the
assumptions on which the advice is based, the transition mechanism through which
the reform will operate, and expected outcomes.
From a policy making perspective, transparently laying out the policy
logic in this way can help to focus staff attention on the real economy responses to
policy change, thereby improving staff projections and policy advice, providing a
more coherent framework for sensitivity analysis, and promoting greater awareness
of the risks and uncertainties involved. From an accountability perspective, it
'serves as the baseline against which to monitor performance'.32
In terms of getting policies right, the balance of effort should be weighted
towards the design stage, since it is more difficult to change direction once a
program is being implemented. Thus the range of policy options needs to be fully
considered and their viability tested prior to a decision being taken.
Viability includes assessing whether the government has the capacity to
implement the proposed reforms and a supportive political environment. For the
poorest countries, assessment of the expected poverty and social impacts should
also be undertaken. This analysis should also be reported as a necessary element of
the policy logic. In addition, policies should be stress-tested, with key risks to a
program identified up-front to facilitate contingency planning. Contingency plans
should also address what policy changes or safety nets to implement should
negative social impacts prove bigger than anticipated.
There has been considerable discussion about whether the IMF should
assess political economy issues. While there are concerns that the IMF would be
straying too far into the domestic political arena, the IMF is unable to offer
practical solutions if it is not aware of the political climate in which a government
operates, and does not understand where it faces constraints and where there is
room to manoeuvre. However, the IMF's ambition should not be to make its advice
'politics proof. It is up to governments to determine which policies are most
appropriate and to justify them to their societies. Instead the IMF's aim should be
to focus its advice within a country's political context and in accordance with its
institutional capacities.33 In the context of the World Bank, the Operations
Evaluation Department concurs that 'development effectiveness depends critically
32 World Bank, 2002.
33 Typically the IMF tries to bend a country's political context to fit its advice. However,
some political situations may be so extreme that the IMF may simply judge that it is too
unsettled a climate for achieving any significant policy change, in which case it may choose
not to lend.
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on adapting institutional priorities and programs to individual countries'
constraints and opportunities. Such adaptation requires an up-to-date knowledge
base about country operating contexts and the enabling environment'.34 The IEO
(2002) argues that since the staff already implicitly assesses political feasibility,
this should be made explicit in staff reports.
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) of policies expected to have
significant social impacts is a requirement for Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) programs.35 The staff is required to take PSIA into consideration
and report findings in PRGF program documents (IMF, 2002).36 PSIA is not
undertaken directly by the IMF; instead it is being carried out by the World Bank
and bilateral donors.
Ideally, PSIA needs to be carried out at the stage of discussing policy
options if it is to contribute to evidence-based policy making. Richmond and Ladd
(2002) argue that PSIA should be conducted on a range of different policy options,
so that the best policy for poverty reduction can be selected.37 However, examining
initial ex ante assessments, Bretton Woods Project (2002) concludes that '[t]he
pilot studies being carried out by the World Bank and DFID [Department for
International Development] for the most part fail to do this [look at policy
alternatives]. Instead they take single pre-existing reforms, which are assumed to be
going ahead, and focus on sequencing and mitigation measures. They do not question
whether or not this reform is the appropriate or optimal one for poverty reduction'.
The implication is that while PSIA may be helpful for monitoring
purposes by providing an initial assessment of likely outcomes, it is not being
factored into the policy process early enough to facilitate decision making between
policy alternatives.
The IMF has a responsibility to fully inform governments of both the
social benefits and the costs of implementing its advice prior to a decision being
taken. This implies that it should be developing its capacity to determine when
PSIA is necessary, that PSIA should be an integral part of its policy deliberations
and therefore carried out early on, and that it should collaborate with others to
undertake it.38
34OED, 2001, p. xiii.
35 PSIA is the analysis of intended and unintended consequences of policy prescriptions on
the well-being of different social groups, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable.
36 For an analysis of linkages between macroeconomic policies and social and poverty
impacts, plus examples of PSIA carried out in relation to IMF programs, see Robb, 2002.
37 While the IMF/Bank process runs from policy formulation to PSIA, many outside the
IMF argue that to facilitate democratic decision making the reverse is needed. The question
should not be 'what impact do the prescribed policies have on society or poverty reduction?'
but 'which macroeconomic and structural policies achieve the best results for poverty
reduction?'. Schmidt (2002) neatly reorients the process as 'Macroeconomic Policy Impact
Assessment'. The implication is that PSIA or MPIA should be carried out first leading to a
policy decision, thereby facilitating policy transparency and dialogue at the national level.
38 Selvaggio and Joyner (2002) propose that teams conducting PSIAs should include World
Bank or IMF staff, members of the host country governments, civil society representatives
and local experts from the country.
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Program Monitoring
While the IMF has traditionally focused on monitoring program implementation, a
focus on results requires monitoring whether the program's immediate objectives
(outputs) are being achieved, and secondly, whether it is on course to achieve its
intermediate objectives (outcomes) and longer-term goals (impacts). One means to
focus the IMF's attention on monitoring outputs and outcomes as opposed to
policy inputs is to switch to outcome conditionality instead of policy
conditionally.39
In the case of the poorest countries, these longer-term goals are framed by
the Millennium Development Goals. Movement towards these wider objectives
will typically not be observable within the timeframe of an IMF program, implying
that intermediate indicators will need to be specified. However, since the IMF's
involvement in the poorest countries is often expected to be long term by having a
series of rolling programs, it can also factor in monitoring the contribution of its
programs to these objectives over a longer timeframe.
For monitoring results, quantitative indicators need to be selected for
measuring progress towards objectives and targets. Consideration will need to be
given to which indicators provide useful information towards intermediate
outcomes and longer-term impacts, and which provide early-warning of the need to
correct programs. For example, monitoring might want to prioritise those reforms
which are anticipated to have significant social impacts (these should be identified
through ex ante PSIA) or reforms identified as vulnerable to risk in the
contingency strategy. Performance monitoring should thus alert program staff to
the possible need to implement the contingency strategy. Internal staff evaluation
should be triggered if outcomes are found to be going off-course in order to
understand why this is so and whether (further) corrective action is needed, and
what the implications are for the coherence of the program.
It would be beneficial if a range of national stakeholders (and donors)
were involved in performance monitoring, particularly if a policy reform has a
potentially large social impact or high degree of uncertainty and may need to be
adjusted. For an effective collaborative process, it is essential for all parties to
agree, during the policy formulation stage, on outcome targets/indicators, what
data needs to be collected, and how regularly it should be monitored and analysed.
Different stakeholders will interpret results differently, particularly as
much data may initially be of poor quality: 'monitoring is far from being simply a
technical activity; instead it is a key part of what is a highly charged political
process which involves considerable vested interests, many of whom are keen that
39 The IMF already imposes short-term quantitative targets as macroeconomic performance
criteria. However, these are often not specifically monitored in relation to long-term
objectives, to determine whether they contribute to these objectives. Thus domestic
borrowing may be the short-term target whereas the long-term objective is greater domestic
private investment; both need to be monitored.
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the true nature of the situation should be concealed as much as possible'.40 This
means that the process, and who is included in it, is particularly important.
The staff should present an analysis of the performance monitoring data in
relation to planned results along with the views or contradictory interpretations
from other stakeholders in the process to IMF management. This should also be
made publicly available. The IMF's MONA database, used for tracking
performance under programs, should be made more comprehensive, accurate, and
up-to-date and publicly available, as the IEO (2002) recommends.
Ex Post Evaluation and Feedback Loops
Key elements of the program should be evaluated on completion, with a view to
informing the next policy/program cycle. The IEO recommends ex post assessment
of all completed or permanently interrupted programs 'to ensure that the lessons
for program design are absorbed more quickly'.41
Evaluation could:
• Examine the relationship between outputs, outcomes and whether these
have contributed to longer-term goals. These should be examined in
relation to expected outcomes/targets. Where there are wide discrepancies
between the two, the reason for this should be assessed;
• Focus on whether anticipated transmission mechanisms were accurately
specified, and if not, assess whether the assumptions made were incorrect
and what the implications are for future policy;
• Examine what unanticipated factors impacted on programs and why they
were not anticipated;
• Assess why certain reforms were delayed or not implemented, and the
resulting effects on the program's coherence;
• Assess the effects of any adjustments to policy made during the course of
the program; and
• Take a step back from the program details and examine its coherence with
the government's overall reform objectives and other donor programs.42
This analysis should be fed back into ex ante analysis to improve projections,
consideration of transition mechanisms, risk assessment, PSIA and analysis of
institutional and political capacities and to inform alternative policy options. To
facilitate and demonstrate the absorption of lessons learned into future programs,
staff should be required to detail in PRGF documentation and requests for the use
of Fund resource documents how the proposed program has been informed by the
evaluation results and discussions of these at the national level. Such a procedure is
40 Oxfam, 2002.
41 IEO, 2002, p. 86.
42 The IEO (2002) argues that this could be carried out through the IMF's surveillance
processes.
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consistent with the IEO's (2002) recommendations that 'Staff reports ... should
provide more of a perspective of the history of the IMF's program involvement
with a country. This should highlight what has been achieved and where previous
strategies have fallen short of their objectives and why'.
As with monitoring during implementation, evaluation of outcomes
should be an open process involving IMF staff, key national stakeholders, donors
and evaluation specialists, and should bring together quantitative and qualitative
data from a range of sources. A participatory process is likely to generate a wider
range of data, and therefore a more disaggregated picture of policy impacts (Robb,
2002). There are likely to be conflicting views of successes and failures and costs
and benefits. Conflicts of interest are likely to be common and consensus rare.
Evaluation should be understood as a means to negotiate these different realities,
providing opportunities for program stakeholders to reconcile their various
perspectives or versions of reality (Earl et at, 2001). Reconciling these (or not) is
an invaluable opportunity for broadening understanding. The co-existence of
different interpretations of outcomes requires participants in the process to become
aware of different points of view and broadens the interpretation of the evidence.
This can help to avoid 'paradigm traps' among policy makers that limit their views
on development options (ECPDM, 2003). The participation of all key actors is
important because 'it is often the learning that takes place in the course of the
evaluation process which is most used, rather than the report prepared at the end'.43
Performance Monitoring for Learning and Accountability
There is likely to be a trade-off between performance monitoring to improve
learning and performance monitoring for accountability to internal and external
stakeholders. The latter is likely to encourage a greater focus on easily measurable
outputs which are more easily attained and attributed to IMF activities and for
which data can be regularly collected, rather than a focus on outcomes and overall
goals. Since program staff cannot easily be held accountable for outcomes that can
be affected by many factors, this is also likely to encourage a focus on inputs and
outputs for which staff can have (potentially) great control. Whereas performance
monitoring for learning is more likely to encourage a shift in attention away from
inputs and outputs to outcomes and impacts on longer term goals, and to better
understanding of the cause-effect linkages between them. While accountability
tends to be a backward-looking, fault finding exercise, learning takes a more
positive, forward-looking perspective.
Secondly, accountability reporting is likely to require much more rigorous
data collection, methodology and attention to data quality and external verification.
Annual reporting may also encourage standardisation of outcome performance
criteria for aggregation purposes, which may not be optimal or possible. The
data/results for which it is possible, such as inputs and outputs, may not be very
informative whereas learning for decision making is more likely to involve more
43 Earl et al, 2001.
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rapid and low cost data collection and appraisal techniques and self-assessment,
and encourage more participatory methods and stakeholder involvement.
Thirdly, accountability reporting, especially if linked to rewards or
penalties, is more likely to encourage risk averse behaviour and a focus on easily
achievable results or what is easily measured. In contrast, a learning approach may
encourage risk-taking and experimentation (OECD, 2001).
Given these trade-offs it would seem to be more beneficial to implement a
results-based process to focus on learning to improve policy advice, since
minimising adverse policy outcomes and maximising goals would seem to be more
worthwhile to achieve than apportioning blame.
Instead, it would seem more appropriate to allow governments to take
policy decisions and for them to be held accountable at the national level. In which
case staff could be appraised on the basis of how well they understand transition
mechanisms and can anticipate shocks and risks into their policy analysis, whether
they undertake PSIA, how willing staff are to enter into discussion with national
stakeholders and comprehend different view-points during performance monitoring,
and to what extent they feed evaluation experience back into their ex ante analysis
and policy design, and generally how well they comply with operational procedures
for preparing policy advice, and monitoring and evaluation (see next chapter).
Resources
Introducing more analysis and evaluation into program design will require more
staff time and resources. Previous efforts to encourage ex-post assessment of
programs have been hampered by a lack of time in busy program departments,
suggesting that staff numbers should be increased in these (IEO, 2002).
Departmental targets for staff time allocated to analysing monitoring and
evaluation findings could be introduced to help staff prioritise competing
requirements. Introducing more analysis and evaluation is also likely to require a
wider range of expertise than the IMF currently employs.
Financial resources could be redirected from current surveillance budgets.
A significant amount of resources (both staff and financial) are spent monitoring
industrialised economies with little overall benefit (Crow et al., 1999). These
activities could be reduced and the freed-up resources channelled into area
departments engaged in lending and program activities.
Although a results-based system will cost more, it is also likely to save
money in the long-run if it leads to better policy design, better program
implementation and better outcomes.
Conclusion
Accountability and effective learning are two sides of the same coin. If the IMF
can demonstrate that it is learning from policy mistakes, through a transparent and
systematic learning process, and taking appropriate action, then it is effectively
being accountable.
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However, no matter how well designed IMF policy becomes, there will
always be winners and losers. Therefore, designing the 'right' policy will never
be a purely technical process. Inevitably, there will be a political element to the
policy choice and losers will demand accountability. Democratising decision
making, by opening up policy debate at the national level and enabling decisions
to be taken here, effectively 're-politicises' policy making, and allows those who
take decisions to be held accountable. The implication is that the IMF should
satisfy itself with a purely advisory role and should resist imposing policy
conditionality.
In an advisory capacity the IMF still has a responsibility to demonstrate
the outcomes of its policy advice. To improve and demonstrate the quality of its
advice, the IMF needs to establish clear processes by which assumptions and
policy rationale are clearly articulated, ex ante analysis of impacts and risks feeds
into its policy advice, intermediate monitoring feeds into program review and ex
post evaluation informs new program design to facilitate evidence-based policy
making. At every stage data and analysis should be made publicly available.
The IMF has an opportunity to facilitate accountability and learning at the
national level as well as for itself by including national stakeholders in monitoring
and evaluation processes. Inclusive and transparent monitoring and evaluation is
likely to be as equally political as making policy choices. Different stakeholders
will interpret results differently and debate about policy choices will almost
certainly open up areas of conflict between stakeholders. However, the
opportunities for all stakeholders to learn from this process are invaluable, and
efforts should be made to share lessons beyond those immediately involved in the
process.
Incentive structures will need to change at the IMF to encourage staff to
fully engage in such monitoring and evaluation processes. The IMF should fulfil
the lEO's recommendations to assess implicit and explicit staff incentives in order
to reorient these to support a culture based on performance and to facilitate
learning.
This discussion has barely touched upon the issue of data problems. That
data problems exist is put forward as a case for not undertaking impact analysis,
monitoring and evaluation. This is a short-term issue; with due incentive the
necessary data will be collected. The IMF has made it a priority to push
governments to collect and publish good quality data in other areas through its
Special and General Data Dissemination Standards which has given due incentive
to governments. It can likewise do the same for data on outcomes and key
objectives. Improving the IMF's own databases and making these public should be
a priority to demonstrate that it is willing to practise what it preaches.
However, in terms of both accountability and learning, no matter how
good the data, policy design and evaluation will be a political process. Thus the
transparency and inclusiveness of these processes is essential. As Earl et al. (2001)
point out, the most useful lessons are often achieved during the process rather than
from the actual data. Whether the IMF is prepared to learn will depend on whether
it is prepared to be accountable to a wider public.
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Chapter 4




This chapter is about the administrative practices of a public institution, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The principles of good governance require
that the IMF's administrative practices should promote both efficient and effective
IMF operations and the accountability of IMF staff and management.1 The
administrative practices can only promote accountability if they satisfy two
conditions. First, the institution's stakeholders and the staff and management
themselves must be able to determine if the staff and management's conduct
conforms to the appropriate standards for measuring their performance. These
standards can be divided into two categories. The first, which can be termed
operational policies, establishes the substantive requirements that the staff and
management must meet in implementing the institution's policies. Examples of
operational policies are the World Bank's environmental assessment requirements2
and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) guidelines on conditionality.3 The
second, which can be called operational procedures, explains how the staff and
management of the institution should go about making decisions and conducting its
operations. Examples of operational procedures are the steps that World Bank staff
must take in conducting environmental assessments4 and the IMF's guidance note
1 For a general overview of IMF governance, see, L. van Hourven, Governance of the IMF:
Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency and Accountability (IMF Pamphlet
Series #53, 2002).
2 World Bank, Operational Manual, Volume II, 'Safeguard Policies, Operational Policy'
(OP) 4(01), Environmental Assessment, 1999, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/
Manuals/OpManual.nsf7toc2/9367A2A9D9DAEED38525672C007D0972?OpenDocument.
3 International Monetary Fund, Guidelines on Conditionality, 2002, www.imf.org/External/
np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf.
4 World Bank, Operational Manual, Volume II, Safeguard Policies, Bank Procedure (BP)
4.01: Environmental Assessment, 1999, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/
OpManual.nsf/ea5916efc9250dl0852565afD054d273/c4241d657823fd818525672c007d09
6e?OpenDocument.
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on the guidelines on conditionality.5 This second category is comparable to
administrative procedures in national legal systems.
The second condition is that the institution must have some mechanism
for dealing with cases of staff or management non-compliance with the applicable
operational policies and procedures and the consequences thereof. Examples of
mechanisms established for this purpose include ombudsmen, administrative
tribunals and inspection mechanisms, like the World Bank Inspection Panel.
This chapter examines how well the IMF's administrative practices
conform to this principle of good governance. It is divided into four sections. The
first section is a review of the existing operational policies and procedures in the
IMF and a comparison with the situation in the multilateral development banks
(MDBs). The second section evaluates the feasibility of the IMF establishing a
comprehensive set of operational procedures. The third section considers the case
for establishing a mechanism for holding the IMF staff and management
accountable for their compliance with a comprehensive set of operational policies
and procedures. The final section contains recommendations, based on the lessons
learned in the previous sections of the chapter. It recommends that the IMF
develop a comprehensive set of formal operational policies and procedures and that
it establish an ombudsman to deal with the problems created by staff and
management non-compliance with these policies and procedures.
The Current Situation in the IMF and Comparison with the MDBs
A. Current Situation in the IMF
Operational policies and procedures are part of the 'internal law' of an
international organization. For current purposes, 'internal law' refers to the
combination of the constitutive documents of the organization and the rules and
regulations that it develops to govern the way in which it implements its mandate.
The IMF's internal law consists of the following:
1. Articles of Agreement':6 This is the international agreement, signed and
ratified by all IMF member states, that establishes the powers and mandate
of the IMF. The issues addressed in the Articles include the purposes of the
IMF; its powers to conduct surveillance, to provide financing to its member
states and to issue SDRs; its governance structure; and the rights and
obligations of IMF member states.
5 International Monetary Fund, Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality
Guidelines, www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2003/eng/050803.htm.
6 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
adopted 22 July 1944, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf.
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2. By-Laws:1 The Board of Governors adopts these by-laws pursuant to its
authority under the Articles of Agreement. They are intended to
complement the Articles. They deal with such matters as the conduct of
the meetings of the Executive Board and the Board of Governors, the
appointment of Executive Directors, voting, the ability of members not
entitled to appoint an Executive Director to be represented at meetings of
the Executive Board, budgets, audits and membership issues.
3. Rules and Regulations:8 These 'provide such operating rules and
procedures, regulations, and interpretations as are necessary and desirable
to carry out the purposes and powers contained in the Articles, as
supplemented by the By-Laws'.9 The IMF has 20 rules and regulations,
each of which is identified by letter. They cover such issues as the
meetings of the Executive Board, the mechanical aspects of transactions
with the IMF, accounting and reporting in the IMF, relations with non-
member states, staff regulations and the operation of the SDR account.
The rule dealing with staff is designated Rule-N. It covers such issues as
appointment of staff, the fact that staff owe their loyalty 'entirely' to the
IMF, individual staff involvement in political affairs, publications by
staff, the affirmation that staff make upon their appointment, staff
grievances and staff travel.
4. Decisions of the Board:10 These are formal decisions of the Executive
Board that establish clear policies for the IMF. They deal with such issues
as the content of conditionality, Article IV consultations and the role of
the IMF in governance.
5. General Administrative Orders:11 These are orders issued by management.
They usually deal with personnel issues as opposed to operational issues.
6. Codes of Conduct:12 The IMF has a code of conduct for its staff and
management and a separate code for Executive Directors, Alternate
Executive Directors and their advisors. Both codes deal with ethical issues
related to the problem of corruption.
7 International Monetary Fund, By-Laws of the International Monetary Fund, adopted 16
March 1946, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm.
8 International Monetary Fund, Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund,
adopted 25 September 1946, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm.
9 International Monetary Fund, Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund,
Rule A-l, Scope of Rules and Regulations, adopted 25 September 1946, amended 1 April
1978, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftVbl/rr01 .htm.
10 International Monetary Fund, Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF
Twenty-Seventh Issue, 31 December 2002, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp.
11 International Monetary Fund, Report of the External Panel, Review of the International
Monetary Fund's Dispute Resolution System, 27 November 2001, available at
www.imf.org/external/hrd/dr/l 12701 .pdf.
12 International Monetary Fund, Code of Conduct for Staff, 31 July 1998,
www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm; International Monetary Fund, Code of Conduct for
Members of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, 14 July 2000,
www.imf.org/external/hrd/edscode.htm.
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7. Guidance Documents: These are policy papers and guidance notes that set
out the IMF's policies on specific issues. Most of these documents are
operational policy documents that are intended to provide guidance on the
substance of IMF policy in regard to specific activities of the IMF or to
specific issues relevant to IMF operations. An example of such a
document is the IMF Guidelines on Conditionality.13 Recently, the IMF
issued a guidance note that provides guidance on how the staff should
implement the conditionality guidelines.14 This is a rare example of a
formal and publicly available IMF operational procedure. Most IMF
operational procedures are informal and not publicly available. It is
important to note that it is unclear if these guidance documents establish
binding standards and procedures for IMF staff or are merely precatory in
intent.
The internal law addresses four administrative issues with differing degrees of
detail. The most detailed relates to the personnel policies of the IMF, including the
rights and responsibilities of IMF employees. One indication of the importance that
the IMF attaches to this issue is the number of mechanisms that it has established
to 'enforce' these personnel policies. This infrastructure, in addition to less formal
grievance procedures,15 consists of the following elements:
1. Ombudsmen: Ombudsmen are able to investigate and then help resolve
problems that arise between staff and management.
2. Staff Association Committee:16 This is a committee of the Staff
Association and one of its functions is to advise staff on their rights and
responsibilities and to assist in the resolution of cases of staff grievance
with IMF management.
3. Administrative Tribunal:17 This is an independent tribunal on which legal
experts who are not employees of the IMF serve on a part-time basis. The
tribunal's function is to hear formal complaints and grievances of
employees of the IMF relating to their treatment by their managers and
the IMF as an institution. The tribunal has the power to overrule
management and to provide complainants with compensation for the harm
they have suffered and to order their reinstatement.
4. Ethics Officer.18 The IMF has appointed an Ethics Officer to advise all
IMF officials on issues arising from the applicable code of conduct.
13 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra, note 3.
14 Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines, supra note 5.
15 Review of the International Monetary Fund's Dispute Resolution System, supra note 11.
16 Review of the International Monetary Fund's Dispute Resolution System, supra note 11.
17 International Monetary Fund, Administrative Tribunal (IMFAT), www.imf.org/external/
imfat/index.htm.
18 International Monetary Fund, Ethics Officer - Terms of Reference, 28 February 2000,
www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm.
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These mechanisms support the internal law in three ways. First, they help educate
staff about what their rights are and the standards with which they can expect their
managers to conform. Second, they allow employment problems to be resolved in a
way which is effective, impartial and based on the merits of the case. Third, their
case records help the IMF learn lessons about the nature of the employment
relationship in the institution and how to improve it.
It is important to note that the IMF has established an infrastructure for
implementing its personnel law that meets almost all the requirements for
accountability mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. It has clear policies and
procedures, with the possible exception of a rule making process, and a mechanism
for monitoring and enforcing compliance with these policies and procedures.
Interestingly, this is the only part of the IMF internal law for which this
observation is accurate.
The second issue addressed by the internal law is the rules and practices
dealing with the governance of the IMF. These rules and practices deal with such
issues as the election of Executive Directors, the conduct of Board of Governors'
and Executive Board meetings, and the accounting practices of the organization.
The third issue addressed by the internal law is operational policies. The
content of these policies is less detailed than the content of the law in regard to
personnel matters. The mechanisms for 'enforcing' this law are also less well
developed. Examples of IMF operational policies are the new conditionality
guidelines,19 and the policy documents on surveillance,20 governance21 and poverty
reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).22 Until recently the only IMF mechanism for
monitoring compliance with these operational policies was the Policy
Development and Review Department (PDR) of the IMF. It is interesting to note
that PDR, whose staff are regular IMF employees, is responsible for both the
development and the review of IMF policies and their implementation. There is an
obvious conflict of interest between the policy development and policy review
aspects of PDR's work which has tended to undermine public confidence in the
objectivity of PDR reviews of IMF operational policies. Recently, the IMF, in part
to address this problem, established an Independent Evaluation Office,23 which is
independent of IMF management and reports directly to the Executive Board, to
evaluate selected aspects of IMF operations. Consequently, to some extent it
19 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra note 3.
20 International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 03/50, 10 April 2003,
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Surveillance: Operational Responses, the Agenda Ahead,
and Next Steps, www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0350.htm; International Monetary
Fund, Surveillance: A Factsheet, April 2003, www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm.
21 International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note,
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htmffI2, International Monetary Fund, Good
Governance: The IMF's Role, 1997, available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/
govern.pdf.
22 International Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), last updated 16
June 2003, www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp.
23 International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF,
www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/index.htm.
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functions as a monitor of staff and management compliance with the applicable
operational policies.
The fourth and least developed area of the IMF's internal law is its formal
operational procedures. Two preliminary points must be made about this area of
the internal law. First, IMF 'operational procedures' can be understood as referring
to the way in which the staff and management execute their responsibilities in IMF
surveillance, financing, analytical, and technical assistance activities. Second, the
focus of this chapter is on the establishment of formal operational procedures,
which means that they have entered into force after a drafting and approval process
that result in a board-level decision, and that they are publicly available.
With one exception, the IMF does not have formal operational
procedures. This exception is the operational guidance note that the IMF has
adopted to assist staff in implementing the conditionality guidelines.24 The IMF
does have informal procedures in the form of memoranda and notes from
management to the staff that provide guidance on how they should conduct IMF
operations. These existing procedures are informal in the sense that they have not
been presented for board approval and are not contained in a publicly available
document. One example of such an informal operational procedure, identified
through references in published materials, is an operational guidance note on
surveillance.25
The lack of formal operational policies means, for example, that there are
no publicly available documents that external stakeholders can consult to learn
how the IMF decides with whom it should consult during surveillance operations
or in designing its financing arrangements or its technical assistance programs or in
its general analytical and policy work, how it organizes these consultations, or
what are the factors that staff consider in making specific types of decisions. In
addition, there are no mechanisms that stakeholders can use to hold the IMF
accountable for the way in which it implements the existing informal operational
policies or the one formal policy. Thus, the internal law in regard to operational
procedures fails to conform to either of the two standards for good administrative
practices identified at the beginning of this chapter.
The IMF's failure to develop comprehensive formal operational
procedures can be explained. When the IMF was responsible for managing a
system of relatively fixed exchange rates, it could limit its interactions in its
member states to the financial and monetary authorities. This meant that there was
a limited range of officials involved in these interactions. In addition, the IMF staff
would be sent on mission with detailed and carefully crafted instructions and
24 Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines, supra note 5. The IMF is
currently engaged in a participatory process regarding its relations with civil society and it is
possible that this process will result in a second formal operational procedure.
25 Footnote 28 in Enhancing the Effectiveness of Surveillance: Operational Responses, the
Agenda Ahead and Next Steps, prepared by the Policy Development and Review
Department in consultation with Other Departments (13 March 2003) refers to an
Operational Guidance Note for Staff Following the 2002 Biennial Surveillance Review,
September 2002. However, this note is not publicly available.
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would be required to refer matters back to headquarters before agreeing to any
deviations from what was proposed in these instructions.26 The result was that both
from the IMF and the member state perspective there was limited need for formal
operational procedures. Everyone involved in the discussions between the IMF and
the member state knew and understood the de facto operational procedures.
However, following the collapse of the par value system and the
expansion in the scope of IMF operations that occurred in the course of the 1980s
and 1990s, the nature of IMF interactions with its member states has changed.27
There are at least three changes that are relevant for current purposes:
1. The political context within which the IMF must operate has changed.
Non-state actors - corporations, NGOs, civic organizations - have begun
to play a greater role in international affairs generally and in the work of
the IMF in particular. This can be seen, for example, in the consultation
requirements in the PRSP process, the efforts the IMF makes to meet with
civil society in its missions to its member states, and in its growing
informal interactions with civil society over particular policy papers of the
IMF. This evolving relationship has increased the pressure on the IMF to
disclose more information and was an important factor in the
establishment of the Independent Evaluation Office. NGOs and civic
organizations, however, continue to criticize the IMF for the lack of
transparency in its operating procedures. They argue that they do not fully
understand how the IMF makes operational decisions and that it appears
that its decision making process is subject to undue influence from the
IMF's most powerful member states.
2. The nature of the IMF's relations with its member states has changed.
Originally the IMF was perceived as and operated like a credit union in
which all participants were both contributors to the fund and users of its
services. Thus, all member states understood that IMF policy and
operational decisions could become directly applicable to them. However,
this is no longer the case. Today, the rich countries contribute most of the
IMF's funds but never use its financial or technical services while the
developing countries contribute a relatively small portion of its resources
but use all its services. In addition, the rich countries, both because of the
weighted voting structure in the IMF and the structure of its Executive
Board, are able to control the institution and make operational policy for it,
even though these policies will never be applicable to them or their citizens.
The developing countries, who are dependent on the services of the IMF, on
the other hand find it much more difficult to participate in policy and
decision making of the IMF. The result of these changes is that a power
26 R.H.R. Harper, Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and
Organizational Action (1998) at 175-230 for a description of an IMF mission.
27 See James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1$
(2001) for a history of the International Monetary Fund during much of this period.
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imbalance has developed in the IMF.28 In this situation, the lack of formal
comprehensive operational policies and procedures becomes a problem that
affects the perceived fairness of IMF operations and decision making.
3. The scope of IMF operations has expanded dramatically. The IMF, in
addition to its involvement in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, is
now also involved in advising countries and in supporting their efforts to
promote better governance, and to adopt policies that are geared towards
poverty reduction as well as towards macroeconomic stability. The result
is that a member state's central bank and ministry of finance do not have
all the necessary information about the issues of interest to the IMF. Thus,
the IMF needs to interact with a much broader array of governmental and
non-governmental sources if it is to obtain the necessary information, and
effectively design and implement its operations. All these sources can
influence the success of its proposed activities. For these additional actors,
the lack of clear and predictable IMF operating procedures becomes a
problem because they do not know the most effective ways to engage with
the IMF and cannot understand its operational needs.
The combined effect of these three changes is that the need for formal and
comprehensive IMF operational procedures has become more urgent. The lack of
such procedures is undermining the efficacy of the IMF and even threatening its
legitimacy.
B. Situation in the World Bank19
The World Bank, unlike the IMF, has formal operational policies and procedures to
guide its staff in the conduct of their responsibilities. Both of these are contained in
the Bank's Operational Manual30 which is available at the Bank's website. It
addresses such issues as the types of products the Bank offers, the procedures Bank
staff should follow in developing their country assistance strategies and other
analytical work, the procedures they should follow and the factors they should
consider in their project and loan preparatory work, the environmental and social
safeguard policies of the Bank, the procedures applicable to loan disbursements
and repayments and the staffs responsibilities in monitoring Bank-funded projects.
28 See Daniel D. Bradlow (2001) 'Stuffing New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Troubling Case
of the IMF', Journal of International Banking Regulation, 3(1).
29 The 'World Bank' refers to the members of the World Bank Group. The members of this
group are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes.
30 The Operations Manual can be viewed at www.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/
opmanual.nsf. This manual is only applicable to the IBRD and IDA. However, many of its
policies and procedures have been incorporated into the operational policies and procedures
of IFC and MIGA. See websites: www.ifc.org; www.miga.org.
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The Bank's operational policies and procedures consist of a number of different
documents. They are:31
1. Operational Policies (OPs)\ These are short, focused statements that are
drawn from the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the general conditions, and
policies approved by the board. They establish the parameters within
which Bank operations must be conducted and describe the circumstances
under which exceptions to these policies are admissible and who can
authorize such exceptions. In the terminology of this chapter, the OPs are
the Bank's operational policies.
2. Bank Procedures (BPs): These are statements explaining how Bank staff
should implement the policies set out in the OPs. They spell out the
procedures and documentation that staff are required to obtain. One of
their purposes is to ensure Bank-wide consistency and quality in the
implementation of the OPs. In the terminology of this chapter, the BPs are
the Bank's operational procedures.
3. Good Practices (GPs): They contain advice and guidance for staff on
implementing the OPs. The GPs contain information on such matters as
the history of the issue being addressed in the OP, the sectoral context
within which the OP is being implemented, the analytical framework that
has informed the substance of the OP, and they provide some best practice
examples.
4. Operational Directives (ODs): The ODs contain a mixture of policies,
procedures and guidelines. They are gradually being replaced by OPs,
BPs and GPs.
5. Operational Memoranda (Op. Memos): These are interim instructions
designed to elaborate on issues raised in OPs/BPs or ODs. Once the
instructions in Op. Memos are incorporated into revisions of the pertinent
OPs/BPs, the Op. Memos are retired.
OPs, BPs and ODs, which are contained in the Operational Manual, are mandatory
and the staff is expected to comply with their terms in all operational activity. GPs
and Op. Memos are not mandatory and may not be in the Operational Manual.
The Bank has established a number of independent mechanisms for
monitoring and ensuring staff compliance with these operational policies and
procedures.32 They are:
31 These descriptions are drawn from the definitions of these documents contained in the
Operations Manual, idem.
32 In the case of the IBRD and IDA these independent mechanisms are in addition to the
Operations Policy and Country Services Vice Presidency, which is responsible for
strengthening management systems for monitoring compliance. See World Bank, Quality
Assurance Group, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
PRO JECTS/Q AG/0,,pagePK: 109619~theSitePK: 109609,00.html.
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1. Operations Evaluation Department (OED):33 The OED is responsible for
evaluating completed Bank projects and for offering the management
insights into the strengths and weaknesses in Bank operations. Its
activities may lead it to recommend changes in Bank operating policies
and procedures.
2. Inspection Panel (Panel):34 The Panel, whose jurisdiction is limited to
IBRD and IDA operations, is authorized to receive requests from any
groups of two or more persons who claim that they have been or are
threatened with harm by the Bank's failure to act in compliance with its
operational policies and procedures. The Panel is authorized to investigate
these complaints and make recommendations to the Bank's Executive
Board on how to correct the problems caused by Bank non-compliance
with these policies and procedures.
3. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO):35 The CAO's jurisdiction is
limited to the social and environmental aspects of IFC and MIGA
operations. It is authorized to deal with complaints received from persons
who claim they have been or are threatened with harm caused by IFC or
MIGA funded operations, to monitor compliance with IFC and MIGA
social and environmental standards and operational procedures and to give
the management of these institutions advice on the social and
environmental aspect of its operations.
The Bank's personnel policies and procedures have a similar structure to the IMF.
It has a staff manual that informs staff about their rights and responsibilities. In
addition, the Bank, like the IMF, has an Administrative Tribunal, an Ombudsman,
and an Ethics Officer. Their powers and procedures are similar to those of the
corresponding bodies in the IMF.
Situation in Regional Development Banks
The African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development follow similar approaches to the World
Bank. This means that they each have operational policies and procedures to guide
their staff in the conduct of their operations. All four have an evaluation
department that helps monitor the implementation of these operational policies and
33 World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, www.worldbank.org/oed/.
34 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/
ipnweb.nsf.
35 Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, www.cao-ombudsman.org/ev.php.
36 For information on the operational policies and procedures of these banks, see
www.iadb.org/exr/english/POLICIES/policies.htm for the Inter-American Development
Bank; see www.adb.org/Development/policies.asp and www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/
Operations/default.asp?p=policies for the Asian Development Bank; see
www.afdb.org/projects/policies_and_procedures.htm?nl=3&n2=l&n3=0 for the African
Development Bank; see www.ebrd.org/about/index.htm for the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
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procedures. In addition, the Asian, and Inter-American Development Banks and
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have inspection
mechanisms to monitor compliance with these policies and procedures and to deal
with the harm that they cause.37 Finally, each of the regional development banks
has personnel policies and mechanisms for dealing with grievances that may arise
under them.
Designing a Formal and Comprehensive Set of Operational Policies and
Procedures for the IMF
The previous section makes it clear that the IMF is an unusual international
financial institution (IFI) because it does not have a set of formal and
comprehensive operational policies and procedures. There are two possible
explanations for this difference. The first is that the IMF's lack of such procedures
is attributable to the significant operational differences that follow from the
macroeconomic focus of the IMF's responsibilities compared to the MDBs'
emphasis on project lending. However, this is not an adequate justification for the
IMF's lack of a formal set of operational procedures. The scope of the IMF's
interactions in those member states that use its services tends to be no less diverse
or complex than the interactions of the MDBs in these societies. In addition, the
impact of an IMF operation on a particular state tends to be stronger than the
impact of most MDB operations on the same state. Consequently, it has the same
need for transparent and predictable procedures to guide the conduct of staff and
management as the MDBs.
The second possible explanation is that the costs to the IMF of having
formal operational procedures are too high. In order to adequately assess this
explanation, it is necessary to determine both the costs and benefits that such
procedures would create for the IMF.
A. The Benefits
There are five significant benefits that would accrue to the IMF from having a set
of formal operational procedures. They are:
1. Effective Guidance for Staff: Formal operational procedures would
provide staff and management with a clearer understanding of what is
expected from them during IMF operations. This should facilitate staff
accountability and provide a basis for improving staff performance. It
should also facilitate the decentralization of IMF operational decision
making, which may help promote member state 'ownership' of IMF-
37 Asian Development Bank, Inspection Function, www.adb.org/Inspection/default.asp;
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism,
www.ebrd.org/about/policies/irm/irm.pdf. The Inter-American Development Bank does not
mention its Investigation Review Mechanism on its website.
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funded programs. Finally, these procedures may positively affect staff
willingness to be innovative by giving them clear guidance on where there
is scope for innovation.
2. Predictability in the Conduct of IMF Operations: Formal operational
procedures provide greater predictability to IMF operations than informal
procedures which can relatively easily be changed. This will enhance both
stakeholder confidence in dealing with the IMF and IMF staff confidence
in their interactions with outside stakeholders.
3. Transparency in IMF Decision Making and Action: Formal procedures
would make it easier for outsiders to understand how the IMF does its
work and the factors that it considers in making its decisions. This should
help clarify the scope of IMF responsibilities and differentiate them from
the responsibilities of member governments in their dealings with the
IMF. increased transparency may also reduce suspicion that the IMF
management is unaccountable, has too much discretion and is susceptible
to pressure from powerful member states in its decision making.
4. Accountability: Formal operational procedures will promote
accountability in two ways. First, they will give outside stakeholders -
member states and non-state actors - a principled basis on which to hold
IMF staff and management accountable. This should help depoliticize the
issue of IMF operational accountability for specific operations and
decisions. Second, formal procedures will help the board members to hold
IMF staff and management accountable.
5. Lessons Learned: Formal operational procedures will also make it easier
for the IMF to learn about the actual impact of its operational practices
and the strengths and weaknesses of its operational policies and
procedures and to improve them over time.
B. The Costs
The IMF would incur the following costs from having formal operational
procedures:
1. Increased Bureaucratization: Formal operational procedures can result in
IMF staff developing a cautious approach to their work in which they seek
to do everything 'by the book'. There is also a danger that the rules result
in an increase in reporting and paperwork requirements that reduce staff
productivity.
2. Loss of Flexibility: It is impossible for the drafters of the procedures to
anticipate all the situations in which they need to be applied. Thus, the
procedures can result in a certain loss of operational flexibility because
they cannot be easily adapted to specific conditions in which they actually
must function. This in turn may cause the IMF, once again, to be seen as
imposing a 'one size fits all' approach on its member states.
3. Disincentives for Innovation: Formal procedures can increase the risk that
staff and management will be sanctioned for being innovative in ways that
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do not strictly comply with strict interpretations of the procedures. Since
the issues with which the IMF deals do not have clear answers and their
resolution requires creativity, any disincentive to innovation is a
potentially significant cost for the IMF. The cost however is mitigated by
the fact that it is not in the IMF's interest for the staff and management to
have too much scope for uncontrolled innovation and the procedures can
establish the limits on their scope for permissible ingenuity.
C. Balancing Costs and Benefits
There are four reasons why the benefits of having formal operational policies and
procedures outweigh the costs for the IMF. First, such procedures help outside
stakeholders engage effectively with the IMF, which is particularly relevant at a
time when the IMF is advocating increased participation in the PRSP process,
increased country ownership of IMF-supported programs and transparency,
participation and accountability as key elements in good governance for its
member states. Second, transparent and predictable operational procedures will
increase public understanding of the IMF's operations, including of the costs
associated with more transparent operating procedures. Third, the procedures will
promote IMF accountability. Fourth, the policies and procedures will improve
internal IMF governance at a time when IMF operations are growing more
complex. All these benefits would be earned in areas where the IMF is particularly
weak: public confidence and trust in the IMF and the efficacy of its operations is
declining and there is a growing mismatch between the IMF's rhetoric on good
governance and its own governance practices.
Given these significant gains, the question of whether or not the IMF
should adopt a set of formal operational rules and procedures seems to boil down
to two questions:
1. Can the IMF draft operational policies and procedures that maximise the
benefits while minimising the costs associated with such policies and
procedures?
2. What should the scope of the policies and procedures be?
Each of these questions is answered below.
C. 1: Drafting Operational Policies and Procedures
The primary drafting challenge is to strike the appropriate balance between the
rigidity needed to provide stakeholders with the desired predictability and
transparency in IMF operations and the flexibility needed for management and
staff to adapt the policies and procedures to the variety of situations in which they
must operate. There is no theoretical reason that this cannot be done. In fact, it is
the type of drafting challenge that government drafts-people confront all the time.
In this case the goal is to draft operational policies that are sufficiently
detailed that they provide all stakeholders with the predictability and information
that they need to understand the policies of the IMF and their operational goals
Operational Policies and Procedures and an Ombudsman 101
when they implement the policies. The objective in drafting the operational
procedures is to identify the categories of information staff need to gather in order
to perform their operational responsibilities; the factors they should consider, the
people they should consult and the steps they should follow in making operational
decisions. In addition, the procedures should clearly explain how staff can seek
exceptions to the policies and procedures. There are two good models that the IMF
could use in this drafting exercise. The first is the IMF's own New Conditionality
Guidelines and its Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines.38
The second is the Bank's three related operational documents - OPs, BPs and GPs.
These examples clearly demonstrate that it is possible for the IMF to develop
operational policies and procedures that combine predictability and transparency in
IMF operations with operational flexibility.
C.2: The Scope of the Operational Rules and Procedures
There are two aspects to this issue. First, the operational policies and procedures
should address how the IMF conducts its operations and makes decisions relating
to all aspects of its work. This means that they should cover all aspects of IMF
surveillance, the design, negotiation and implementation of IMF financial
programs, IMF technical assistance, policy and analytical work and its relations
with other organizations.
Second, the IMF needs to establish a transparent and predictable rule-
making procedure that will govern how the IMF develops all its operational
policies and procedures. The extensive consultation that preceded the adoption of
the current guidelines on Conditionality and of the work plan of the Independent
Evaluation Office are important precedents in this regard. However, in each of
these cases this impressive process was 'revealed' to all interested parties as it
unfolded. Instead, the IMF needs to establish a predictable rule-making procedure
that it will always follow when developing new operational policies and
procedures. This is consistent with general principles of good governance that the
IMF advocates to its member states.
The Need for an Ombudsman in the IMF
In order for operational policies and procedures to be effective, they need to be
supported by a mechanism capable of monitoring and promoting compliance with
them. One indication of the importance of such mechanisms is that the MDBs
either have or are considering establishing an inspection mechanism that is
empowered to investigate charges of non-compliance with their operational
policies and procedures.39
38 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra note 3, Operational Guidance on the New
Conditionality Guidelines, supra note 5.
39 See World Bank, The Inspection Panel, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf;
International Finance Corporation (IFC)-Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA), Office of Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, www.cao-ombudsman.org/ev.php;
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There are a number of benefits that such mechanisms offer to IFIs. First,
the mechanisms can help raise the profile of the operational policies and
procedures within the institution. In this regard the experience of the World Bank's
Inspection Panel is instructive. The risk that Bank projects may become the object
of Panel investigations has increased staff sensitivity to the Bank's operational
policies and procedures and their interest in acting in compliance with them. In
fact, it has led to a phenomenon known as 'Panel-proofing' a project, which means
making sure that the project is sufficiently in compliance with the policies and
procedures that it will survive any challenge in the Inspection Panel.
Second, the mechanism can become a vehicle for solving problems that
have arisen in IFI operations. Such problem-solving capability offers obvious
advantages in terms of the quality of the operations of the institution and in terms
of public relations. The IFC and MIGA's Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO)
offers the best example of an effective problem-solving mechanism.
Third, the mechanism offers the institution an opportunity for learning
lessons about the actual impact of its operations. Since these mechanisms are
triggered by complaints from those who have been most directly affected by the
operation, they have a unique perspective on the operations of the institution.
Consequently, its findings and the expertise it develops over time can offer the
institution some important insights into the strengths and weaknesses of its
operations and into what feasible improvements can be made to both the policies
with which its operations must comply and the procedures that it should follow in
designing and implementing these operations.
Fourth, the mechanism is helpful in differentiating the responsibilities of
the international financial institution from those of other actors in its operations.
This is a particularly useful benefit for an institution like the IMF which has to be
careful to avoid unduly interfering with the sovereignty of its member states. The
mechanism, whose mandate is limited to monitoring issues arising under the
institution's operational policies and procedures, can focus just on the operations of
the institution without having to investigate the activities and decisions of its
member states. The evolution in the functioning of the World Bank's Inspection
Panel shows both the sensitivity and importance of this issue and the ability of such
mechanisms to enhance institutional accountability without unduly interfering with
the sovereignty of its member states.40
The above suggests that the efficacy of the IMF's operational policies and
procedures would be enhanced if it established a mechanism that was empowered
Asian Development Bank, Inspection Function, www.adb.org/Inspection/default.asp;
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism,
www.ebrd.org/about/policies/irm/irm.pdf, Inter-American Development Bank, Independent
Investigation Mechanism, www.iadb.org/cont/poli/mecanism.pdf; The African Development
Bank is also being encouraged by the G-7 to establish such a mechanism.
40 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (2d ed. 2000);
Daniel D. Bradlow (2001) 'Lessons From the NGO Campaign Against the Second Review
of the World Bank Inspection Panel: A Participant's Perspective', Journal of International
and Comparative Law, 7.
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to monitor their implementation. There are a number of forms such a mechanism
could take. For example, the IMF could follow the examples of the IBRD and IDA,
and the regional development banks and establish an inspection mechanism.41
Alternatively, it could follow the example of the IFC and MIGA and establish a
compliance advisor and ombudsman arrangement. A third possibility is to follow
the example of many national governments and the European Union and appoint an
ombudsman.42
Based on the experience of all these examples, it is possible to deduce
certain general principles that should be observed by any IFI interested in
establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of its operational policies
and procedures. Any mechanism that fails to incorporate these principles is likely
to be viewed as deficient by at least one of the IFI's stakeholders.
These principles are:
1. Role of Non-State Actors: It is absolutely essential that the mechanism be
triggered by complaints received from non-state actors who claim that
they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the failure of the IMF
to comply with its operational rules and procedures.
2. Clarity of Purpose: The mechanism can be designed to serve one or more
of three different functions. These functions are:
a. Compliance Review: This involves determining if the IFI staff and
management are satisfying the requirements of all the applicable
operating policies and procedures in a particular IFI operation. The
World Bank's Inspection Panel is a good example of an inspection
mechanism whose primary focus is compliance review.
b. Problem Solving: This involves resolving problems that arise in the
course of an IMF operation and that have been identified by affected
people as causing them or threatening them with harm. The IFC and
MIGA's CAO is a good example of a problem-solving mechanism.
c. Lessons Learned: This refers to the ability of the mechanism to
contribute to the lessons that the IMF can learn about the efficacy of
its operational rules and procedures. Given its unique perspective, the
mechanism is in a position to identify trends within the
implementation of operational policies and procedures that are
unlikely to be obvious to other IFI actors. This function is not well
developed in most of the mechanisms in the MDBs. The European
Union's ombudsman is an example of a mechanism that performs a
'lessons learned' role.
These three purposes are not necessarily mutually exclusive and it is
possible for one inspection mechanism to perform more than one of these
functions. In the case of the IMF, the two most relevant functions will be
41 See, supra, note 40. The United Nations also has an inspection mechanism, although this
is not triggered by outside complaints. See, United Nations, Joint Inspection Unit (JIU),
www.unsystem.org/jiu/.
42 European Ombudsman, www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/home/en/default.htm.
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the compliance review and lessons learned function. It is more difficult
for the mechanism to perform a problem solving function because of the
complexities and multi-faceted nature of IMF operations. However, this
does not mean that it should not be given the ability to solve problems
when it can appropriately do so.
3. Limited Jurisdiction: The mechanism's jurisdiction must be limited to any
case arising out of an allegation of non-compliance by the IFI staff and
management with the IFFs operational policies and procedures. This
helps ensure that the mechanism does not encroach onto the sovereignty
of the institution's member states.
4. User Friendliness: Since the mechanism is intended to be available to
those who have been adversely affected by the operations of the IFI, its
procedures for receiving and handling complaints should be as easy for
the affected people to understand and utilise as possible. One way to make
the mechanism user friendly is to limit the number of requirements that a
complaint must satisfy before the mechanism begins to address the
substance of the matters raised in the complaint. The Ombudsman part of
the CAO is a good example of a user friendly mechanism. An example of
a mechanism that is not particularly user friendly is the World Bank
Inspection Panel.43 One consequence of its formal procedures is that the
management of the World Bank has been able to use the Panel procedures
to challenge the eligibility of complainants and the suitability of
complaints for investigation. This has forced affected people to rely on
relatively sophisticated advisors in preparing their complaints. In some
cases, it has also contributed to an unnecessary politicization of the
complaint.
5. Independence: The mechanism should be independent of the management
of the IMF and should report directly to its Executive Board. In addition,
the terms and conditions of employment of the mechanism's personnel
should be designed to promote and protect its independence. Finally, the
budget of the mechanism should support its independence.
6. Powers of Investigation: The mechanism must have access to all the
persons, documents, records, and locations that it deems necessary to
conduct a complete investigation.
7. Impartiality and Competence: This means that the mechanism's
recommendations, findings and conclusions must be supported by facts
and well-reasoned arguments. In addition, the mechanism's investigations
should be sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate that it has gathered
all the relevant information and has used this information in its reports.
8. Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness: This means the mechanism should be
able to deal with complaints relatively quickly and at a cost that does not
impose an undue burden on the IMF.
43 See, supra, note 40.
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9. Effective Management of Issues Presented: This means that the
mechanism must be able to demonstrate to all stakeholders that its
findings and recommendations are taken seriously by the IFI and that the
IFI will either implement the mechanism's recommendations or explain
its failure to do so. One important consequence of this principle is that the
mechanism should be given the power to monitor the implementation of
the results of an inspection process.
10. Transparency: This means that the mechanism must publish the results of
its investigations and must publish an annual report.
Application of the Principles to the IMF
Given the complexity of the IMF's operations, it needs a mechanism that is
flexible, efficient, effective and easy to use. It also needs a mechanism that can
both monitor staff and management compliance with its operational policies and
procedures and can provide the IMF with a lessons learned capability. The
mechanism should also, where appropriate, be able to help those directly affected
by the IMF's decisions and operations either resolve their problems with the staff
and management, or explain to them why a resolution is not possible.
The model that is most suited to the IMF's needs is an ombudsman.
Historically an ombudsman was created for the purpose of receiving complaints
from people who believed that they had been harmed by the failure of an institution
to comply with its own policies and procedures.44 It was also expected to report to
higher authorities on how well the institution was performing its responsibilities
and complying with its policies and procedures. An ombudsman was designed to
be flexible and relatively informal in its approach to the issues brought to it. This
means that it can perform its function with minimal procedural requirements. The
ombudsman is also well suited to help educate the institution and the authorities to
which it reports on the problems that are arising in its operations and on identifying
ways in which it can improve its operations.
The following are the essential characteristics that should be exhibited by
an IMF ombudsman charged with monitoring its operational policies and
procedures:
1. The ombudsman must be appointed by and report directly to the IMF's
Executive Board. He/she should have the status of a senior official of the
IMF.
2. The ombudsman must be given all the indicia of independence. This
means he/she should not have to report to IMF management or to receive
any authorization from management regarding its budget or personnel
decisions. He/she must be appointed to a single non-renewable term of
office from which he/she can only be removed by the Executive Board for
44 For information on ombudsmen generally, see Ibrahim al-Wahab, The Swedish Institution of
Ombudsman (1979); World Bank, PREM Notes, No. 19, April 1999, Using an Ombudsman to
Oversee Public Officials, wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnotel9.pdf.
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cause. The ombudsman should also have full control over all staff
appointments in the ombudsman's office, and assured budgetary support.
3. The ombudsman must be able to receive any complaint relating to the
IMF's operations from any person who believes they have been or are
threatened with harm caused by the failure of IMF staff or management to
comply with the IMF's operational policies and procedures.
4. The ombudsman must have the exclusive power to review the complaint
and to decide whether to investigate the complaint or to reject it.
5. If the ombudsman decides to accept the complaint for investigation,
he/she must have complete powers of investigation, which includes access
to all the IMF staff and records that he/she deems relevant to the
investigation.
6. The ombudsman must be required to make a report, which is publicly
available, to the Executive Board for each case for which he/she conducts
a full investigation.
7. The ombudsman must publish an annual report in which he/she must
report on all the complaints he/she received and on how they were
handled. In addition, the ombudsman, in the annual report, must comment
on the lessons he/she believes can be learned about the IMF's operational
policies and procedures from the cases he/she has received and, if
appropriate, make suggestions on how to improve these rules and
procedures.
8. The ombudsman must have the authority to monitor the implementation
of the outcome of any investigations he/she conducts.
Conclusion
The complexity and range of IMF operations has grown to the point where it is no
longer feasible for it to limit its interactions in its member states to officials in the
central bank and the ministry of finance in those countries. It now regularly
consults with a broad range of government officials, legislatures and actors in civil
society in those member states that utilise its services. This means that the number
and range of actors with which the IMF is engaged has grown beyond the point
where its operating practices can be kept informal and known only to a relatively
small number of experts. Consequently, it needs to develop a set of operational
policies and procedures to guide its interactions with all these actors and to guide
its decision making. The lack of a comprehensive set of such policies and
procedures renders IMF operations unduly opaque and undermines stakeholder
confidence in its fairness and impartiality.
While the creation of such operational policies and procedures does
impose some costs on the IMF, they can be minimised through the policy and
procedures design and drafting process. In addition, these costs are more than
compensated for by the benefits that they will bring to the institution.
It is not sufficient for the IMF to merely promulgate such policies and
procedures. It must support the implementation of these operational policies and
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procedures by establishing an independent ombudsman with the authority to
investigate complaints from directly affected people and groups about staff and
management non-compliance with the policies and procedures.
Both of these steps are required if the IMF is to demonstrate that it





Professor Bradlow's argument seems to be as self-evidently true as motherhood
and apple pie. Of course it would be a good thing if the IMF had more 'formal and
comprehensive' operational policies and procedures, more public disclosure of
what it is doing, and an ombudsman able to investigate complaints from non-state
actors who claim that they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the
failure of the IMF to comply with those operational policies and procedures. More
accountability is always better. Or is it? A little 'ground truthing' is in order.
There are some immediate objections to Bradlow's proposals, and some
deeper problems. The immediate ones include the point that the Fund already has
plenty of 'formal and comprehensive' operational policies and procedures, laid out
on the Fund's website and in public documents. By what criteria are more needed?
Moreover, the Fund has recently established an Independent Evaluation Office
(IEO) that is carrying out part of the role of an ombudsman; and it is seeking public
comment on its work. Should one not wait to see what impact the IEO is making
before setting up a new inspection regime?
Now, to the deeper issues: is Bradlow's an appropriate model of
accountability for the Fund (as distinct from the Bank)? To whom would the Fund
end up being more accountable? Who gets to set the appropriate standards, policies
and procedures, and which nation's political culture would inform their content?
How to establish the ombudsman function so that it is captured neither by
management nor by Fund critics, and avoids creating the risk-averse behaviour that
the Bank's Inspection Panel has prompted inside the Bank?
The core of the argument is this: increased accountability of an
organization is not necessarily a good thing; it also depends on accountability to
whom. In the case of the IMF (like the World Bank), the concentration of structural
power in the hands of 'developed', creditor countries means that more
accountability translates as more accountability to the developed, creditor
countries, not to the 'developing', borrower countries. Institutionalizing more
accountability is a way of undercutting the demands from the developing countries
45 Professor of Political Economy, London School of Economics; author of 'Greening the
Bank. The Struggle Over the Environment, 1970-1995', in D. Kapur, J. Lewis, R. Webb
(eds.), The World Bank: Its First Half Century, vol. 2, Washington DC: Brookings.
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for an increased role in the governance of the organizations, and reining in any
expansion of the organizations' autonomy - autonomy from the preferences of the
Northern member states, something the Northern states are determined to prevent.
Since the Northern member states know that they will never depend on either the
Fund or the Bank, their dominance gives them scope for opportunism and
carelessness in the conditions they require others to meet. The accountability
mechanisms being proposed do not begin to address this problem.
Inapplicability of Bradlow's Accountability Model
Bradlow was a key architect of the World Bank's Inspection Panel, and his
argument for the Fund applies much the same underlying model of accountability.
But it is not clear that a model designed for a project-based organization is
appropriate for a program-based organization. Fund programs have
macroeconomic targets and conditions, and it would be hard to ascribe specific
harm from the general provisions of Fund programs - which is feasible, in
principle, in the case of projects that affect a specific set of people (the people to be
moved from a coming reservoir, for example). Then there is the 'agency' problem
in the form of the slippage between the Fund's program intentions and the specific
steps taken by the national government to implement them; which again
complicates the judgement of Fund accountability.
The Problem of Asymmetrical Accountability
The Fund should be more accountable to whom? The organization is in effect run
by a condominium of a small group of states, ranging in number from one (G-l),
the United States, to seven (G-7). They set the rules and decide what the Fund will
do in crises, such as the Asian crisis of 1997-98. On the other hand, the Fund's
clients are the developing countries, which operate primarily in the status of
petitioners for loans and easy conditions.
In the present power structure, it is difficult to see how proposals for more
accountability would not mean, in effect, more accountable to the US above all
(the US Treasury, Congress, and US-based NGOs). This might erode rather than
strengthen the Fund's legitimacy, at least in the developing world. It is going to be
a long time before the US and the rest of the G-7 are willing to dilute their
dominance and give more influence to representatives of states who know that their
own state might someday have to follow the rules they are setting for others.
When some developing country representatives began to press the issue of
increasing the voting share of developing countries in the boards of the Bank and
the Fund in 2003, the response of the US Executive Director was sharp. 'We reject
the proposal to increase the number of basic votes ... The increase in developing
countries' share of votes ... would not be material [because of the informal custom
of making decisions on a consensus basis ...], would do more harm than good and,
in our view, would be inconsistent with the principle that country shares in the IFIs
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[International Financial Institutions] should reflect relative economic weights in
the world economy ... Giving population and other factors a weight in voting
strength would create a radically different, less desirable and non-financial
structure for the Bank'.46
In practice, more Fund accountability would translate into more
accountability to Western NGO watchdogs (as well as G-7 governments). This
raises the separate question of how to make the exploding sector of watchdog
NGOs more accountable. Some do not disclose their financing, or set policy
through some explicit process of debating the views of members, or have members
at all, and their claim to be acting in the best interest of those for whom they claim
to speak rests on uncertain foundations. In American political culture it is a matter
for outrage when important decisions are made in a way that excludes any affected
interest group, and the fragmentation of public power provides ample access points
through which even small NGOs with a foundation grant and catchy name can
claim a voice. Hence all the attention is on the accountability of public entities, not
on that of the watchdogs whose virtue is taken for granted.
Who Sets the Content of the 'Formal and Comprehensive' Operational
Policies and Procedures, and What Incentive Do They Have to Recognise
Varying Capacities and Preferences Among the Borrower States?
Bradlow emphasises the need for explicit rule-making procedures so that insiders
and outsiders know exactly how its policies and procedures are developed. Making
the procedures explicit and public will benefit especially the weaker member
states, he implies, which become less subject to the covertly-pressed self-interested
demands of the stronger. Perhaps; but in the present power structures the content of
the additional policies and procedures may only serve to strengthen the dominance
of the G-7.
The existing asymmetry of power creates what could be called a 'moral
hazard' problem in Fund governance (and equally in World Bank governance).47
'Moral hazard' handicaps the Fund's ability to advance a common good whose
characteristics are defined by debate between state representatives on the Fund's
board of directors. First, the G-7 set standards for others knowing they will not
have to meet the same standards. Second, the G-7 often insist that the Fund require
developing countries to act in ways that clearly advance G-7 interests but less
clearly advance the developing countries' interests.48
46 Carole Brookins, 'Enhancing the Voice of Developing and Transition Countries at the
World Bank', EDS2003-0389, Office of the US Executive Director, World Bank, 20 June
2003.
47 'Moral hazard' comes from the economics of insurance, where it refers to the tendency of
insurance to generate carelessness. I use the term in an extended sense.
48 For a case study of malign Fund pressure on Ethiopia to open its capital account -
strongly backed by the US Treasury - see Wade, 'Capital and Revenge: the IMF and
Ethiopia', Challenge, September/October 2001, pp. 67-75. Much of the Fund's intervention
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For example, the G-7 are likely to set rules and requirements that err on
the side of 'international best practice', making no allowance for the range of state
capacities that the Fund has to deal with. This then opens up unlimited
opportunities for critics of the Fund (think US Congress) and of a particular Fund
member (think China), to attack the Fund and indirectly the member government
for failure to comply, while overlooking similar lapses on the part of states that are
important for US strategic objectives at the time (think Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Jordan).
This, at any rate, has been the case in the World Bank. Consider the
Bank's Qinghai project, prepared in the mid to late 1990s.49 The Qinghai project
became the subject of an 'NGO swarm' in 1999-2000, and the swarm was
successful in getting the Bank to withdraw from the project (formally, in getting
the Chinese government to withdraw it from the Bank).
Qinghai province is about the poorest in China, and its provincial
administration had never done a World Bank project before. The project consisted
of a small irrigation dam and canal, and voluntary settlement on new irrigation
farms of some 60,000 dirt-poor people from the eastern part of the same province.
The provincial administration was determined to do the environmental assessment
largely with its own staff guided by a World Bank consultant. The US NGOs
which led the campaign against the project attacked the environmental assessment
as third rate, ignoring the point about local learning and also ignoring that no one
was able to point to serious environmental dangers likely to be realized if the
project went ahead. (Not even the very critical Inspection Panel Report could point
to likely serious dangers, as distinct from procedural flaws in the environmental
assessment.)
The NGO critics - boosted by Congressional members delighted to use
the opportunity to bash the Bank, foreign aid, and China all at the same time - took
for granted that an environmental assessment, anywhere, had to be done to
'international standards' as defined by the (Western) international community of
environmental assessors. They ignored the difference between China, trying to
ensure that these skills are domesticated, and Indonesia, which has produced
world-class environmental assessments for many Bank projects over many years
and still has hardly a single citizen able to do an environmental assessment unaided
by foreign experts because the ones for the Bank were done by flown-in
consultants.
in the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 is open to the same interpretation. See Paul Blustein
(2001) The Chastening: Inside The Crisis That Rocked the Global Financial System and
Humbled the IMF, Public Affairs Books, New York.
49 The Qinghai project was in Qinghai province (next to Tibet), and it formed one of three
provincial components of the China Western Poverty Reduction Project. My remarks about
the Qinghai investigation by the Bank's Inspection Panel are based on work as a consultant
to the Panel in the Qinghai investigation, from October to December 1999, and on following
the case subsequently to the Chinese government's withdrawal of it from the Bank in July
2000. My task was to write a report to the Panel about how the project had been prepared
inside the Bank. I came to very different conclusions about the Bank's role in the project to
those reached by the Panel.
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Those who press for tighter IMF accountability, then, have to address the
question of how to ensure that the formal and comprehensive operational policies
and procedures adopted by the Fund are indeed flexible enough to avoid providing
an almost guaranteed margin of non-compliance for NGO and US Congressional
critics to mount campaigns against the Fund, and make it ever more responsive to
the preferences of the US government.
As another illustration of the problem of asymmetrical accountability,
consider the case of the Fund's conditions on its loans. The number of conditions
multiplied from an average of around eight 'performance criteria' per loan during
the 1980s to some 26 during the 1990s.50 Of course, the Fund's staff and
management are aware that the multiplication of conditions on loans can have
diminishing returns and undermine the effectiveness of conditionality. The recent
Guidelines on Conditionality call for streamlining the conditions to those essential
to the program; and there has indeed been some reduction latterly. But the
watchdogs tend to want more conditions, seeing them as protection against the
waste of taxpayers' money. Which NGOs, which Congressional bodies, are going
to complain about the Fund's failure to comply with its own streamlining
guidelines? The recent stand-by arrangement with Turkey had about 100 structural
benchmarks and conditions.
How to Ensure the Independence and Legitimacy of the Ombudsman?
The ombudsman has to be seen to be independent from the board and the
management - and also from NGO and Congressional watchdogs. This raises
difficult issues of organisational design.
Consider the World Bank's 'independent' Inspection Panel.51 Its existence
and mandate has been the most persistently divisive issue on the board of the Bank
since its creation in 1993, with the US and a few other non-borrower countries
strongly in favour and virtually all developing countries against. The Panel's
creation owes everything to US NGOs and the US Congress (though Bradlow and
some other academic lawyers had key roles in formulating the idea).
The Panel has accordingly been highly responsive to the preferences of
NGOs, because they are its main support base. It needs to score 'knock outs' from
time to time to keep them on side. On the other hand, the Bank's board has for the
most part taken a lackadaisical attitude to the question of who the President
50 Devesh Kapur (2001) 'Expansive Agendas and Weak Instruments: Governance Related
Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions', Journal of Policy Reform 4(3);
Ngaire Woods (2002) 'Global Governance and the Role of Institutions', in Governing
Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, eds. David Held and Andrew
McGrew, Cambridge: Polity.
51 For background on the World Bank's Inspection Panel and an assessment of its
effectiveness see Jonathan Fox, 'The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Limits of
Accountability', in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds.) (2002) Reinventing the World
Bank, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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nominates as Panel members (the board is meant to have a co-equal role in the
selection). The President, needing to keep enough NGOs inside the tent, is
responsive to the personnel preferences of NGOs.
No surprise then that for much of its history the Panel has had a
predominance of members who are out 'to get the Bank'. It has operated 'Star
Chamber' procedures of interrogation of Bank staff. There has developed a
syndrome of mistrust between it and Bank staff- a syndrome in the sense that the
behaviour of each side merely confirms the negative expectations of the other. In
particular, Bank staff respond to the threat of the Panel by becoming highly risk-
averse, avoiding projects of the kind that might attract an investigation, and tying
the Bank up in endless paperwork responding to the Panel's enquiries. This
response has raised questions in the eyes of borrower governments about the
Bank's overall benefit to them.
Bradlow recommends for the Fund an ombudsman, not an inspection
panel. One of the important differences is that the Bank's Panel is formally limited
largely to the function of 'compliance review', reflecting the hostility of the
developing country Executive Directors to its very existence. The Fund's
ombudsman, in Bradlow's proposal, would also be permitted to engage in
'problem solving' and in 'learning lessons'. This may well soften the pressures for
it to become, like the Inspection Panel, prosecutor, judge and jury all in one.
However the danger remains - even with an ombudsman rather than an
inspection panel - of a syndrome of mistrust developing between ombudsman and
IMF staff. This is because the Fund and the ombudsman operate within the
mistrust-hardening assumptions of American political culture.
The culture assumes, first, antagonistic relations between regulators and
regulatees. It assumes, second, a punishment-based notion of accountability, such
that 'no punishment, no accountability'. This is much more of an American notion
of accountability than a European or Japanese one, and the American NGOs who
shape the thinking of the Bank's Inspection Panel take it as obviously true that
non-compliance implies that someone is to blame. Panel members have in the past
pointed to specific Bank staff as culpable (in informal discussions with NGOs and
management, though not in Panel reports), and supported NGO leaders in their
lobbying of senior management to have those staff members punished. Not
surprisingly the panellists limit their pointing to lower-level operational staff, never
to senior management, as though the foot-soldiers are to be blamed for fighting
wars.
The third assumption of US political culture is 'multilateralism at our
convenience', meaning 'we will cooperate with other nations in multilateral
organizations provided they do what we want'.
This multilateralism of convenience plus the other two assumptions were
all on display in the behaviour of the US Congress after the board of the Bank
voted to allow the Qinghai component to be put on hold while the Inspection Panel
did an investigation, against the demand of the US that the Bank withdraw
immediately. In high indignation the Senate voted to cut the US appropriation for
IDA (the Bank's soft loan fund) from US$803 million to US$785 million; the
House voted to cut the contribution to US$576. Representative Christopher Cox
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presented a bill which among many other punitive clauses required automatic cuts
in US payments to IDA 'if the institution has not developed and implemented a
'pay-for-performance policy' which requires salary or pay reduction, or
termination of employment, for any employee of the institution who is involved in
the preparation, appraisal, or implementation of any project or activity which, if
conducted, would violate any environmental or social policy of the World Bank
group'.52 The bill was not passed, but it illustrates the spirit towards multilateral
organizations prevalent in the US legislature. No other legislature in the world
presumes that it is entitled to dictate what a multilateral organization does.
The danger, then, is that the US's dominance of the Fund - and the
assumptions it brings to that dominance - would push the ombudsman to interact
with the Fund in a way that generates a syndrome of mistrust, as has happened in
the Bank, resulting in more paperwork, more caution, and less flexibility in the
relation of the Fund with members.
On the other hand, more public disclosure of what the Fund has required
of a borrower, and the justification, would surely be a good thing. It might check
the kind of abuse of Fund authority shown in the Fund's dealings with Ethiopia,
referred to earlier. If the Fund had had to justify openly why it was refusing to
extend Ethiopia's eligibility for the Extended Structural Adjustment Program (and
hence for cheaper Fund credits) until the government agreed to open the capital
account, even though Ethiopia had met the other conditions, it probably would not
have been so silly. More open disclosure of the reasons for the terms and
conditions of Fund loans to specific borrowers, combined with an institutional
commitment on the part of managers to learn from the evaluations of the
Independent Evaluation Office, may together address one of the Fund's biggest
weaknesses, the lack of incentive on managers and staff to learn from experiences,
especially failures, and to take risks in doing things differently. The big question
about Bradlow's proposal is whether his additional elements would help more than
they hinder.
52 Cox bill to 106th Congress, First Session, draft dated 17 September 1999, sec. 1308,
emphasis added.
Conclusion
Reform must be multidimensional. There is no one silver bullet or initiative that
responds to the several legitimate concerns about the accountability of the IMF.
Reform must extend beyond the composition of the Executive Board. The 'don't
fight with the cook' and 'Yes, Minister' syndromes lead some to believe that
Executive Directors cannot ever on their own hold staff to account. Efforts must be
focused inside the organization. One priority is to diversify staff recruitment. This
must precede what should also be priority efforts for more provision for outside
voices - to ensure there are staff inside that will understand outside voices.
Effective accountability requires facts - more 'virtuous circle' forecasts, risk
analysis, monitoring and evaluation of results. There is merit in the proposal for
establishing an independent think-tank in Washington to assist staff of developing
countries to increase the effectiveness of their participation in the IMF. Perhaps the
example of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law is a departure point for its design. In
line with the view that to increase effectiveness, it is in the interest of all that more
voices are heard, there is minimum downside to establishing an ombudsman. If
nothing else is done, the Independent Evaluation Office should be strengthened,
with an increase to its currently very modest resources.
Of the various ideas and recommendations presented, we believe highest
priority should be given to modernization of quotas. Who sits at the table is of
critical symbolic and substantive importance. The answer is not to increase the size
of the board, nor to remove the creditor majority. The Europeans have it within
their power to break the impasse. Of all the inexplicable dimensions in the IMF,
the most inexplicable is the European grip on seats (6 out of 24, not counting the
Spanish or Swiss constituency). The six Europeans (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have about 30 per cent of the
voting shares.
If Belgian, Dutch and Swiss actions in the IMF were consistent with their
rhetoric and their well-deserved reputation for international development good
works, they would unilaterally cede their quota and Executive Board seats. 'Jubilee
2000'-type lobbying and public pressure should not have to be brought to bear on
Belgium the Netherlands and Switzerland to yield their Executive Board seats to
more populous, bigger countries. The way forward is to redefine the quota
allocation formula to target decreases for Belgium (5.14 per cent) and the
Netherlands (4.85 per cent), and Switzerland (2.85 per cent), who together in sum
have shares larger than China, India, Nigeria and Brazil combined. An approach
can be devised to reallocate quota, with developing and emerging countries paying
for their increased shares. Imagine the impact if enlightened Belgians, Dutch and
Swiss took the lead.
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